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**THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE
WORLD WAR**

LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Naval History of the World War

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1914—1915

BY

THOMAS G. FROTHINGHAM

CAPTAIN U. S. R.

With Maps and Diagrams



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**THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE
WORLD WAR**

CHAPTER I

THE GERMAN "DRY-LAND" PLAN OF WAR

(See Map at page 16)

IN any work on the naval operations of the World War, it should be stated at once that the great German offensive of 1914 must be studied as an attempt to win a quick victory on land before Sea Power was given time to influence the result; in the words of Falkenhayn,¹ the German "hope of forcing a decision by overthrowing our enemies by a few great blows, the product of an extreme concentration of effort and complete disregard of all secondary considerations."

This fact has been conclusively established by the bitter complaint of Admiral Tirpitz, the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Administration: "At the outbreak of the war I was surprised to learn that the Navy's plan of operations, which had been withheld from me, had not been arranged in advance with the Army. The Army based itself on the view, quite comprehensible from its standpoint, that the war at sea, and indeed the whole campaign against England, was merely a secondary matter. Steps could have been taken before the war, under the control of the Chancellor, to draw up a single plan for a war on three fronts² or a world war;

¹ It has become the custom, even in books of German origin, to give the names Bismarck, Moltke, Hindenburg, and the like, without the prefix "von." To secure uniformity in a book of this nature, this practice will be followed in the case of all German names.

² The German military plan of 1914 was described as "a war on two fronts" by Bethmann-Hollweg.

but, as I have already stated, no such steps had been taken.”¹

All the volumes that can be written on the naval strategy of the World War will not be able to add anything to this unmistakable statement of the real situation. To understand this utter failure on the part of the Germans to prepare in advance for an aggressive use of the naval arm, it is only necessary to realize the strange, abnormal development of Germany in the forty years before the World War, and the resultant military régime, which had assumed control of all the nation's accumulated forces.

The impetus of the united strength of the German Empire, evolved from the War of 1870, had never been appreciated by outside nations. For Germans the War of 1870 had become their text and their inspiration.² They had made it the foundation of their national structure. The following generations of Germans modeled the life of Germany, military, civic, commercial, scientific, and social, on the efficiency of the War of 1870. Their industries were shaped in the same mould, and their expanding foreign trade was so well organized that the Germans in the markets of the world were like invading armies.

This all-pervading system had also inevitably shaped the German ideals and the German philosophies.³ It was maintained that this German Kultur was the strongest force in the world. This doctrine was preached with a fanatical contempt for weaker nations and all other modes of living. From these convictions had

¹ Admiral Tirpitz: "My Memoirs."

² "Those who had behind them the glories of 1870." — Bethmann-Hollweg.

³ The cult of Nietzsche, Treitschke, etc.

grown a self-centred and self-justified German national ambition, which became a most dangerous menace to the world, after Germany had been allowed to gain strength and to muster all the resources of this system for an effort to gain dominion by arms.

After the War of 1870 Germany had steadily gained power, under the shrewd policies of Bismarck, who skilfully took advantage of the enmity between Great Britain and Russia at the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, and made Germany a dominating power in Europe at the Congress of Berlin (1878), at which the treaties were drawn up after that war. In 1879 the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary had been made, which became the Triple Alliance when joined by Italy. But Great Britain was influenced by anti-Russian policies, and in fact had even fostered the growth of Germany as a buffer against Russia.

Taking full advantage of this, Germany was able to cement together the Teutonic countries, under the absolute control of Germany, to gain also dominating influence over Turkey, and to make undisturbed preparations for a German war to gain world power. These plans were made almost openly, and they were accompanied by a campaign of propaganda all over the world, to strengthen German interests. It was not until the last years of the nineteenth century that Great Britain realized this menace — that Germany was not a "friendly nation,"¹ but a hostile rival.

As a result of this dawning knowledge, enmity had replaced friendship between Great Britain and Germany. The natural common interest in curbing this growing danger had drawn Great Britain, France, and Russia

¹ Lord Salisbury.

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together, and these three powers became the Entente Allies. ✓

This course of events had resulted in the European situation at the beginning of the World War in 1914, and this situation was greatly to the disadvantage of the Entente Allies. Germany had been allowed to grow into a power that dominated Central Europe, fully organized for war and almost openly committed to ambitions that aimed at the leadership of the world. The Germans had taken shrewd advantage of the fact that the policies of 1878 had continued to maintain the Turks in their position on the Dardanelles, as a barrier against Russia. With this situation to help them, the Germans, in the years preceding the war, had made successful efforts to place Turkey under the influence of Germany. Germany had far reaching schemes of a *Mittel Europa*, extended through Turkey to the Persian Gulf by means of the Berlin-Bagdad Railway. But always bound up with these plans was the other primary German object, to use this barrier at the Dardanelles as a means of separating Russia from France and Great Britain. Pre-war policies had also created a situation that gave Germany naval control of the Baltic Sea at the beginning of the war. Consequently, from the start, the Russians were shut off from the seas to so great an extent that their enormous military man-power could not be at full strength when Russia fought in the war as one of the Entente Allies.

The Balkan Slav States had been split up by carefully fostered jealousies, and there was no possibility of their uniting against the Central Powers. As for Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance, it was known that the innate hostility of the Italians to the Austrians

would prevent Italy from casting her lot with Austria-Hungary; yet it was also known that Italy would not declare war against Germany at the outbreak of hostilities. The European field was thus clear for the successive German attacks upon the nations of the Entente Allies, without danger of military interference by other nations.

It has been necessary to trace briefly this array of the opposing nations, because the military and naval situation was a direct consequence, and was correspondingly favorable for the Central Powers. The outstanding military advantage in the European situation was the ideal central position of the Teutonic allies for delivering attacks upon separated enemies.¹ All the road and railway transportation had been carefully prepared for this purpose, and the value of this means of disposing the Austro-German forces cannot be stated too strongly. Not only could troops be shifted with astonishing rapidity from one part of a line of operations to another, but they could be transported from one front to another in a time that would have been thought impossible before the war.² Throughout the World War, it must be kept in mind, this element of interior communications multiplied the effectiveness of the forces of the Central Powers.

With these strong military factors in favor of the Central Powers, the German General Staff could be sure that, at the outbreak of war, there would be a

¹ "At present Germany and Austria-Hungary have the same advantage of central and concentrated positions against the Triple Entente — Russia, France, and Great Britain." — Admiral Mahan.

² An American Army observer in Germany, Col. S. G. Shartle, U.S.A., stated that a complete division could be transported from one front to another in a week, including the entraining and detraining.

correspondingly disadvantageous situation against the Entente Allies. As Russia was shut off from the waterways by the conditions at the Dardanelles and in the Baltic, there was practically no communication between the East and the West. This meant that, in a military sense, Russia would be altogether separated from France and Great Britain. Consequently there would be an isolated enemy force on the east of the Central Powers, and another isolated enemy force on the west.

These were unquestionably great military advantages. In fact, the Germans had built the most remarkable military structure that the world has ever seen. But they had been so absorbed in the military problem that it had pushed aside all other considerations. As a result, the minds of the German leaders had been influenced, even to such an extent that they had been tempted to disregard Sea Power. They had thus allowed themselves to fall into the error of neglecting naval strategy and concentrating all their efforts solely upon the supposedly infallible military plan of the German General Staff, which had been devised to overwhelm the Entente Allies.

This German military plan, matured through years of preparation, was to attack in detail — first France, then Russia.¹ The German military leaders were convinced that a quick decision could be thus obtained. In fact, to quote again from Falkenhayn, “the intention of forcing a speedy decision” had been “the foundation of the German plan of campaign.” The alternative of an attack first against Russia had been rejected, as implying

¹ “Their plan was a quick and forcible offensive to the West, during which the defensive positions of the German troops in the East would develop into what would be, after the expected success in the West, an offensive against Russia on a large scale.” — Bethmann-Hollweg.

too long a war.¹ But, against France, the Germans were convinced that the overwhelming victory of 1870 would be repeated in 1914. So supremely confident were the German leaders of the success of the *coup* they had planned and rehearsed for many years, that their carefully prepared attack was launched against France, in the full assurance that it would win the war before the naval power of the Entente Allies could score against Germany.

This was the reason for the neglect of the Germans to prepare for a full use of the naval arm in their great offensive of 1914. It would be inexplicable otherwise, for, as will be explained, in the decade before the World War the Germans had made great efforts to produce a strong Navy. The German Navy had been built up largely through the skill and energy of Admiral Tirpitz, who constantly urged, without avail, the use of the Navy in conjunction with the Army. Admiral Scheer's comment has emphasized this ignoring of Tirpitz, "who by his outstanding abilities had gained an influence which no naval officer had ever before exercised in the history of our Navy. In war, on the other hand, he had no direct influence on the conduct of operations."²

Consequently, at the outset, the supposedly infallible German Superman must be considered self-convicted of not using all possible means to carry out the German strategy. It was true that preponderance in Sea Power rested with the Entente Allies, and, in view of the primary importance for Germany of the defense of the

¹ "In the assumed military situation, as countless war-games had abundantly demonstrated, an offensive against Russia, with simultaneous operations in the West, implied, as a matter of course, a long war, and was therefore rejected by Count von Schlieffen." — "Ludendorff's Own Story."

² Admiral Scheer: "Germany's High Sea Fleet."

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Baltic Sea, it would have been unjustifiable to risk the German Battle Fleet in an immediate attack upon the superior British Fleet. It was essential that the Germans should defend the Baltic, to shut Russia off from overseas communication by that vital route; and the loss of the German Battle Fleet would have implied the loss of control of the Baltic entrance.

But the use, by the Germans, of harassing offensive naval tactics against this stronger enemy would have been altogether a different matter. It is also now evident that the naval situation in 1914 was especially favorable for harassing tactics, with the new great possibilities for the offensive use of submarines and mines as weapons for a weaker navy. But, as will be shown later in this work, the Germans had not even developed these possibilities in their preparations for offensive warfare.

As a result, there was no real use of these means for the obvious missions of the German Navy, in harassing and delaying the transportation of troops and supplies from Great Britain to France, and in coöperating with the German armies in closing the Channel Ports, as urged by Tirpitz at the beginning of the war.¹ Important as would have been the use of the German Navy in harassing tactics for these objects, there was another opportunity for the German naval forces in threats and diversions against Great Britain.

It is now known that in 1914 there was actually a state of mind in Great Britain which would have favored the success of German naval threats. This was a belief,

¹ "However important a factor in the war England's effort might be, the best way of neutralizing it would have been the occupation of the French Channel coast." — Admiral Scheer.

which was prevalent among high British officials, in a German plan to invade Great Britain,¹ and this would have added to the effect of threats of German naval activities.

Instead of anything of the kind, as a matter of fact, there was no activity on the part of the German Navy that could be called harassing tactics. The German naval forces only undertook scattered forays of no importance. There actually was no serious effort of the German Navy to harass the transportation of the British Expeditionary Force, which was sent to France undisturbed, and was an important factor in the opening campaign and the Battle of the Marne. There was no attempt on the part of the Germans to coördinate their military and naval strategy and seize the Channel Ports when they were at their mercy. Nor was there any German naval activity that would make the deterrent threat of a German invasion of Great Britain.

These facts are stated at the outset, to fix in the reader's mind the fundamental defect of the German strategy of 1914 in not making use of both the military and the naval means to gain the objective. The responsibility for this glaring error cannot be shifted from the régime in the German Great General Staff of 1914, which had acquired controlling power,² to the exclusion of naval matters as "secondary."³

The causes for this assumption of control by the ruling régime in the German General Staff had been

¹ "This fear of invasion, which Kitchener shared." — Lord Sydenham.

² "In 1870-71 the Navy was of no account. The General Staff thus assumed a position of immense power and, with the Kaiser's backing, did what it liked." — Lord Sydenham.

³ The term used by both Tirpitz in complaint and Falkenhayn in explanation.

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accumulating through the long years of preparation for the great German assault.

A hierarchy had become established in the German General Staff, which was supposed to transmit the organization of 1870, with the accumulation of all the most advanced military science of the succeeding years. Yet all of this knowledge had become tied to the "Schlieffen plan of war." Ludendorff wrote: "The plan of campaign, which was inaugurated in August, 1914, was conceived by General Count von Schlieffen, one of the greatest soldiers that ever lived." This sounded the key-note of the German strategy of 1914 — the fatal defect that the plan of war of 1914 was the plan of war of the year 1906, the end of Schlieffen's service as Chief of the German Great General Staff.

The date of this plan ¹ alone proved that the German General Staff had ceased to be a general staff, in the true sense of the word. Its controlling régime had become absorbed in one idea only, the Schlieffen plan of war. This strategy obsessed the Germans. It was thought to be the heritage of Clausewitz, Moltke, and Schlieffen — infallible and undefeatable. It was this obsession for the predetermined military strategy of 1906,² and the unquestioning faith of the Germans in its infallibility, which pushed the German Navy into the background; and the General Staff of the Moltke of 1914 committed the test of all the years of German preparations to the Army alone.³ The assault on

¹ "His successor, Colonel General von Moltke, adhered to the fundamental ideas of Schlieffen. Thus the beginning of the campaign in the west, in August, 1914, developed in the main in accordance with Schlieffen's views." — Freytag-Loringhoven: "Deductions from the World War."

² "Our military men, so far as I know had for long only one plan of campaign." — Bethmann-Hollweg.

³ "The dry-land point of view of the Army." — Tirpitz.

France in 1914 was, consequently, as much a thing apart from naval strategy as was the onslaught in 1870, which the Germans attempted to duplicate.

The German military preparations had been perfected in 1914 to an astonishing degree, if considered only as machinery. When called upon, the German armies were mobilized in 1914 with the same admirable organization, equipment, and transportation, that signaled the mobilization of 1870. In fact "something like one-and-a-half millions" were at once called into being, to surge across the German frontiers against France in 1914, in contrast to five hundred thousand in 1870.¹

This was a winning military superiority on the left of the French armies, if the Germans had been able to establish immediate destructive contact, which should have been their one strategic object. But the elaborate Schlieffen enveloping movement,² through Belgium,³ failed to impose this necessary destructive contact until the Allies had been given time to gather sufficient forces to fight an equal battle.

The same obsession of the German General Staff which had put aside considerations of naval strategy

¹ "Up to the beginning of the World War, the mobilization of the German forces by rail in 1870 was looked upon as a phenomenal achievement, and rightly so. . . . Nevertheless, at that time less than half a million Germans had to be despatched to the frontier, as compared with something like one-and-a-half millions in the year 1914." — Freytag-Loringhoven: "Deductions from the World War."

² "Before the war the envelopment of one or both of the enemy's wings was considered the decisive form of operation. The real problem of the commander was to bring about strategic envelopment and finally carry it through tactically. We entered the war imbued with these ideas." — Bernhardt: "The War of the Future."

³ "But military opinion held that a condition of success for the western offensive was passage through Belgium." — Bethmann-Hollweg.

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had tied this German plan of war to the machinery of 1906, which was the period when "Verdun and the forts of the Meuse offered too formidable an obstacle."¹ Absorbed in this past doctrine alone, the German General Staff had not been awake to the value of developing the full use of the new Teutonic high-angle fire artillery, which made all formal fortresses helpless in the World War.² Failure to make full use of this new overpowering weapon brought delays, and the element of *time*, given to the enemy, lost the offensive for the Germans in the West. At the same stage, contrary to all the calculations of the German General Staff, the Russians had proved too strong for the Austro-Hungarians in the East. Thus in six weeks the Germans had frittered away their long-prepared initial superiority.

On the part of the Germans, this campaign had been fought as if there were no such factor in war as Sea Power, the German General Staff having taken the offensive with the over-confident assumption that a quick victory was a certainty. But, even in this short time, there were two notable examples of the folly of ignoring the naval arm.

Naval control of the waterways had brought the British Expeditionary Force to France, and had thus put two army corps and a cavalry division into the Allied battle-line, in addition to the troops transported by sea from Africa to France. In the German calculations, of course, this was not held to be a great factor. But the reader must bear in mind, at this stage, that the fate of the initial campaign swayed in a close bal-

¹ Stein: "A War Minister and His Work."

² "But the day of the ring fortress is past. It cannot stand against modern artillery and its scale of munitionment." — Ludendorff.

ance. The narrow margin of final defeat made every factor of importance. The Germans, on their part, have made an excuse for their defeat the fact that two army corps and a cavalry division were diverted from the crisis of the campaign as a reinforcement against the Russian invasion of East Prussia.¹ The fact that Sea Power had added exactly this amount to the ranks of their enemies, by the British Expeditionary Force alone, must be considered equally important, following the German line of argument.

The other outstanding element, relating to Sea Power in this short campaign, should also be emphasized. This was the failure of the Germans to seize the Channel coast, at the critical time in the invasion of France when it was at their mercy to the line of the Somme. At this very time the Germans had failed to impose destructive contact upon the French Armies. Afterwards, in the fall of 1914, when it was too late, the Germans fought in vain for this important strip of coast; but in their first great offensive they were so absorbed in their preordained plan that they swung toward Paris, blind to all other objectives.² The loss of this French strip of the Channel coast would have done far reaching damage to the cause of the Entente Allies, as it would have been a serious restriction upon Sea Power. But all this was not included in the German prewar plans, in the German concentration of effort on the military campaign alone.

¹ " . . . the withdrawal of the Guard Reserve Corps and the XI Army Corps had made itself felt with fatal results." — Ludendorff.

² "So long as the Army hoped to capture Paris, I waited for the coast to fall into our hands of itself. I leave undiscussed the question whether it would not have been right to treat the coast as the objective from the start." — Tirpitz: "My Memoirs."

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The collapse of this German military "dry-land" ¹ offensive in September, 1914, was so absolutely beyond recovery, that it became a clear-cut episode set apart from the rest of the long World War. It is idle to speculate on the results, if it had succeeded, and the fact that it nearly won victory only emphasized the danger of the initial German military superiority, if the best use had at once been made of its strength. With its failure fell the régime of 1914 in the German Great General Staff. The Chief-of-Staff, Moltke, broke down after the Battle of the Marne, and General Falkenhayn succeeded him on September 14, 1914. This change was kept secret to prevent "further ostensible proof of the completeness of the victory obtained on the Marne." ²

Nothing can be added to this self-evident admission by Falkenhayn of such utter defeat that it had to be kept secret from the German Army and the German people. Then and there the decision was forced, that, instead of a quick overwhelming victory by a well prepared military power, the World War would be a long hard struggle for supremacy. From that time the German veil of delusion was torn away, and Germany faced the relentless strength of Sea Power, which was destined to be the greatest factor in German defeat.

¹ Tirpitz.

² Falkenhayn: "The German General Staff and its Decisions."

I. EUROPEAN SITUATION AT OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR, 1914

(This map is diagrammatic only)

THE CENTRAL POWERS

- (A) German long planned military offensive, to overwhelm France by an enveloping movement through neutral Belgium and Luxemburg.
- Russia to be contained by small forces in East Prussia (B) and by Austro-Hungarian armies (C).
- (D) German main naval forces in defensive position at Double Base, with no offensive naval plans in combination with armies.

THE ENTENTE ALLIES

- (1) French military concentration, with a counter offensive planned in Alsace-Lorraine.
- (2) Communication between Great Britain and France conceded by German naval apathy.
- (3) British main naval forces concentrated to contain the German Fleet.

Unexpected prompt mobilization of Russian Armies, with offensives in East Prussia (4) and against Austria-Hungary (5).

Thus the Central Powers trusted to the military plan of Germany alone to overwhelm first France, then Russia.

On the other hand, the naval strategy of the Entente Allies did not include gaining control of the Baltic (6) and Dardanelles (7), which left Russia cut off from France and Great Britain.



CHAPTER II

CONTROL OF THE SEAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD WAR

AS the Germans had thus failed to make any aggressive naval preparations, but had concentrated all their energies upon the unsuccessful military plan of the German General Staff, Sea Power in the hands of the Entente Allies became a controlling force at the very beginning of the World War. This was not in the least affected by the isolated episode of the great "dry-land" military assault upon France, and the broad strategic situation, which had been thus created at the outset in 1914, should be summed up at this time.

The error of the German military leaders, in not combining the efforts of their Army and Navy, had, as a matter of cause and effect, conceded in advance to the Entente Allies this outstanding advantage of Sea Power. The die was cast on the military field of battle alone, as has been described, and Germany was left without recourse against Sea Power. As a consequence of this failure of the Germans to disturb the prewar naval situation, the Entente Allies, from conditions established before the beginning of the war, possessed so great a superiority in naval strength that it was not overturned, or seriously endangered, until the Germans had at last waked to the possibilities of the naval arm, culminating in the destructive campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917. This broad situation in 1914 defined the naval strategy of the Entente Allies upon

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equally broad lines, and correspondingly limited the possible objectives of the Central Powers. The great new disturbing factors in naval warfare had not been developed by the Germans at the beginning, but were a gradual development of years of warfare. As a natural result of all this, there was a marked contrast between the opportunities offered to each side, at the beginning of the war, for the use of naval forces.

Thus the Entente Allies, in their strategic use of Sea Power; were, from the first, enabled to aim at control of the seas by their naval forces for their own purposes, and they were also enabled to enforce the exclusion of the Central Powers from the use of the seas. This meant that the Entente Allies aimed to make the waterways of the world their secure means for transporting men and supplies, to maintain their armies, their peoples, and their industries; and also to shut off the Central Powers from the use of these invaluable means of carrying on war.

On the other hand, the strategic objectives of the Central Powers in naval warfare were necessarily limited by this conceded superiority of their enemies. Consequently, the only possible Teutonic offensive naval strategy, at the beginning, may be described as an effort to harass and impair the existing Allied control of the seas.

After the World War has been fought, looking backward and realizing the extent to which the later use of submarines and mines upset former ideas of naval warfare, and also remembering the prewar reputation of the Germans as masters of warfare, it is astonishing that the initial naval problem of the Entente Allies was so simple. The obliteration of the human element by the

German military machine was the only thing that prevented danger of an unexpected naval overturn.

As a matter of fact, on account of the failure of the Germans to foresee these new possibilities of upsetting the existing naval conditions, there was no real chance of a naval overturn in 1914, and the naval situation at the start of the World War was cast in the conventional mould, with all its proportions conceded beforehand. Although, at first, there was a great deal of doubt and anxiety as to what might happen, these undisturbed conditions greatly simplified the task of the British Navy, which remained the dominating force on the seas, as in former years, and the main reliance of the naval power of the Entente Allies. For a war that was destined to involve all the great powers of the world, the situation of the opposing battle fleets was free from complications and uncertainties.¹ In the decade before the World War, which was a period of growing hostility, Germany had been openly building a fleet of battleships against Great Britain. So evident was this, that Great Britain had not only built battleships in competition with Germany, but had also adopted a changed naval policy by which these British battleships were to be concentrated against the German battleships in the North Sea.

This had been made possible by turning over the Mediterranean to the French Navy, which at the outbreak of war had all its Battle Fleet in that area.² This

¹ "The case of a war with Germany presented no such complication. Seeing that her whole Battle Fleet was concentrated in the North Sea, the conditions permitted us a complete counter-concentration in the new position." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² "All that remained at the northern bases was their 2d Cruiser Squadron, composed of six 'Gloires,' an old type of armored cruiser, and the flotillas

policy had ensured a safe protection by the French fleet against the other naval forces of the Central Powers, and had left the British Battle Fleet free to concentrate against the German Battle Fleet. To preserve the "naval tradition" ¹ of the British Mediterranean Fleet, a British Mediterranean Squadron was formed of "four battle cruisers, our four best heavy cruisers, and four light cruisers, but even this force was regarded only as provisional till the development of our building program permitted more to be done." ²

With this policy in effect in 1914, there was absence of the uncertain problems of former naval wars as to the battle fleets, and consequently a naval strategic situation existed, as to the main forces, that was baldly simple in its conditions.

The other wide areas of the waterways of the world were thus outside the operations of the battle fleets, and these areas were to be protected by British cruiser forces. As described by Sir Julian Corbett, "In this way the vast extent of the Seven Seas was occupied in the traditional manner, not by patrolling the trade routes, but by guarding in such force as our resources permitted the main focal areas where they converged, and where the enemy's commerce destroyers were most likely to be attracted and had the only chance of making a serious impression upon the whole volume of trade."

This British policy of guarding the focal areas of the seas was in accordance with their naval tradition; and it must be kept in mind that protecting these wide areas of

which were to cooperate with the British in the combined defense of the channel." — Sir Julian Corbett.

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

waterways was most important for Great Britain, both for the physical needs of the Empire and for the moral effect upon its people.

It was true that, as another result of the prewar apathy of the Germans in naval preparations, the pre-supposed German plan of organized commerce destroying, which was thus provided for by the British Navy, did not exist. It was also true that this British naval strategy, of guarding the areas of the seas instead of policing the outlying German cruisers themselves, left these German cruisers footloose to do a lot of harm, as will be shown in the following accounts of naval operations. But there was nothing that threatened any far reaching effect upon the course of the war. For a short time there was an unfavorable situation in the Pacific, and a few of the German cruisers also made raids upon commerce — but the results for the Germans, as actual influences upon the World War, were inconsiderable.

Consequently, it is the only true description of the naval situation in 1914, to state that naval supremacy was conceded by the Germans to the Entente Allies. With the failure of the German attempt to win a quick decision by military means alone, there was no possibility of escaping this constricting force of Sea Power, which was, from this time, working against the Central Powers in warfare.

The initial assault of the military power of Germany had spent its force without result, but its great proportions fixed the scale of the war of a magnitude undreamed before. This meant inevitably a long war that would call upon the man-power of the nations to exhaustion. Thus, from the first, the World War became an unending effort to maintain and strengthen these huge

armies in the long drawn struggle, each side attempting to gain a superiority that would win a decision, and all the nations involved in expenditures of resources that were unprecedented. Armies in the battlefields are only maintained in their positions by being replenished with men and supplied with material. Even when recruits do not have to be transported by sea, the sea is the one greatest means of moving supplies. This fundamental condition of warfare was made all the more important by the increased drain upon the resources of nations, and the effect of Sea Power was correspondingly increased.

On the one hand, the Entente Allies, by their conceded control of the waterways of the world, were, from the start, enabled to move men and supplies for their armies by means of these greatest common carriers of all the ages. By the same means they could supply and maintain their nations and their industries. More than this, they had access to their own outlying dominions and colonies, and also access to the neutral nations, to use all the advantages of agricultural and producing countries, which had cheap labor and were free from war conditions.

On the other hand, the Central Powers were shut off from these advantages. Germany was even cut off from her Colonies, all of which were doomed to fall into the hands of the enemy.¹ It is true that Germany had been made as nearly self-supporting as possible, by intensive cultivation of all her resources; and, as the event proved, she was able to stand a long continued drain upon these resources. But, throughout the war, the Germans were

¹ "The last of the German colonies — German East Africa — has been cleared of the enemy." — War Cabinet Report (1917).

always at the disadvantage of being compelled to exact the utmost from all their own sources of supply. This was always being done with the handicap which came from the fact that Germany was a nation in war conditions, and consequently also compelled to exact the utmost from her man-power for her fighting forces. This double tax, imposed by Sea Power, was more than any people could endure.

These broad underlying conditions must be realized before studying in detail the distribution of the opposing naval forces, and the ensuing initial naval operations. In this way the events of warfare on the seas will keep their true proportions, in relation to the whole of the World War.

CHAPTER III

THE DISTRIBUTION OF NAVAL FORCES

THE diagrammatic map at page 42 shows the widespread influence of Sea Power at the beginning of the World War in 1914. The most notable feature was the situation of the main forces, with the two battle fleets fixed in opposing positions in the North Sea area. In the period of growing hostility before the war, the jealous competition in ship building programs between Great Britain and Germany had almost automatically brought about this result.¹

The contest in building warships was stimulated by "the initiation of the 'Dreadnought' policy in 1905."² This new type was the product of the régime of the energetic Lord Fisher in the British Admiralty. This innovation was not only the idea of the all-big-gun battleship,³ but it also established at once an increased standard of size and power for the battleship, which immediately relegated the predreadnought battleship to the background.⁴ "With sound instinct, Admiral Fisher detected *the* enemy, and he hoped by the rapid building of super-Dreadnoughts to force Germany to

¹ ". . . that drastic revolution in all things Naval which brought 88 per cent of the British Fleet into close proximity with Germany and *made its future battle ground in the North Sea its drill ground.*" — Lord Fisher.

² Lord Sydenham.

³ In fact, the U. S. Navy's design of the all-big-gun battleship *Michigan* antedated the design of the *Dreadnought*.

⁴ ". . . the prevailing idea seemed to be that the science of naval construction demanded a succession of monster ships which would relegate existing battle fleets to the scrap heap." — Lord Sydenham.

deepen the Kiel Canal, while we attained a position of such predominance in capital ships that the German fleet could be attacked and destroyed without difficulty.”¹ Lord Fisher also originated the battle cruiser, another radical change.

But, the fact was, the fresh start offered by the introduction of these new types of capital ship, which had put out of date the superior British Fleet, really gave the German Navy an opportunity to catch up and approach more nearly the strength of the British Navy. With Admiral Tirpitz, a man of similar energy, at the head of the German Navy, the German Reichstag in 1906 was induced to meet this situation by voting “the increased financial means necessitated by the transition to the Dreadnought class . . . and finally, the means had to be voted for the widening of the Kiel Canal which was rendered necessary by this increase in the size of the ships.”² With vast expenditures, Great Britain managed to keep ahead of Germany in this competition in building capital ships — and the result was the production of the two rival battle fleets pitted against one another in the North Sea area.

The abbreviated tables on page 26 show at a glance the comparative strength of the opposing battle fleets at the outbreak of war.

It is evident from these tables that the British Battle Fleet possessed a marked superiority in 1914 over the German Battle Fleet. But, on the other hand, the German Battle Fleet, at the beginning of the World War, was not in the usual predicament of an inferior fleet shut into port by a superior enemy fleet. On the contrary, this main force of the German Navy was greatly

¹ Lord Sydenham.

² Admiral Tirpitz: “My Memoirs.”

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BRITISH BATTLE FLEET		GERMAN BATTLE FLEET	
<i>Dreadnoughts</i>		<i>Dreadnoughts</i>	
2 Iron Dukes	Ten 13.5"	5 Kaisers	Ten 12"
4 King George V }	Ten 13.5"	4 Ostfrieslands	Twelve 12"
4 Orions }	Ten 12"	4 Nassaus	Twelve 11"
2 Colossus }	Ten 12"	<i>Pre-Dreadnoughts</i>	
1 Neptune }	Ten 12"	5 Deutschlands }	Four 11"
3 St. Vincents	Ten 12"	5 Braunschweigs }	
3 Bellerophons	Ten 12"		
1 Dreadnought	Ten 12"		
<i>Pre-Dreadnoughts</i>			
1 Agamemnon	Four 12"		
8 King Edwards	Four 12"		

For detailed statement of Battle Fleets, see Appendix, pages 289 *et seq.*

strengthened by the advantages of the double base of the Kiel Canal and the outpost of the island of Heligoland.

It was an irony of fate that Great Britain allowed Prussia to take Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark in the sixties, and afterwards, in the late eighties, made the mistake of ceding Heligoland to Germany. The harm done by that unfortunate gift of Heligoland cannot be measured. Heligoland had been transformed into a great gun mount, impregnable to attack from the sea, and it was an outwork securely defending the Bight at the North Sea entrance of the Kiel Canal. A study of the map will also show the value to the German Navy of this passage between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.

The Kiel Canal was a military conception, to increase the effectiveness of the German Battle Fleet operating from this double naval base. The Canal had been enlarged to admit the passage of the largest dreadnought of the German Navy, and this work had

been completed only a few months before the outbreak of the war, at a cost nearly 50 per cent greater than the original cost of the Canal. By the use of this just completed passage, the whole German Battle Fleet was assured access to both the North Sea and the Baltic.

So evident was all this, that the German Battle Fleet had been created with a view to operating from these unusually advantageous bases. For this reason, in constructing the German battleships, Admiral Tirpitz was enabled to lay less stress upon radius and habitability — and he could thus concentrate upon his own doctrine: “The supreme quality of a ship is that it should remain afloat. . . . So long as a ship is afloat it retains a certain fighting value and can afterwards be easily repaired.”¹

With this sound doctrine as his basis for German naval construction, Admiral Tirpitz produced a battle fleet of very advanced types, not only in strength of resistance to gunfire but especially in construction to neutralize under-water injury. As a result, Tirpitz was justified by the events in stating: “The buoyancy which was attained by our system stood the test. . . . It was astonishing what our ships could stand in the way of mines and torpedoes without sinking.”² In guns, ammunition, and other material, the German warships were also in advance of the times.³

Consequently, the German Battle Fleet must be considered as unusually strong in material, and especially well adapted for operating from the German naval

¹ Admiral Tirpitz: “My Memoirs.”

² *Ibid.*

³ “The High Seas Fleet was in fact more formidable than it appeared on paper, and Tirpitz believed that numerical inferiority was partly redressed by the superiority of material, to which Admiral Jellicoe has paid tribute.” — Lord Sydenham.

bases, which greatly increased its effectiveness in the North Sea area, where the two rival battle fleets had been fixed in position by the course of events in the decade before the World War.

Lord Sydenham has pointed out that the keen competition between Great Britain and Germany for producing naval material before the war, had done harm to the British Navy in absorbing too much of its energies for material, to the detriment of direction and methods. "For the superior direction at sea, we were singularly ill-equipped. There was no real war staff at the Admiralty until the reorganization in 1918, and for some time naval policy had been dominated by a school which placed material above the study of war and developed tendencies closely resembling those which, at an earlier date, had led to the erection of monumental fortifications in defiance of principles and quite unsuited to the requirements of the strongest naval power."

With these defects existing in the British Navy, the German Navy had the advantage of a high development in direction and methods, as was shown by the events of the war. But, in spite of this, the initial situation in 1914 was much worse for the German Navy, because, after developing the strong material of its Battle Fleet as described, with also due attention to direction and methods, the German Navy had been shouldered aside, on account of the all-absorbing concentration of German war preparation upon the Schlieffen military plan, which excluded naval operations as "secondary." This mania for the military plan alone was a paralyzing blight for the German Battle Fleet that was much more harmful than the questions of doctrine in the British Navy.

The events of the war have clearly shown that there actually were possibilities of disputing the British control of the North Sea area, if the preparations of the Germans had been far seeing enough to devise an offensive use of submarines and mines, with the support of this unexpectedly strong German Battle Fleet operating from the advantageous German bases.

However, nothing of the kind had been planned by the Germans, who were under the domination of the German Great General Staff. It is also now known that Tirpitz, himself, although he had constantly urged the offensive use of the German Battle Fleet, which he had created, was still "waiting"¹ for proof of the value of the submarine. His own positive statement ends any discussion as to the possibilities of such a German offensive: "The question as to how far our submarines were capable of rendering material assistance in the war had not been settled in July, 1914."² With this definite information that before the war the Germans had not realized the offensive power of these new weapons, in addition to the neglect of the German Navy in the plans for war, the chances for a naval overturn in 1914 may be dismissed, as has been stated.

It is now, therefore, evident that there was no question of a dangerous German naval offensive at the beginning of the war, and it followed that the lack of early offensive operations on the part of the main fleets was in favor of the British Navy, and helpful to the Entente Allies. On the other hand, it is difficult to see any opening for an early naval offensive, on the part of

¹ "My tried and trusty method of waiting to prove the military usefulness of a new invention." — Admiral Tirpitz: "My Memoirs."

² Ibid.

the British Navy, that would have had a greater effect upon the crucial initial campaign than the domination of the North Sea area, which was conceded by the Germans at the beginning of the World War. This ensured the command of the waterways and sending the reinforcement of the British Expeditionary Force to France. As the British Navy also had not developed the offensive use of submarines and mines, the possibility of a British harassing offensive in the Baltic, in these first six weeks, may also be dismissed.

Realizing these conditions, it becomes evident that the naval situation in respect to the opposing main forces at the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, was advantageous to the Entente Allies, and a contributing cause to the defeat of the long planned German assault.

In the Mediterranean area there was also no danger of an enemy offensive, as Italy declared neutrality at once (August 3, 1914) and the Austrian fleet in the Adriatic was never a menace to the Entente Allies.¹ "In the Adriatic too was the German battle cruiser *Goeben*,² which during the recent Balkan troubles had been dominating Turkish sentiment at Constantinople, and had just completed a thorough dockyard refit at Pola . . . and the German light cruiser *Breslau*, taking part in an international demonstration in support of the Conference which was sitting at Scutari for the settlement of Albania."³ As there was no danger of an Austrian naval offensive, these two German warships must be looked upon as a proper objective of the British Mediterranean Squadron and the French Fleet. But the French at the same time were engaged in transport-

¹ See Tables of opposing forces in Mediterranean, pages 297 *et seq.*

² Armament: ten 11", six 5.9".

³ Sir Julian Corbett.

ing their African troops across the Mediterranean to France, a most necessary operation in the critical situation of the invasion of France.

The Dardanelles were closed to the Entente Allies by the hostile attitude of Turkey, and the Russian Navy was not to be considered in this situation, "for the reconstruction of her Fleet, which had been taken in hand after the war with Japan, had not yet proceeded far enough to make it an effective factor in the situation. Her Black Sea Fleet for the purpose was off the board."¹

In the Baltic, also, the Russian Navy was weak in 1914. The Russian dreadnoughts had not been completed, and, for the Baltic Fleet,² "their policy was one of concentration in the Gulf of Finland. . . . Except therefore for such influence as the Russian Fleet could exert by forcing the Germans to watch it with a superior force, it could have no effect upon our own disposition."³

In order to understand the dispositions of the outlying naval forces of the Entente Allies, which were for the most part forces of the British Navy, it is necessary to realize that, before the outbreak of war, British information had given warning of danger of an organized German attack upon the trade routes, by means of converting fast German merchant steamers into armed commerce destroyers.⁴ "Other evidence pointing to a

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Predreadnought battleships, *Imperator Pavel I*, *Andrei Pervozvanni* (four 12", fourteen 8"), *Tzesarevitch*, *Slova* (four 12", twenty 6"); cruisers, *Ryurik* (F) (four 10", eight 8", twenty 4.7"); *Gromoboi* (four 8", twenty two 6"), *Bayan*, *Pallada*, *Admiral Makarov* (two 8", eight 6").

³ Sir Julian Corbett.

⁴ ". . . the discovery that the Kaiser Wilhelm II, one of the North German Lloyd vessels, was provided with gun mountings. This German liner had to put into Southampton for repairs after collision in the Channel, and evidence was thus obtained that some German ships, as had been

settled German policy in this respect was reluctantly received — reluctantly, because it pointed to a new danger on the trades route calling for protective measures.”¹

This danger to the shipping of the Entente Allies had seemed so grave, that in March, 1913, the annual statement of the Navy estimates by the First Lord of the Admiralty included the following: “There is now good reason to believe that a considerable number of foreign merchant steamers may be rapidly converted into armed ships by the mounting of guns.”

Archibald Hurd has described this state of mind, which existed at the beginning of the World War: “The possibility of several of the swiftest of the German merchant vessels, their character disguised, breaking out in thick weather, and taking the fullest advantage of the period of darkness, was one that it was impossible to ignore. In the outer seas the danger was far greater, as there were distributed in neutral ports a large number of ships which could be converted into armed vessels for use on the trade routes.”²

Sir Julian Corbett has also emphasized this: “In view of the prevailing naval opinion that the greatest protection would be dealing with enemy auxiliary cruisers of this class, these ships had a special importance. We have already seen how deeply their menace affected our cruiser dispositions in the Atlantic; in the area of the Eastern Fleet the preoccupation was no less insistent.”

But, in common with the neglect of other naval schemes by the Germans, these ideas had not been de-

suspected, were fitted to facilitate conversion on the outbreak of war.” — Archibald Hurd: “The Merchant Navy.”

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

veloped into any organized plan.¹ "The evidence as to the German policy of arming merchant ships on a large scale on the outbreak of war was not confirmed by subsequent experience."² Yet the dread of this supposed menace to commerce was very real in 1914, and it seriously influenced the disposition of British naval forces at the beginning of the World War.

Outside of the area of operations of the main battle fleets, British naval protection was continued by the Second British Fleet of predreadnought battleships, *Lord Nelson* (F) (four 12", ten 9.2"), five "Duncans," eight "Formidables," and the *Vengeance* (each four 12", twelve 6"). Two cruiser squadrons³ had been assigned to this fleet, but they were no part of its war organization, as they were used for more important duties. "In the same way there was nominally attached to it the bulk of the Home Defense Patrol Flotillas. They comprised seven flotilla cruisers, four patrol flotillas and seven flotillas of submarines. Except for the submarines this fleet was not on a war footing, but was manned by what were called 'Active Service Crews,' consisting of all the specialist officers and about three fifths of the full complement of men. They could, however, be ready in a few hours, for 'Balance Crews,' consisting of men going through courses of training, were kept together in various naval barracks ready to

¹ "This unfavorable state of affairs was due to the fact that the German authorities had not yet been able to decide upon the policy of stowing on board a large number of steamers in peace time, the guns and ammunition that would be needed for their conversion, a measure which would have made it possible to exert an effective menace to English commerce simultaneously in widely separated regions of the sea." — "The War at Sea" (German official).

² Archibald Hurd: "The Merchant Navy."

³ The 5th and 6th Cruiser Squadrons.

embark at the shortest notice. As the main function of these battle squadrons was to form the Channel Fleet in immediate proximity to its home ports, no higher degree of readiness was necessary.”¹

“The remainder of the battleships and cruisers still on the active list formed the Third Fleet, which was in effect a ‘Reserve.’ It comprised the 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons — that is five ‘Canopuses’ and nine ‘Majestics,’ with five squadrons of cruisers. They were not in commission, but were distributed in groups in various home ports, and were manned by no more than ‘care and maintenance’ parties.”²

The battleships of the Third Fleet were nearing the end of their usefulness and were only available for subsidiary services. “With the cruisers, however, the case was different. Besides securing the position in Home Waters, the Home Fleet was responsible for commerce protection over all the trade routes in the Atlantic, and it was from the Third Fleet cruisers that the system had to be completed.”³ “During peace we had nothing in the Atlantic except one ship on the South American station, and the 4th Cruiser Squadron, which, as we have seen, was engaged at the moment entirely in the West Indian area for the protection of British interests in Mexico. By the organisation, it will be remembered, it belonged to the First Fleet, and though the intention was that from time to time it should join the Commander-in-Chief’s flag for manœuvres, it was in practice permanently detached in the West Atlantic.”

“The next squadrons to be ready would be the two attached to the Second Fleet. Of these the 6th, which

¹ Sir Julian Corbett: “Naval Operations.”

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

consisted of four 'Drakes,' though intended to support the flotillas in the south part of the North Sea, had to be diverted to take the place of the 4th Squadron in the Grand Fleet. The 5th, which on the eve of the war consisted of the *Carnarvon* and three 'Monmouths,' was assigned to the most important and exposed area in the Atlantic trade routes — that is, to the Mid-Atlantic area between the West Coast of Africa and Brazil, in which lay the converging points of the great southern trade."

"All the nearer stations had to be filled from the Third Fleet Squadrons, some of which were actually required to complete the disposition in Home Waters. The 10th, for instance, was to act in close connection with the Grand Fleet and to form what was known as the Northern Patrol — that is, the Patrol specially charged with exercising control of the trade route to Germany north-about. The 11th Squadron was to operate to the West of Ireland to cover the home terminals of the great Western trade routes, and the 12th to combine with the French cruisers in the approaches to the Channel, in accordance with the provisional arrangement which had been settled between the two Admiralty Staffs in October, 1913."

"The 7th Squadron also acted in Home Waters, the greater part of it being employed in place of the 'Drakes' with the flotillas which guarded the southern part of the North Sea. The remaining Squadron — that is, the 9th (for the 8th had no ships assigned to it) — was to complete the protection of the great Southern and Mediterranean routes, its station being off the mouth of the Straits and covering the area Cape Finisterre-Azores-Madeira immediately north of the 5th Squadron in the

Mid-Atlantic area. The general idea was to push out these ships as fast as they were mobilised; but as they were on the Third Fleet basis some delay was inevitable. So far as possible it was minimised by the fact that the nearest stations were assigned to them. Still the risk remained, and had to be accepted as the price paid for the immediate readiness of the First and Second Fleets."

"Beyond the Mediterranean and Red Sea, for which, as we have seen, a special fleet was provided, our interests were guarded by four squadrons. The most important of them was that on the China station, with one battleship, two cruisers, two light cruisers, eight destroyers, four torpedo boats, three submarines and a flotilla of sixteen sloops and gunboats, ten of which were river gunboats. Next came the squadron provided by the Australian Commonwealth, with one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, three destroyers and two submarines. Associated with it was the New Zealand station with three old 'P' class light cruisers and a sloop. Finally, there was the East Indies Squadron, with one battleship, two light cruisers and four sloops."

"Each squadron was an independent command, but an organisation had been worked out under which they could be formed into one force, known as the Eastern Fleet, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the China station. When so formed it would consist of two battleships, one battle cruiser, two cruisers, eleven light cruisers, eleven sea-going sloops and gunboats, eleven destroyers and five submarines. More loosely connected with this fleet was the Cape station, which, with only three light cruisers, occupied South African waters between the Mid-Atlantic station and the East Indies station. The only other foreign stations

were the West Coast of Africa with a single gunboat, the South-east Coast of America with one light cruiser, and the West Coast of North America with two sloops, both of which were on the west coast of Mexico watching British interests, like the 4th Cruiser Squadron on the Atlantic side.”

The foregoing is Sir Julian Corbett’s account of the dispositions of the British cruiser forces, to protect the trade routes against the anticipated German policy of widespread commerce destroying, by means of converting fast merchant steamers into German raiders. As has been explained, the fact was this danger did not exist. To fix this in mind, it should be stated here, as will be shown in the account of operations, that, instead of the expected German fleet of commerce destroyers suddenly springing to arms at the outbreak of war, only one solitary well equipped merchantman raider appeared, the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*.¹ A few others were improvised by being armed with guns from the outlying German warships,² but, as has been explained, there was no trace of the systematic German campaign, which had been anticipated by the British Admiralty.³

These dispositions of British cruiser forces and of outlying German cruisers are shown on the map. It will be evident at once that the German cruiser forces were

¹ “. . . the period in which the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* inaugurated the German attack upon our commerce.”—Sir Julian Corbett: “Naval Operations.”

² *Cap Trafalgar*, armed in the Southern Atlantic by the German gunboat *Eber*; *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, armed in the Atlantic by the German light cruiser *Karlsruhe*; *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, armed with guns from gunboats *Luchs* and *Tiger* at Tsingtau; captured Russian steamer *Rjasan*, also armed at Tsingtau and called the *Cormoran*.

³ “. . . all these elements of danger which the Admiralty could not, and in fact did not ignore.”—Archibald Hurd: “The Merchant Navy.”

weak in comparison — and it will be evident also that these inferior German armed forces were not made the main objective of the British naval dispositions. The result was again an object lesson of the fundamental precept that to seek immediate contact with the weaker enemy's armed forces should always be the main objective of the superior armed force.

Of course, dispositions of British cruiser forces to cover the trade routes were necessary, and, even though this was overdone in 1914 from preconceived ideas and wrong information, this aspect of British naval strategy can be justified, as acting upon the best information at hand. But the events showed that, in this case, it was especially dangerous to leave the German cruisers foot-loose, because these German cruisers, weak as they were in numbers and strength, turned out to be the only German naval forces which possessed, and were ready to use, the careful preparation for service in naval warfare, which had been wrongly attributed to other German elements. These German cruisers were enabled "to depend for their supplies in coal, equipments and provisions upon the successful working out of an organization which they themselves had created in foreign waters during years of coöperation with the Admiralty of the Navy,"¹ and were thus able to do more harm than had been anticipated. It is true that belief in the use of cruiser warfare had waned in the German Navy,² with the result that this phase of the naval war was held of minor importance and only these slight German forces were all that the Germans had outlying at the

¹ "The War at Sea."

² "No one believed for a moment, however, that any essential effect upon the outcome of the war could be attained by a war on commerce by surface craft alone." — Ibid.

beginning of the World War. Yet these few cruisers reaped all the benefit of years of German preparation for more extended cruiser warfare.

In the first place, with Tsingtau the only fortified German base in foreign waters, it had become evident in former years that German naval forces would be hard pressed for points of support. "Hidden fitting out places had therefore been established in the decades of peace time employment by our foreign service cruisers and their utility tested repeatedly from time to time."¹ With these in view, "the necessary supply ships for the cruisers, as well as reserves in fuel, provisions and general equipments and their delivery to the cruisers also had to be included in the preparations for cruiser warfare in foreign waters."²

For these purposes, the Germans had established a system "of outlying supply districts, which were distributed over the seas entering into the question."³ Each of these districts had its numerous staff, with commercial members, under the German Supply Officer, with all steamers in the district "assigned by him to definite places where they could count upon falling in with German warships."⁴ For setting this supply service in prompt operation, at an outbreak of war, German banks and commercial houses were prepared to place their ships, their resources, and their credit at the disposition of the German warships. Special arrangements had also been made in advance for maintenance of coal depots, delivery of fixed amounts of coal, supplies, and ammunition, and forwarding to the cruisers in foreign service.

At the outbreak of the World War, this admirable

¹ "The War at Sea."

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

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system was ready for operation, hidden under the "strong national sentiment of the German merchants,"¹ and the German cruisers were thus secretly ready for operations, even against the overwhelming naval superiority of Great Britain.

After this review of the situation of naval forces throughout the wide areas of warfare on the seas, there can no longer be any question of the one outstanding main fact — that Sea Power rested with the Entente Allies at the beginning of the World War. As to the main forces, the extraordinary constricted position of the two battle fleets was all in favor of the British Navy. In the outlying areas, the Germans had not carried forward plans for any wide disturbance of traffic over the seas. The Germans had also utterly failed to develop the new auxiliary naval forces, which might have made so much difference at the outset.

Of this resultant naval situation in 1914, it is most significant to read the following from the official German naval history, conceding this initial naval superiority of the Entente Allies: "The position of the British Islands, in relation to the German coast, made it possible for the English fleet to keep watch from a dominant position over the entire traffic from the North Sea into the Atlantic and *vice versa*. This meant, on the one hand, that the entire German commerce from overseas was cut off from the beginning of the war, while the German oversea trade routes at their entrance into the North Sea led immediately past the controlling centers of English sea power."²

No more impressive statement could be made than this German concession of Sea Power to the Entente

¹ "The War at Sea."

² *Ibid.*

Allies in 1914. And with this was included the German abandonment of serious attempts elsewhere. The situation as to the German cruisers in the outlying areas could only bring temporary embarrassment to the Allies, as there was no idea of any offensive on the part of the German main naval forces, to take advantage of any diversion of British naval forces that would be caused by sending reinforcements to these outlying areas. Consequently, in the main, Sea Power rested with the Entente Allies from the first. It was only by the later development of new strategy and tactics, on the part of the Germans, that this naval superiority was disputed.

Yet, in these conceded naval conditions of 1914, there were two serious abatements of the naval power of the Entente Allies, so important that they stand out in their influence upon the war. In the first place, the Entente Allies did not control the Dardanelles. In the second place, the Entente Allies did not have command of the Baltic Sea.

Both of these defects in the Allied control of the waterways of the world were also results of events before the war. It was a consequence of this course of events, as has been explained, that the Turks were maintained in their possession of the Dardanelles, interposing a barrier between Great Britain and France, on the west, and Russia on the east. It has also been shown that the situation at the double German naval base, created by the Kiel Canal, prevented the Entente Allies from controlling the Baltic Sea. By these two factors, adverse for Allied Sea Power, the unfavorable situation was brought about as to the lack of communication with Russia.

Keeping these conditions in mind, a study of the map will bring conviction that these two points were the logical main objectives of the Entente Allies, to make complete their control of the seas, and these two objectives should have been the aim of their naval strategy. This cannot be emphasized too strongly. On the other hand, in the established naval situation at the beginning of the war in 1914, for the Central Powers the only objective was to impair the existing Allied control of the seas.

The reader must also bear in mind the fact that these initial naval forces, which have been described, were but an inadequate measure of the great forces that were destined to take part in the operations over the seas. The World War, which grew to huge proportions that called upon all the resources of the nations, also brought into being movements and operations over the wide expanses of the seas, which dwarfed all former ideas of navies.

CHAPTER IV

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

WHEN war was declared (Germany *vs.* Russia, August 1; Germany *vs.* France, August 3; Germany *vs.* Belgium, August 4) there was no question of the fact that the German Great General Staff felt absolute confidence in the success of the military coup, which had been planned throughout so many years. This carefully prepared machinery was at once set in motion to conquer France, in full conviction that it would succeed as quickly and decisively as did the invasion of 1870, long before Sea Power could count against Germany.

The Schlieffen plan had always included the violation of Belgian territory and the enveloping sweep wide of the Meuse. There was no thought of changing this plan, not even a pretense of regard for treaties, or respect for the rights of neutral nations, but military operations were at once remorselessly begun, with an invasion of Belgium according to the long arranged schedule. For the next six weeks the efforts of Germany were concentrated upon this military assault against France — and within that short time its faulty execution and final failure became matters of history.

At this stage another important established issue must also be understood, for it had a far reaching influence upon the course of the World War. Not only had the perfected strategy of the Schlieffen school failed to win the German victory which had been thought cer-

tain, but also great harm had been done to the prospects of Germany, on land and sea, in the ensuing war, by the moral effect of the invasion of Belgium. Moral forces are of actual impelling strategic value in war — and the Austrian statesman, Count Czernin, had realized this bitter truth when he wrote the heartfelt phrase, “Our greatest disaster, the German entry into Belgium.”¹ It is known that this violation of Belgium had been deliberately planned in Schlieffen’s time, before 1906. In 1914, as the German armies were first making their entry through the neutral states, the German Chancellor had said, in his speech in the Reichstag: “We were compelled to override the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. This is a breach of international law. . . . The wrong — I speak frankly — that we are committing we will try to make good as soon as our military goal is reached.”

Of this speech the German Crown Prince wrote, “On that 4th of August, 1914, before a single shot had been fired over yonder, we Germans had lost the first great battle in the eyes of the world.”² It was all of that, for, in spite of German excuses, the public opinion of the world was turned against Germany by the invasion — and the harm done to the German cause by this fruitless violation of Belgium was too great to be estimated.

At the crisis brought about by the German invasion of Belgium, Great Britain had unfalteringly stood by her treaty pledges to Belgium. When Germany repudiated the treaty to respect the neutrality of Belgium, which was called “a scrap of paper,” and after the German refusal to abandon the invasion of Belgium, Great Britain declared war against Germany (official, August 4,

¹ “In the World War.”

² “Memoirs of the German Crown Prince.”

11 P.M.). Thus Sea Power accepted the challenge of German Militarism.

The period of strained relations, which had followed the conduct of the Central Powers in the Serbian controversy, had given the British Navy ample time to prepare for war, to the extent that was deemed adequate according to the doctrines then prevailing in the Admiralty. The main reliance of the British Navy, as has been stated, was the concentration of the British Battle Fleet against the German Battle Fleet. The period of competitive building programs, which had produced this situation, had in itself been a warning and a preparation for the coming naval war, and this had also moulded the naval strategy of the Admiralty to conform to the point of view of looking upon naval warfare as a matter of the comparative strengths of the battle fleets thus arrayed against one another.

In these years of competition and hostility between Great Britain and Germany, the approach of a great war had been forecast very accurately by the Fisher régime, which had controlled the Admiralty at the time of the rival programs of building battleships. After these years of naval preparation, all tending in one direction, and with the period of strained relations in addition to give warning, Sir Julian Corbett is justified in his opening claim: "Given the scale which we deliberately chose to accept, there is no doubt that the machinery for setting our forces in action had reached an ordered completeness in detail that has no parallel in our history."

But it must be understood that this state of preparedness in the British Navy was limited by the condition, which Lord Sydenham has pointed out, that "for some

time naval policy had been dominated by a school which placed material above the study of war." Therefore, Sir Julian Corbett's qualification, that the scale of naval preparation would be a question "that will long be debated," is not a measure of the real naval situation at the outbreak of war in 1914. It was not alone a question of the scale and the system, but of British naval doctrines and of British naval policies.

With all the claims that have been made for "prophecies," it cannot be said that there is evidence of any comprehensive grasp in advance of the actual naval developments of the World War. On the sea, as on land, the great struggle rolled on, with increasing great dimensions, and forces which were far beyond the claims of the self-styled prophets. The fundamentals of warfare, on sea and on land, do not change, but the World War has swept away many erroneous conceptions of these fundamentals, and has shown the broad scope of a call upon all the efforts and all the resources of nations.

The British Navy was ready, in the sense of being prepared for its self-imposed task. But it was not ready with well studied doctrines, on the broad scale that would produce a comprehensive naval strategy for a world war, to include immediate operations for gaining control of the Baltic and domination of the Dardanelles. As has been stated, the lessons of the World War have shown that these should have been the naval objectives from the start.

Consequently, the careful preparation of the British "War Book" can only be said to have produced a naval preparedness for Great Britain in accordance with a limited viewpoint. This "War Book," which followed

the Admiralty's "War List," was the result of the labors of the Committee of Imperial Defense of 1911 for "the coördination of Departmental Action on the outbreak of war." In common with other Departments, the program for the Admiralty in case of war had been worked out in detail.

The Precautionary Stage was to be initiated by the Foreign Office directly informing the Admiralty that relations with a certain Foreign Power were strained. Then was to be sent the "Warning Telegram," to be followed by the "War Telegram" upon declaration of war. "During the three and a half years the Sub-Committee was at work these details, by constant revision, and particularly by the experience gained during the Agadir crisis at the end of 1911, were carried to a high degree of precision."¹ These means were to be used to initiate the British naval strategy, of which the opening dispositions of forces have been described.

Sir Julian Corbett has stated: "So far as the Navy was concerned, everything was in order. The Home Fleets were even in a state of readiness beyond what the War Book provided. In March 1914 it had been announced in Parliament that instead of the usual summer manœuvres a test mobilization would be held. It was to begin about the middle of July, and after carrying out exercises at sea the various fleets and flotillas would disperse on the 23d. It was in no sense a surprise test, nor was it a real war mobilization, for the Reserves were invited to attend — not called out — and officers were appointed as convenient, and not to their true war stations. The composition of the cruiser squadrons also differed in some cases from that of the War Organization."

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

“Operation orders were issued on July 10 for the ships to assemble at Portland under the command of Admiral Sir George A. Callaghan, who was completing his third year as Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets. All told, counting fleet auxiliaries, not less than 460 pennants were in orders for his flag. They included the whole of the Home Fleet, except the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, which, owing to the unhappy state of affairs in Ulster, was tied to police duty in the Irish Sea. The response of the Reserves proved all that could be desired, and by July 16 the whole of the vast Fleet was assembled in a state of mobilization.”

The exercises of the Fleet were ended upon July 23. “Whether by coincidence or design it was on this memorable day — July 23d — that Austria presented her harsh and peremptory ultimatum to Serbia, and the long-dreaded hour seemed at hand.”¹ Admiral Callaghan had informed the Admiralty that the Fleet would be dispersed on July 27. On July 26 it became certain that the Serbian reply had been rejected. That afternoon (July 26, 4 P.M.) a telegram was sent to Admiral Callaghan with orders that no ships of the First Fleet were to leave Portland until further notice, and “the ships of the Second Fleet were to remain at their home ports in proximity to their balance crews.”²

By informing Petrograd of this decision to hold the British Battle Fleet together in readiness, Sir Edward Grey was able to correct the wrong impression that under no circumstances would Great Britain intervene. “At home all necessary steps were taken to make the measure a reality.”³

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Ibid. ³ Ibid.

On July 28, Austria refused to delay operations against Serbia and declared war. The British Foreign Office had not yet given instructions for inaugurating the Preparatory Period, but the Admiralty that afternoon (July 28, 5 P.M.) ordered the First Fleet to proceed to its preliminary war station at Scapa on the morning of July 29. In obedience to this order, the First Fleet put to sea (July 29, 7 A.M.), taking the east route, as the last news of the German Battle Fleet was off the coast of Norway. That afternoon the "Warning Telegram" was sent broadcast by the Admiralty.¹ "The form used by the Admiralty was the second, which authorized everything short of full mobilization."²

The situation had grown more serious (July 29), and all officers and men on leave were recalled by telegraph.³ Negotiations were still going on, which were foredoomed to failure because the Central Powers were intent on their program. "Concealment of our precautionary measures was no longer possible, even had the Government desired it. But, in fact, that afternoon Sir E. Grey had definitely warned the German Ambassador that he must not be misled into thinking we would necessarily stand aside if France became involved."⁴ A futile proposal from the German Chancellor, that Great Britain should remain neutral if "no soil of France were annexed," was rejected.

Sir Julian Corbett has stated the situation at that time, as to the British Navy: "War was now very near, but we were ready. The machinery of the War Book

¹ Also from the British War Office.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

³ "But by evening the war cloud was so dark that the Admiralty ordered all officers and men on leave to be recalled to duty." — Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

was working smoothly, and everything was slipping into its place without further orders. During the two days of suspense all units of the First and Second Fleets had reached, or were on their way to, their war stations. . . . It says much for the skill and completeness with which our preparation for war had been elaborated during the past ten years that the general situation was so far secured without any recourse to a complete mobilization by the time the critical day arrived."

On July 31 Great Britain asked for assurances from both France and Germany that Belgian neutrality would be respected. On August 1 France gave "a full and frank assurance," and Germany evaded a reply. On that day (August 1, 2.15 P.M.) the word went out to act on Mobilization Instructions. It was approved that the time had come for the patrol and local flotillas to be out at night,¹ and some hours afterwards the Admiralty set on foot the last stage of naval mobilization, which would render the Third Fleet active. "Late that night (August 1) the news came in that Germany had declared war on Russia, and, as soon as it was known at the Admiralty, it was felt that the final step could no longer be delayed. At 1.25 A.M., therefore (August 2), without further consultation they gave the word to mobilize the Naval Reserve, and their action was formally sanctioned by the Cabinet. . . . The actual mobilization was an independent act ordered by the Admiralty after a definite war movement had been ordered. It was not completed till 4 A.M. on August 2, and was not even ordered till the First and Second

¹ "The dominating apprehension was that the Germans meant to deliver a blow at sea before declaration — as the Japanese were assumed to have done at Port Arthur — and it was highly probable that it would take the form of offensive mining." — Sir Julian Corbett.

Fleets were so far assembled at their war stations as to render a serious surprise impossible.”¹

On August 2 Sir Edward Grey was authorized to give the following undertaking to the French Ambassador: “If the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power.” At the request of the Admiralty, approval was given for “the dispositions which had been provisionally arranged in October, 1913, for the combined defense of the Channel — and orders immediately went out for the Dover Patrol and the Cross Channel Patrol, which was to act with the French, to take up their war stations next morning, but neither was to attack unless attacked.”²

At this stage the British intelligence was that the German “destroyers and submarines were spread fifty miles north and south of the Elbe, and that the shores of Borkum and the approaches to their North Sea ports had been mined. . . . That night, however, there was information that the Germans meant to get a number of commerce destroyers to sea before the outbreak of war, and at 4.0 in the morning of August 4 the Grand Fleet received orders to carry out a movement in force to intercept them.”³

At this time Admiral Callaghan, “whose term of command had already been extended a year,”⁴ was ordered to strike his flag, and Sir John Jellicoe succeeded him, with the acting rank of Admiral. The new Commander-in-Chief of the British Battle Fleet had been long before chosen by the Fisher régime in the Ad-

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

miralty, and he must be considered as representing the prevailing doctrines of the British Navy.¹

Early in the morning of August 4 (6 A.M.), the news came that the Germans intended to cross the Belgian frontier that afternoon. "At 9.30 the Foreign Office sent off an emphatic protest requesting an immediate reply. Meanwhile, in accordance with the concerted procedure, contained in the War Book, to meet this emergency, steps had been taken by the Board of Customs and Excise and the Admiralty to detain German ships in our ports in retaliation for what they had already done at Hamburg, and in particular two mail boats which had just put into Falmouth, one with a very large amount of gold for the Bank of England. At noon came the German reply. It merely gave an assurance that no part of Belgian territory would be annexed, but that they could not leave the Belgian line of attack open to the French.² That was the end. Two hours later the Fleet was informed that an ultimatum had been sent to Berlin which would expire at midnight, and that at that hour the War Telegram would go out."³

¹ "My sole object was to insure Jellicoe being Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet on December 19th, 1913, and that is being done by his being appointed Second-in-Command of the Home Fleet, and he will automatically be C-in-C in two years from that date. All the recent changes revolve around Jellicoe, and no one sees it." — Lord Fisher to Lord Esher, December 24, 1911.

² The hollowness of this pretense has been shown by the fact, now conclusively proved, that before 1906 the Schlieffen plan had been predicated upon an invasion of Belgium.

³ Sir Julian Corbett.

CHAPTER V

FIRST NAVAL MOVEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

WHEN the ultimatum from Great Britain was sent to Berlin, Admiral Jellicoe was already at sea "commencing the precautionary movement which he had been directed to make. The general idea which had been laid down by the Admiralty was that he should take his four battle squadrons, with their attached cruisers and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, to within 100 miles of the Norwegian coast, leaving the battle cruisers and Admiral Pakenham's squadron to watch the Shetlands. The 2d Cruiser Squadron and six other ships of different squadrons, which, with the 2d Destroyer Flotilla, were at Rosyth, were to meet him at a mid-sea rendezvous and then make a sweep south and west, and at 8.30 A.M. on August 4 he had sailed to carry out the movement."¹

The "War Telegram" actually was sent broadcast at 11 P.M.² on August 4. The naval operations of the World War were thus begun, with the main forces of the British Navy ready and disposed in accordance with the ideas then prevailing in the British Admiralty. As to the Mediterranean area, Sir Julian Corbett has stated that the Precautionary Period found the British Navy

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Midnight, Central European Time, that is, 11 P.M. G. M. T.

"less well placed," because "all the Admiralty appreciations had to take into account the possibility of Italy being drawn into the struggle against France."

This must be rejected as a description of the actual situation in the Mediterranean area, because the anti-Austrian sentiment of the Italian nation had assured the neutrality of Italy from the first. Equally, of course, it is unprofitable to consider the Italian Fleet as any influence upon the opening naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea.¹

When the preliminary warning was sent out to all British naval stations on July 27, "a special clause was added for the Mediterranean, directing Admiral Milne² to return to Malta as arranged, and to remain there with his ships filled up with coal and stores. He was also to warn Admiral Troubridge to be ready to join him at any moment."³ Admiral Milne was on his way to Malta, in accordance with this order, when he received the "Warning Telegram" on the evening of July 29. On the next day he was informed: "His first task should be to assist the French in transporting their African Army, and this he could do by taking up a covering position and endeavoring to bring to action any fast German ship, particularly the *Goeben*, which might try to interfere with the operation."⁴ Sir Julian Cor-

¹ As a matter of fact, Admiral Milne was informed as early as July 30 that Italy would probably be neutral.

² Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne, commanding the British Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.

³ Sir Julian Corbett. See Map at page 90.

⁴ This is the British Admiralty historian's description of Admiral Milne's mission. The actual wording of the order was as follows: "Your first task should be to aid the French in the transportation of their African army by covering and if possible bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly *Goeben*, which may interfere with that transportation."

bett has pointed out that this order, which made the assistance of French transportation the "first task," "had very regrettable consequences."

In the forenoon of July 30 Admiral Milne reached Malta, to which station the Admiralty had already recalled Rear Admiral Troubridge from Durazzo.

"Admiral Milne thus had his fleet well concentrated, and decided to keep it so till he had leave to consult the French Admiral."¹ With the exception of a single light cruiser, the *Chatham*, which he detached to watch the south entrance of the Straits of Messina, Admiral Milne's whole Fleet was gathered at Malta on July 31. The *Black Prince* was detached August 1 to take Lord Kitchener to Egypt, but recalled the next day by wireless, "when it had been decided that Lord Kitchener should join the Cabinet as Secretary for War."²

On August 2 further orders came to Admiral Milne, "to detach two battle cruisers to shadow the *Goeben* and he was also to watch the approaches to the Adriatic with his cruisers and destroyers."³ Following these instructions, Rear Admiral Troubridge was detached, with his own Cruiser Squadron (*Defence, Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh*),⁴ reinforced by two battle cruisers (*Indomitable, Indefatigable*), the cruiser *Gloucester*, and eight destroyers, to be joined also by the *Chatham*. "This was the position when, on August 2, our undertaking in regard to the Atlantic was given, and that evening authority was sent to him (Admiral Milne)

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Black Prince* also rejoined, after being recalled, as explained. Sir Percy Scott has pointed out the fact that three British submarines were at Malta. But, at this stage, submarines were only given a defensive rôle, and these did not affect the situation.

to get into communication with the French Admiral (Lapeyrère).”¹

All day, on August 3, Admiral Milne from Malta had been unable to get any response from the French Fleet, which had refrained from putting to sea until that day, “with orders to watch the German cruiser *Goeben* and protect the transport of the French African troops.”²

“Thus both the Admirals had the same principal object, but no coördination of their efforts had yet been possible, nor could anything further be arranged when, in the evening of the 4th, Admiral Milne received word through Malta that the British government had presented an ultimatum to Germany which would expire at midnight.”³

In the other great areas of the seas, the preparations of the Precautionary Period followed the dispositions of forces, which have been described and shown upon the map of the initial naval situation.⁴ But it should again be emphasized that, in these areas as in the Mediterranean, seeking out the enemy’s armed forces was not made the main object. With all due allowances for the necessary precautions to cover the trade routes and to guard against attacks upon transportation, the actual events proved, as will be shown in the following accounts of the naval operations of the World War, that the main difficulties always come from the enemy’s armed forces,⁵ and they should be the primary objectives always, on sea as on land.

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Sir F. Bertie to Foreign Office, Paris, August 3, 6.50 P.M.

³ Sir Julian Corbett.

⁴ See page 42.

⁵ This was shown to be true, even as to the expected outbreak of German commerce raiders. In the first place, the cruisers were most harmful, and, also, the converted armed cruisers were fitted out with guns from the naval

In this Precautionary Period the efforts of the German main forces may be summed up in another pregnant paragraph of Tirpitz: "The plan of operations which, in accordance with the Cabinet order of July 30th, 1914, was now laid before me by von Pohl, the Chief of the Naval Staff, in the event of an English declaration of war, consisted, as I found to my surprise, of short instructions to the commander of the North Sea fleet to wage for the present only guerilla warfare against the English, until we had achieved such a weakening of their fleet that we could safely send out our own; if before that time there should be any good prospects of a successful battle, a fight might then be undertaken." Admiral Scheer has also given the same description: "The order underlying this plan of campaign was this: The fleet must strike when circumstances are favorable: it must therefore seek battle with the English Fleet only when a state of equality has been achieved by guerilla warfare."

In view of the importance of the German Fleet for the defense of the Baltic, and the consequent obligation not to risk its destruction in a rash battle against the greatly superior British Fleet, these statements would have defined a sound naval strategy for Germany, if only there had been any reality in the implied promise that there would be "guerilla warfare" on the part of the German Navy. Instead of this, no plans had been made by the Germans for any naval offensive operations worthy of the name.¹

warships, with the sole exception of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. Even the isolated *Karlsruhe* fitted out the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* with extra guns carried for the purpose.

¹ "And when we were once involved in war with England and problems of attack were presented to our Navy in place of the defensive tasks for which it had been created, it was a fatal blunder to keep it out of the fray,

The mere narrative of the early German naval operations will be enough to prove; that preparations for harassing offensive tactics had been neglected by the Germans; that the German Fleet was merely gathered at its bases for defensive tactics; and that offensive tactics were only tried on a small and tentative scale at the beginning. The subsequent use of harassing naval tactics by the Germans was a gradual development of the war, and must not be confused with the initial naval situation.

This is the only true statement of German naval strategy for the main forces at the outset, when the great opening "dry-land" offensive of Germany was begun in 1914. But there was a strong contrast to this apathy of the German main naval forces, in the activity and resource shown by the minor German naval forces in the other areas. This contrasting alertness, more in line with what had been expected from German methods, will be apparent in the following account of the Precautionary Period with the German Cruiser Squadron.

In July, 1914, the German armored cruisers, *Scharnhorst* (flagship of Admiral Spee, Chief of the Cruiser Squadron) and *Gneisenau*, were on a voyage in the Southern Pacific, using chartered steamers for supplies and coal. With them was also the *Titania*, a tender for the Cruiser Squadron. The other cruisers of Admiral Spee's Squadron were disposed as follows. The light

or to deny a free hand in its employment to Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz who knew the instrument forged by him as no one else could. The parties who, at that time, had to decide concerning the fate of the Navy failed to gain that immortality which lay within their reach." — "Memoirs of the German Crown Prince."

cruiser *Nürnberg*, which had been “representing German interests on the west coast of Mexico since the end of 1913,”¹ had been ordered to proceed, after her relief by the light cruiser *Leipzig*, by the way of Honolulu to Samoa, where she was to meet Admiral Spee’s armored cruisers. The *Leipzig* had been ordered “from Tsingtau on June 7, to take over the duties of the *Nürnberg* on the Mexico coasts.”² The light cruiser *Emden* “remained behind as the only cruiser on the station”³ at Tsingtau, the German base, where Admiral Spee was “to be back by the end of September.”⁴

Admiral Spee had transferred to Captain Müller, in command of the *Emden*, the duty of Senior Officer at the German base of Tsingtau, which implied “very onerous duties in regulating the shipment of supplies for the Squadron and furnishing information to the Squadron Commander.”⁵ The *Emden* was to proceed from Tsingtau to Shanghai July 8, and later to Hankau. Four small gunboats and three river gunboats were attached to the station. Of the two old German cruisers, “in case of war subordinate to the Chief of the Cruiser Squadron,” the *Cormoran* “was at Tsingtau undergoing a thorough overhauling, and the *Geier* was on her way from East Africa to East Asia.”⁶

The news of the murder of Sarajevo had been received at Tsingtau on June 29, and from there it was forwarded to Admiral Spee by the *Emden*. But the first intimation of the “sharpening of the political situation” came to the Chief of the German Cruiser Squadron on July 7 at the roadstead of Truk: “Political situation not altogether satisfactory, await developments at Truk or

¹ “The War at Sea.”

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

Ponape. Expect situation to become clear in 8 or 10 days." On July 9 telegraphic information followed, that "hostile developments between Austria and Serbia possible, and not impossible that Triple Alliance will be drawn into it." Admiral Spee determined to await developments at Truk, and he at once ordered the *Emden* to remain at Tsingtau, and also the *Tiger*, a gunboat which was about to be sent to the Yangtsee, to assist Captain Müller in the execution of his duties as Senior Officer of the Station.

On July 11 a most important and significant telegram was received by the *Scharnhorst*: "England probably hostile in case it comes to war; situation otherwise unchanged. English China Squadron at Hakodate and Vladivostok." The comment on this telegram in the German official naval history, "The War at Sea," is also significant: "This telegram shows that the senior naval authorities, contrary to the directors of public affairs, interpreted the political situation correctly from the start." It also meant that, whatever the German naval apathy was in the home waters, the German outlying cruisers were put on the alert, with plenty of warning to make use of the efficient system which had been built up to supply their operations.

On July 15 Admiral Spee, with his two armored cruisers, accompanied by the *Titania* and the collier *Fukoku Maru*, sailed for Ponape (East Carolinas), where they anchored on July 17. From this port, if there was no war, the voyage to Samoa could be resumed with least loss of time; "on the other hand, that the forces might be assembled more readily in East Asia in case of serious developments."¹ On July 19 Admiral

¹ "The War at Sea." See Map at page 138.

Spee advised Captain Müller to gather the German gunboats at Tsingtau,¹ where the Austro-Hungarian cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth* also arrived on July 22. On July 25 the German Admiralty Staff wired the Cruiser Squadron: "Austria-Hungary sent note to Serbia July 23. Outcome cannot yet be foreseen: await developments at Ponape." This was received on July 26.

On July 27 Admiral Spee was warned that the situation was more serious, and that the cruise to Samoa "apparently must be cancelled." He was instructed: "Await further orders in the neighborhood of Yap. *Nürnberg* has been ordered to proceed to Tsingtau and to report to you." This order for the *Nürnberg* was at once changed, at the request of Admiral Spee, who foresaw that the cruiser might only run into enemy forces, if she should proceed to East Asia.² The *Nürnberg* was ordered to proceed to Ponape, a safer route and certain to put her in touch with Admiral Spee's Squadron.

From this time, Captain Müller did efficient service at the Tsingtau Station, in keeping the Chief of the Cruiser Squadron constantly informed of his own arrangements and of the disposition of foreign forces. The Commander of the *Emden* was ordered to divert from Tsingtau the *Elsbeth*, the second of the colliers for the South Pacific cruise, and send her to Yap where she would be in touch with Admiral Spee.

On July 27 a telegram had reported the situation more quiet. But on July 30 the situation again became critical, and the following telegram was received at

¹ July 30: "Aside from the river gunboats the only vessel of the East Asia station still outside Tsingtau was the gunboat *Jaguar* at Shanghai." — "The War at Sea."

² "It appeared not impossible that England and Japan by this time would have joined the enemy side." — Ibid.

Tsingtau and Ponape: "Relations strained between Dual and Triple Alliance. Awaiting England's stand." This was followed, during the night of July 30, by the announcement: "War has broken out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, political tension has arisen between the Triple Alliance and Great Britain, France, Russia. Latest information, English China Squadron at Wei Hai Wei." Instructions were at the same time sent to the Tsingtau Station "to take measures to protect safety."

On July 31 the following was received on board the *Emden*, at Tsingtau, and the *Scharnhorst*, from the German Admiralty Staff:

"Situation critical, decision must be reached in a short time;"

"Intelligence organization will be set in operation with the dispatch of this order. Doubts exist as to the reliability of Italy's remaining faithful to the Alliance;"

"Reichsmarieneamt authorizes immediate shipment of 10,000 tons of coal from the Tsingtau depot for Cruiser Squadron; German shipping warned July 30."

Early on August 1 the *Scharnhorst* and the *Emden* received this announcement from the Admiralty Staff: "Imminent danger of war with Great Britain, France, Russia. Our Allies Austria-Hungary, probably Italy." This news was transmitted by the *Scharnhorst* to the *Geier* and *Planet* and also to the *Nürnberg*, "which had first announced her presence by radio on August 2."¹ The German Intelligence at the Tsingtau Station had meanwhile been set into operation to inform the gunboats of the East Asia Station. "Shipping in East Asia and the Pacific were warned by the high power radio stations."²

¹ "The War at Sea."

² *Ibid.*

Early on August 2, Tsingtau announced that the British Squadron had put to sea from Wei Hai Wei. On the same day the *Emden*, and in the evening the *Scharnhorst* received the order: "Mobilization of Army and Navy ordered August 1; first day of mobilization is August 2. Outbreak of war immediately imminent. First enemy Russia. France, Great Britain not yet decided." During the night of August 2, a telegram stated: "Hostilities against Russia begun. Outbreak of war with France certain. Hostilities will probably not begin until August 3. Great Britain hostile, Italy neutral." The following night the German Admiralty sent the warning: "Be prepared for hostile activities by the English forces."

"The announcement of the declaration of war on France dated August 3, which the *Emden* received that same night did not reach the Squadron Commander until the afternoon of August 4. It stated: 'War has broken out with France. Declaration of war on Germany by Great Britain will probably follow on August 3.' Very important to the Chief of Squadron in making his decisions was the information received on August 5: 'Chili neutral and friendly. Japan neutral, providing no attack directed against British East Asia district.' This was followed in the afternoon by the important announcement: "England declared war on Germany August 4.'"¹

The only other German naval units in the outlying areas were the light cruisers *Karlsruhe* and *Dresden* on the East American Station, the light cruiser *Königsberg* on the East Africa Station, and the small gunboat *Eber* on the West Africa Station.

¹ "The War at Sea."

The *Karlsruhe*, a new and very fast ship (designed speed $27\frac{1}{4}$), was to relieve the *Dresden*, which was conveying President Huerta of Mexico and his suite to Jamaica, when, on July 24, the news was received of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. After landing the Mexicans at Kingston, the *Dresden* joined the *Karlsruhe* at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on July 25. The next day the ships changed commanders, Captain Lüdecke taking over the *Dresden* and Captain Kohler the *Karlsruhe*, which left that day for Havana. The *Dresden* was ordered home from Port-au-Prince on July 28, with information that a break seemed probable. After taking on full capacity of coal and supplies, the *Dresden* left on July 31; but, only three hours from port, received *via* radio of San Juan, Porto Rico: "Menace of war with Great Britain, France, Russia. Allies Austria-Hungary, probably Italy. Do not return home, conduct cruiser warfare according to mobilization regulations."

The *Dresden* at once changed course at Sombrero Island for the north coast of Brazil, giving a false location to the San Juan radio station to make the enemy believe she was still on her way home. The *Karlsruhe* had also received the news of strained relations, had put to sea from Havana July 30, and on the next day received the "Warning Telegram." Captain Kohler then also used means to deceive the enemy, by steering west and then doubling back, to conceal himself in the Bahamas and await the issue. In these positions the two German cruisers received news of the course of events and the declarations of war, and Captain Lüdecke informed Captain Kohler of his intention to take the *Dresden* to the South Atlantic, leaving the Central and

Northern Atlantic to the *Karlsruhe* and her auxiliaries. The *Königsberg* had also been able to evade the British naval forces and get to sea beyond observation. As she was leaving Dar-es-Salaam, East Africa, on July 31, she had been sighted by a British cruiser of Admiral King-Hall's Squadron, but there was no cruiser in this Squadron with sufficient speed to keep in touch with the *Königsberg*.

The non-appearance of the large number of German auxiliary converted cruisers, which had been expected by the British, was explained by the waning German belief in cruiser warfare through the period of competitive building of capital ships. The following from the German official books shows that cruiser warfare had been given a minor rôle: "In considering this question, the naval authorities could not of course ignore the fact that a war on commerce was only a secondary measure in the conduct of war and that the available means must be employed above all and to the fullest possible extent, by the High Sea Forces upon which the solution of the main problem devolved. Consequently in the years preceding the war only very limited means could be devoted to the preparation for cruiser warfare by the equipment of auxiliary cruisers, and this was detrimental to the progress of the entire question in general and also to the execution of details."¹

¹ "The War at Sea."

CHAPTER VI

NAVAL STRATEGY AT THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES ESCAPE OF THE *GOEBEN* AND *BRESLAU* TO CONSTANTINOPLE

(See Map at page 90)

IN the first days of the World War the British unquestionably looked for some offensive operation on the part of the German Navy, that would be suddenly carried out on a large scale. Lord Jellicoe has stated: "It was curious that, in spite of all the lessons of history, there was a general expectation that a great fleet action would at once be fought."

This expectation of a dangerous German naval assault came not only from the feeling that the German rôle would be a sudden offensive, which would include the immediate use of the new and powerful German Battle Fleet, but it was also founded on a strong belief in a German plan to invade Great Britain. This fear of invasion had been prevalent among the British military and naval leaders in the years preceding the war, and it remained persistently in their minds, even after the other uses of German forces had been developed. Consequently the idea of invasion must be recognized as a strong influence upon the British War Office and Admiralty.

This influence affected British strategy throughout the war, and the exaggerated importance given to "Home Defense" was a constant check upon British

enterprise.¹ It curbed the efforts of the British Navy,² and impeded the flow of British forces to the battlefields by maintaining a coffer dam of useless numbers of troops in Great Britain until they were swept away by the needs of the emergency of 1918.

This influence upon British strategy was unmistakably shown at the very beginning of the World War. In the assurance to France, August 2, 1914, it was stipulated that "in view of our enormous responsibilities all over the world and the primary exigencies of Home Defense, there could be no question at present of a promise to send our Expeditionary Force or any part of it to France." And Admiral Jellicoe, on his first sweep in the North Sea, was "informed that the movement laid down for covering the passage of the Expeditionary Force would not be required for the present."³

Another notable condition was also unmistakably apparent. Although neither side had made any real plan for the use of torpedoes and mines in concerted offensive operations, yet each side believed the other had such a plan — and these beliefs had also a strong influence upon naval strategy and tactics at the opening stage.

Admiral Jellicoe has clearly defined the "watching policy from a distance," which was to be used when he took command of the main British naval force, the Grand Fleet, "so christened" at the outbreak of the war. "No large ship could cruise constantly in the vicinity

¹ "The effects of the invasion scare upon the conduct of the Great War." — Lord Sydenham.

² "Throughout the war the responsibility of the fleet for the prevention of raids or invasion was a factor which had a considerable influence on naval strategy." — Admiral Jellicoe.

³ Ibid.

of enemy bases without the certainty that she would fall an early victim to the attacks of submarines. . . . Moreover, even if the submarine could be overcome, the heavy ships would be so open to attack by enemy destroyers at night, if cruising anywhere near the enemy bases, that they would certainly be injured if not sunk, before many days had passed."

"These facts had been recognized before the War and a watching policy from a distance decided upon, the watch being instituted for the purpose of preventing enemy vessels from gaining the open sea, where they would constitute a danger to our sea communications."

"A consideration of all the circumstances had led to the adoption by the Admiralty of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys as the main Fleet Base, and the Admiralty had determined upon a naval strategy in Home Waters, in the event of war with Germany, based upon the idea that the Grand Fleet would control the North Sea, and that the Channel Fleet would watch the English Channel, thus, in combination, holding the enemy's main force."

"To effect this purpose, it was intended that the main Battle Fleet should occupy, as circumstances permitted, a strategic position in the North Sea where it would act in support of Cruiser Squadrons carrying out sweeps to the southward in search of enemy vessels, and should be favorably placed for bringing the High Seas Fleet to action should it put to sea."

"The War Orders issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet were based, therefore, on this general idea, and when the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea in compliance with Admiralty orders at 8.30 A.M. on August 4, 1914, it left with the intention of carrying

out this general policy. The Channel Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, assembled in the Channel in accordance with the general strategic dispositions.”

There was also the Harwich Force, Commodore R. V. Tyrwhitt, so called from its base. This consisted of 1st and 3d Destroyer Flotillas, each led by a light cruiser (35 destroyers), “oversea” submarines, and old armored cruisers of 7th Cruiser Squadron. This force was a part of the Grand Fleet, to the extent “that it was intended that it should join the Grand Fleet at sea, if possible, in the event of a fleet action being imminent.”¹ But it was used for patrol duty from its base.

Admiral Jellicoe reported his initial sweep complete at noon on August 5, and he was “directed to keep his fleet to the northward so as to hold the entrance to the North Sea.”² There were rumors of merchant ships arming at the Lofoten Islands and a German submarine base on the Norwegian coast, with other reports of German movements, and the bulk of the Grand Fleet was kept at sea until the morning of August 7, when it was brought into Scapa Flow to coal, after finding no enemy activity whatever.³

As a matter of fact, the German Fleet was kept at its bases with a “protective zone” for defense. “The outermost line, 35 nautical miles (from the lightship ‘Elbe I’), was held by destroyers. Six nautical miles behind these were submarines, and a further six miles back the inmost line was patrolled by mine-sweeping divisions. Two to four light cruisers were distributed

¹ Admiral Jellicoe.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

³ “And his first movement, the precursor of so many that were to prove equally disappointing, came to an end.” — Ibid.

behind the two wings of this protective zone, east and south of Heligoland. At night the U-boats and the destroyers on the outermost line were withdrawn, and only the inner one was held. The result of this was that we had all the more destroyers at hand for nocturnal enterprises."¹

Admiral Scheer's description, of the only opening offensive moves by German naval forces in the North Sea area, is almost pathetic in its revelation of the German lack of preparation for offensive naval warfare in this region. "Preparations for the offensive were not neglected during the days in which England was making up her mind what her attitude was to be, and when at 7.47 P.M. on August 4, we received the message 'Prepare for war with England,' we also heard the order to the auxiliary cruiser *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*² to put to sea immediately. At 9.30 P.M. the auxiliary minelayer *Königin Luise* also left the Ems on the way to the Thames estuary."

This German statement is comment enough in itself on the apathy of the Germans in offensive naval strategy.

The converted German liner *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, the only ship in home waters prepared to raid commerce, had no difficulty in breaking out to sea, by keeping close along the coast of Norway and round the north of Iceland into the Atlantic.³

The *Königin Luise* was a local steamer converted into a minelayer. Her orders were: "Make for sea in Thames direction at top speed. Lay mines as near as

¹ Admiral Scheer: "Germany's High Sea Fleet."

² There is a misprint of the name in Admiral Scheer's book.

³ Sir Julian Corbett states: "Her escape was due to the northern area being still short of its proper complement of cruisers."

possible English coast, not near neutral coasts, and not farther north than Lat. 53°." The German steamer got out into the North Sea, unsuspected, but on the morning of August 5 she was reported by a trawler to the light cruiser *Amphion* of the Harwich Force, which was on a patrolling sweep at the time. The trawler described a suspicious vessel "throwing things overboard twenty miles north-east of the Outer Gabbard." The *Königin Luise* was sighted at 11 A.M., and, after a chase by the destroyers and *Amphion*, was sunk by gunfire.

On the return from its sweep in the North Sea the British Naval force, which had destroyed the *Königin Luise*, had changed course to avoid the mines dropped by her. But at 6.30 A.M., August 6, the *Amphion* struck two of these mines in succession, and sank so quickly that one officer and 150 men were lost, with most of the German prisoners who had been taken from their mine-layer the day before.

Admiral Jellicoe has stated that the British Admiralty had received "information from a usually reliable source" that "the Germans intended carrying out a very extensive mine-laying policy in British waters in the event of war between the two countries." And the British Commander-in-Chief's comments are well worth studying, as they show the genesis of the so-called "defensive" school of warfare in the British Navy.

"The proceeding of the mine-layer *Königin Luise* in the first days of war tended to confirm this view, and consequently it was thought to be quite probable that mine-fields of an extensive character might be laid in the North Sea, in positions where they might be expected to be effective against any movement of our Fleet, particularly any southward movement."

“The small margin of superiority which we possessed over the German Fleet as compared with the immense difference in our naval responsibilities, made it very necessary that precautions should be taken to safeguard the most valuable of our ships from such a menace when operating in waters that might be mined.”

Sir Julian Corbett's comments have reflected the same sentiment: “The incident, moreover, could only add to the Commander-in-Chief's anxiety for his base, especially as by the second day of the war it was fairly clear the enemy had located him. Not only had more trawlers with pigeons been overhauled, but several ships were reporting periscopes, and though no attack was made there was every reason to believe the fleet was being shadowed by the enemy's submarines. If they proceeded further the consequences might obviously be very serious.”

Admiral Jellicoe's account of the day of August 7, after the Grand Fleet had gone into Scapa Flow to coal, is most significant: “The greatest anxiety constantly confronting me was the defenceless nature of the base at Scapa, which was open to submarine and destroyer attacks. Whilst the fleet was fuelling the only protection that could be afforded was to anchor light cruisers and destroyers off the various entrances and to patrol outside the main entrance: but these measures were no real defences against submarines, and the position was such that it was deemed most inadvisable to keep the Fleet in harbour longer than was necessary for fuelling purposes. Accordingly, at 6.30 P.M. on the same day, the Battle Fleet again proceeded to sea, being screened through the Pentland Firth to the westward until dark by the 4th Flotilla, and the course being then shaped to

pass round the Orkneys into the North Sea. In order to provide some protection against destroyer attack, a request was forwarded to the Admiralty asking that two of the older battleships might be sent up to defend the main entrances. This measure was approved and a reply was received that the *Hannibal* and *Magnificent* were being despatched."

"The *Russell*, *Albemarle*, and *Exmouth*, of the 6th Battle Squadron, belonging originally to the Channel Fleet, arrived at Seapa to join the Grand Fleet on the night of the 7th-8th."

This same tension was shown in the movements of the Grand Fleet for the following days, which were influenced by the supposed presence of submarines, and a state of mind was unmistakably also shown that would have helped the deterrent effect of a real naval offensive, if one had been undertaken by the Germans. But the apathy of the German Fleet became so evident that, as Sir Julian Corbett has expressed it, "So far, then, as naval readiness could secure the country against invasion, there was now no reason why part at least of the Expeditionary Force should not leave. The Germans seemed to be more concerned with meeting a descent than with making one." This reasoning of the British historian, even in a book written after the war, shows the persistence of the invasion idea as an influence on British strategy.

Lord French's account leaves no doubt as to the effect of this influence upon the make-up of the British Expeditionary Force, which was sent to France at the emergency of the great German assault.

"On Wednesday, August 5, a Council of War was held at 10 Downing Street, under the Presidency of the

Prime Minister. Nearly all the members of the Cabinet were present, while Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener, Sir Charles Douglas, Sir Douglas Haig, the late Sir James Grierson, General (now Sir Henry) Wilson, and myself were directed to attend. To the best of my recollection the two main subjects discussed were:

1. The composition of the Expeditionary Force.
2. The point of concentration for the British Forces on their arrival in France."

"As regards 1:

It was generally felt that we were under some obligation to France to send as strong an army as we could, and there was an idea that one cavalry division and six divisions of all arms had been promised. As to the exact number it did not appear that we were under any definite obligation but it was unanimously agreed that we should do all we could. The question to be decided was how many troops it was necessary to keep in this country adequately to guard our shores against attempted invasion and, if need be, to maintain internal order."

"Mr. Churchill briefly described the actual situation of the Navy. He pointed out that the threat of war had come upon us at the most opportune moment as regards his own department, because only two or three weeks before, the Fleet had been partially mobilized, and large reserves called up for the great naval review by His Majesty at Spithead and the extensive naval manœuvres which followed it. So far as the Navy was concerned, he considered Home Defense reasonably secure: but this consideration did not suffice to absolve us from the necessity of keeping a certain number of troops at home. After this discussion it was decided

that two divisions must for the moment remain behind, and that one cavalry division and four divisions of all arms should be sent out as speedily as possible.”

It is evident, from the character of this Council of War, and from the standing of the Army leaders who were called upon for advice on the statement of the Admiralty, that the idea of a German invasion of Great Britain was not a political or press bugbear, but a serious conviction of the Admiralty and War Office. The action of this War Council showed that this invasion idea was strong enough in the minds of the best British Army and Navy authorities to keep British troops away from France in the great emergency.

But the first period passed without any enemy activity worthy of the name in the whole area of the North and Central Atlantic. The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had kept wide out in the Atlantic and had gone south of the Canaries. The *Dresden*, as explained, was on her way to the South Atlantic. The *Karlsruhe* had successfully hidden among the Bahamas, and on August 6 had met the German liner *Kronprinz Wilhelm* from New York at a rendezvous 120 miles northeast of Watling Island. There, on the same day, just after she had armed the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* with her extra guns, the *Karlsruhe* was sighted by Admiral Cradoek in the *Suffolk*, of whose Cruiser Squadron, the *Bristol* was north of the German cruiser and the *Berwick* south of her. After exchanging shots with the *Bristol*, the *Karlsruhe* doubled back to the south, and, making good use of her speed, eluded the British cruisers.

It is hard to see how Captain Kohler could have escaped, if he had been pursued more persistently. He was so short of coal, that, soon after the British had lost

contact with him, he had no choice but to lay a direct course for San Juan, Porto Rico, and he was obliged to proceed at a slow speed. Yet he was enabled to reach San Juan; he coaled there; and then proceeded to Curacoa without encountering enemy vessels.¹

Admiral Cradock had hurried north on rumors of German raiders in the North Atlantic, which proved to be unfounded, "and the Admiralty's attention was now shifted to the Southern area."² Admiral Cradock, at Halifax, transferred his flag to the *Good Hope*, and sailed to reinforce the southern area of his command. "So by August 14, less than ten days after the declaration of war, the northern trade routes were completely secured and on that day, in response to an inquiry from Paris, the Admiralty could report, 'The passage across the Atlantic is safe. British Trade is running as usual.'"³

Sir Julian Corbett has declared: "It was only in the Mediterranean, where Admiral Souchon was in command of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, that we had met with failure." As to this British miscarriage in the Mediterranean, its causes could not be more graphically expressed than by the British historian's description of the instructions given to Admiral Milne, "to watch the Adriatic, to shadow the enemy's cruisers, not to be brought into action by superior forces⁴ and to cover the French transports." Admiral Milne, in his own account,

¹ The following comment of Sir Julian Corbett should also be noted: "Had the British ship been able to develop her power speed it would have been by no means hopeless. Nominally the *Karlsruhe* had less than a knot's advantage, but in spite of all she could do the *Bristol's* speed kept falling."

² Sir Julian Corbett.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ "Except in combination with the French as part of a general battle, do not at this stage be brought into action against superior forces. The

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has also given a like summary of his instructions from the Admiralty, and there is no doubt as to the complexity of orders which were given for the ensuing operations in the Mediterranean.

On August 3, at 8.30 A.M., with the whereabouts of the two German ships yet unknown, Admiral Milne, from Malta, had "ordered Rear-Admiral Troubridge . . . to send the light cruiser *Gloucester* and the eight destroyers to the mouth of the Adriatic, while the rest of his squadron was to pass south of Sicily and to the westward. The light cruiser *Chatham* was ordered to pass westward along the north coast of Sicily. The light cruisers *Dublin* and *Weymouth* were set to watch the Malta Channel. These dispositions were made in case the German ships should endeavor to pass westward, and they were reported to the Admiralty."¹

At 1.30 P.M. (August 3) the British Admiral "made further dispositions," and the two battle cruisers *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable* were ordered to proceed westward to search for the *Goeben*.² "The idea now arose in the Admiralty, owing perhaps to the unprotected nature of our trade routes, that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were making for the Atlantic,"³ and the two British battle cruisers, which were already on their way westward, "were ordered to proceed at 22 knots to Gibraltar." Admiral Milne who had left Malta in the *In-*

speed of your Squadron is sufficient to enable you to choose your moment. You must husband your force at the outset and we shall hope later to reinforce the Mediterranean." — Admiralty Instructions, July 30, 1916.

¹ "Flight of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*." — Admiral Milne.

² "In accordance with the original instructions allocating these ships for that purpose." — Ibid.

³ Sir Julian Corbett. — "There was never the least suggestion that they might escape elsewhere."

flexible to take up a position in the Malta Channel, received this order from the Admiralty, August 3 at 8.30 P.M.

On the morning of August 4, all doubt as to the whereabouts of the German ships was ended. At daybreak the *Goeben* bombarded Philippeville and the *Breslau* bombarded Bona, both French African ports. At each point the bombardment was short, with no important damage.

In the original plans for war, it had been intended that the troops from Africa should be transported to France in ships which "must leave at the dates fixed, singly, and take the route at maximum speed for the debarkation port, which is Cette. The obligation to make maximum speed excludes the idea of convoys."¹ The safety of these transports was to be assured "by covering them from a distance which the offensive of the battle fleet will procure them at the beginning of hostilities, with an objective of acquiring mastery of the sea in the Western Mediterranean."²

These instructions were again given to Admiral Lapeyrère in a telegram of August 2, 4 P.M.: "German ships *Goeben* and *Breslau* arrived at Brindisi during the night of Friday and Saturday (July 31–August 1). Get under way and if signal is made to you hostilities have commenced stop them. Council of ministers have again decided that transport of special troops will be done by isolated ships. War Department accepts all risks from this."

In his report Admiral Lapeyrère has stated that he received this telegram at 8.50 P.M., that he "had had

¹ Report of Naval Committee of the French Chamber of Deputies.

² *Ibid.*

fires started immediately," and that he sailed from Toulon August 3, 4 A.M. But the French Admiral added: "I have spoken of all the importance which I attached to the immediate protection of the transports, independently of covering from a distance, and I decided to employ all our forces, reserving to myself to concentrate the squadrons of the first line in the East if the expected attitude of Italy should change."¹

The French Fleet proceeded in three groups, for Philippeville, Algiers, and Oran. At 4.50 A.M., August 4, Admiral Lapeyrère learned by radio, "almost at the moment it was happening," of the bombardment of Bona and Philippeville. The French Admiral at once deflected the Philippeville group towards Algiers at full speed, to which port his own group was bound. Admiral Lapeyrère has stated in his report: "Hoping that they would continue their demonstration along the coast, I forced the speed in order to intercept them at Algiers." The French Admiral then made dispositions for the night of August 4-5 "in such a manner as to allow the enemy to approach Algiers and to encircle him if he presented himself" — and Admiral Lapeyrère stolidly added, "He did not appear," thus summing up very effectively this useless movement which he had made without seeking any information of his enemy.

In fact, from this time, the French Commander-in-Chief did not concern himself with anything but conveying the transports. In this changed interpretation

¹ Admiral Milne's telegram—"Admiralty desires combination between French Forces and English Fleet. How am I able to aid you the most?" —arrived at Toulon after the departure of the French Fleet, and was forwarded August 3, 5 P.M., to Admiral Lapeyrère.

of his duty he was supported by the French Secretary of the Navy.¹ But with all due allowance for the need of convoys, with the German ships footloose in the Mediterranean, there was no excuse for tying his whole great force² to a task that prevented getting information of his armed enemy and seeking him out. It was not until the night of August 6-7 that Admiral Lapeyrière offered to place a squadron of armored cruisers at Admiral Milne's disposal.

On the other hand, it was then evident that the French Admiral was not making any demands upon Admiral Milne. Safeguarding the French transports was no longer an influence upon the British dispositions, which from this time were affected by the preconceived idea that the German ships would attempt to escape westward and get into the Atlantic.

Admiral Milne received the news August 4 at 8.30 A.M. that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had bombarded the French African ports, and that forenoon these two German ships, steaming eastward, were sighted by the two British battle cruisers *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable*, which were then on their way to Gibraltar as explained. The British ships then turned, and attempted to shadow the *Goeben* and *Breslau* on their eastward course. For a long time, on this day, the British and German ships were within range of one another, but the British Cabinet had announced the decision that no act of war should be committed before the expiration of the British

¹ ". . . but that he supported unreservedly the Commander-in-Chief of the French Fleet." — Report of the Naval Committee of the French Chamber of Deputies.

² "Thus for covering the passage of their African Army from Algeria to Toulon, there was provided a force of sixteen battleships, six armored cruisers and twenty-four destroyers." — Admiral Milne.

ultimatum to Germany, at midnight August 4.¹ However, as darkness approached, "the *Goeben*, fresh from her overhaul, was getting away from our comparatively slow ships, which had not been in dock for some time and whose engine rooms were understaffed.² In her efforts to escape it is said she did two knots over her official speed,³ while the *Indomitable* could not reach her best. Captain Kennedy then ordered the *Indefatigable* and the *Dublin*, which had joined the chase from Bizerta, to carry on. Still the *Goeben* gained, and as the hours of our ultimatum were expiring only the *Dublin* had her in sight."⁴ This British light cruiser lost the German ships just before 10 P.M. off Cape San Vito, on the north coast of Sicily, and turned back to join, off the west coast of Sicily, the two British battle cruisers, both of which had turned back, at about 7 P.M. The *Goeben* and *Breslau*, thus freed from observation, reached Messina at about 5 A.M., August 5.

¹ Admiralty to all ships, August 4, 2.05 P.M.: "The British ultimatum to Germany will expire at midnight Greenwich mean time August 4. No act of war should be committed before that hour, at which time the telegram to commence hostilities against Germany will be dispatched from the Admiralty."

"Special addition to Mediterranean, *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable*. This cancels the authorization to *Indomitable* and *Indefatigable* to engage *Goeben* if she attacks French transports."

² A similar contrast in efficiency was stated by Sir Julian Corbett in the case of the *Karlsruhe*: "Had the British ship been able to develop her power speed it would have been by no means hopeless. Nominally the *Karlsruhe* had less than a knot's advantage, but in spite of all she could do the *Bristol's* speed kept falling."

³ Admiral Souchon has stated that there were serious defects in the boiler tubes of the *Goeben*, which interfered with her speed, except on this run of August 4. But it is established that the *Goeben* actually drew away from the two British battle cruisers at this time — and this was the only time that a test of speed was demanded of the *Goeben* in her escape to Constantinople.

⁴ Sir Julian Corbett.

Italy had declared neutrality, and the British naval forces operating against the two German ships had been instructed not to use Italian waters.¹ But this was only the usual condition, in international law, governing conduct against an enemy ship that had entered a neutral port. Equally, of course, it was a provision of international law that the stay of the two German ships in Italian waters must be limited or they would have to be interned, and Admiral Souchon faced the immediate necessity of a vital decision as to his future course.

Upon the outbreak of war, the German Admiral's orders had been to attempt to get his ships into the Dardanelles. These instructions had been given to him "on August 3d, as news had come of the conclusion of our alliance with Turkey."² But on August 5, the day the *Goeben* and *Breslau* arrived at Messina, this order was cancelled, "as the embassy at Constantinople, in view of the position there, thought that their arrival would not yet be desirable. The vessels were now instructed to go to Pola or else to break through into the Atlantic."³

Admiral Tirpitz's account of the situation at the time the two German ships were in Messina (August 5-6) is most instructive: "When the *Goeben* and *Breslau* arrived at Messina, after successful bombardments of Algerian ports, they met neither the Italians nor the

¹ Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief in Mediterranean, August 4, 12.55 P.M.: "Italian Government have declared neutrality. You are to respect this neutrality rigidly and should not allow any of His Majesty's ships to come within six miles of Italian coast."

² Admiral Tirpitz. But, as will be explained, Turkey did not finally cast her lot with Germany until influenced by the arrival of the *Goeben* at Constantinople.

³ *Ibid.*

Austrians, and the former, who had declared strict neutrality, scarcely allowed them one coaling at Messina. Enemy ships were cruising at both ends of the straits. As Austria had not yet declared war against the powers ranged against us, difficulties of form stood in the way of our gaining help from the Austrian fleet. The Admiralty's demands were answered on the afternoon of August 5th by the Foreign Office to the effect that our ambassador at Vienna had been instructed to press urgently for a declaration of war. In the evening the news arrived that the Austrian naval commander, owing to the position, the distance, and the state of readiness of his fleet, was unable to help — a typical instance of our preparation for the war in the political field. Under the circumstances Admiral Souchon was informed by telegram that he might himself choose in what direction he should break through. He thereupon, following the lines of the orders he had at first received, chose the way to Constantinople."

This was a most able decision on the part of Admiral Souchon, who thus used his initiative to act promptly, in accordance with the far seeing naval policy which had been implied in his original instructions. The result of this clear-headed solution of his problem by the German Commander was of the greatest strategic advantage to the Central Powers.

At 1.15 A.M. (August 5) Admiral Milne had received "the order to commence hostilities against Germany." Admiral Milne's description of his dispositions of the naval forces under his command was as follows: "At about 11 A.M. on 5th August, *Inflexible* (flag), *Indomitable*, *Indefatigable*, *Dublin*, *Weymouth*, *Chatham* and three destroyers were assembled off Pantellaria Island,

midway in the channel between the African coast and Sicily. *Dublin* was sent back to Malta, there to coal and thence to proceed with two destroyers to join Rear Admiral Troubridge at the mouth of the Adriatic (First Cruiser Squadron, *Defence*, flag, *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Warrior*). *Indomitable* and three destroyers went to Bizerta to coal. *Inflexible*, flag, with *Indefatigable*, *Chatham* and *Weymouth*, patrolled on a line northward from Bizerta, being thus disposed to intercept the German ships should they attempt to escape westward." The light cruiser *Gloucester* had been detached the day before to watch the southern end of the Straits of Messina.

Admiral Milne has also stated: "At 5 p.m. on Wednesday, 5th August, the German ships were reported to be coaling in Messina." Consequently there was no longer the slightest element of uncertainty as to the location of the enemy ships. It was, from August 5, merely a question of the conduct of operations.

The outstanding feature of Admiral Milne's own statement of his dispositions is the fact that all three of the British battle cruisers were gathered on the west, to prevent an escape of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* to westward. Admiral Milne's own words leave no doubt upon this matter: "In accordance with these instructions, dispositions were made to prevent the German ships from going westward."

Moreover, as the British Admiral has also made evident, this preconceived idea of the German movements was so strong, that no thought of Admiral Souchon's intention to go into the Dardanelles was entertained. Admiral Milne has stated: "Had there been any conjecture that the *Goeben* would try to pass the Darda-

nelles, it would have been weakened by the information that mines had been laid and lights extinguished. But, in fact, there was no such conjecture." Sir Julian Corbett has also confirmed the fact that the "forlorn hope" of making the Dardanelles was "the only one that had not entered into our calculations."¹ And the British naval historian has also made the astonishing statement: "That Germany, with the load she already had upon her, intended to attempt the absorption of Turkey was then beyond belief." This shows a complete failure to understand the objectives of Germany in Turkey, and also makes evident the defect, which has been explained, that the prevailing limited and material viewpoint of the British Admiralty did not include a naval strategy that would grasp the import of domination of the Dardanelles.

On August 5 the Admiralty had telegraphed to Admiral Milne that Austria-Hungary had not yet declared war against France and Great Britain, and instructing him to continue to watch the entrance of the Adriatic to prevent the German ships from entering or the Austrian Fleet from emerging unobserved. It was also known that the German mail steamer *General* had landed passengers at Messina and was "at the disposition of the *Goeben*."

The British Commander-in-Chief has stated that he began "a sweep to the eastward, north of Sicily," on August 6, and "by 4.40 P.M." he "determined to close the northern entrance to the Strait of Messina," using the *Inflexible*, *Indefatigable*,² *Weymouth*, with the *Chat-*

¹ "Pola seemed her only refuge throughout the Mediterranean. According to international law nothing but internment awaited her elsewhere. The Turks had kept their secret well."—Winston Churchill: "The World Crisis."

² *Indomitable* was also on the west, coaling at Bizerta.

ham, which was "ordered to proceed at 20 knots to Milazzo Point, off Messina, and was informed of the position which would be occupied by the two battle cruisers and *Weymouth* at midnight."

Only half an hour after Admiral Milne had decided upon these dispositions, the light cruiser *Gloucester*, which was the only British ship watching the southern outlet of the Strait of Messina, reported the *Goeben* coming out of the southern end of the Strait and steering eastward, with the *Breslau* a mile astern. The two German ships steered east, then northeast as if to enter the Adriatic, and then southeast for the Aegean, the *Breslau* turning southeast first to feel the way for the *Goeben*. The British light cruiser *Gloucester* alone followed the German ships for some twenty four hours, signaling their positions to the British Fleet. This close observation by her commanding officer, Captain Kelly, was the only case of proper observation in the whole affair.

In fact, the break through of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* encountered none of the difficulties expected by the Germans, and the success of Admiral Souchon's bold move was assured from the start. His escape was no matter of hair-breadth misses and lucky accidents. It was easily successful for the simple reason that there were no British naval forces in position to stop him. The three British battle cruisers were hopelessly out of touch on the west, as described. And Rear Admiral Troubridge's First Cruiser Squadron, which was to watch the Adriatic, was then off the coast of Cephalonia "on the look out for a German collier."¹

This favored the German ships. Rear Admiral Trou-

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

bridge deemed his four armored cruisers an inferior force,¹ which could only engage the *Goeben* at night, or under other circumstances that would prevent the German battle cruisers from being able to choose the range. Consequently, at the first information of the Germans' deceptive northeast course, Rear Admiral Troubridge "held on for the position he had originally intended to take at Fano Island, just north of Corfu, where he hoped the confined and shoal waters would enable him to force an action, at his own range."²

With the British First Cruiser Squadron thus well on its way to the northeast, the *Breslau*, which had first turned to the southeast and was wide of the *Goeben* to the south, could report all clear on their course for the Aegean, and the two German ships were thus enabled to head for the Cervi Channel, between the southern end of Greece and the island of Kithera.

Rear Admiral Troubridge was informed by the *Gloucester* of the change of course of the German ships to southeast, and turned back the First Cruiser Squadron, to give chase. But it was midnight (August 6-7), and it was a hopeless task to try to bring his squadron into action in the dark hours. "His intention had been to engage the *Goeben* if he could get contact before 6 A.M., since that was the only chance of his being able to engage her closely enough for any prospect of success, and when he found it impossible he thought it his duty not to risk his squadron against an enemy who by his superiority in speed and gun-power, could choose his distance and outrange him."³

¹ "Justified in regarding the enemy's force as superior to his own in daylight." — Finding of Court Martial on Rear Admiral Troubridge.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

³ *Ibid.*

For this reason, and because "he had received no authority to quit his position, nor order to support the *Gloucester*,"¹ Rear Admiral Troubridge gave up the chase in the morning of August 7 and "went into Zante preparatory to resuming his watch on the Adriatic."² The light cruiser *Dublin*, with two destroyers, from Malta had attempted "to head off the chase"³ in the night of August 6-7 and to get in a torpedo attack, but had not found the German ships and had proceeded to join the First Cruiser Squadron.

The *Goeben* and *Breslau* were thus only followed by the *Gloucester*, which exchanged shots with the *Breslau* between 1 and 2 P.M. on August 7. But the *Gloucester* was recalled at 4.40 P.M., off Cape Matapan, with a last report that the two German ships "could be seen holding eastward through the Cervi Channel." Thus easily did the *Goeben* and *Breslau* draw clear into the Aegean. The two German ships were enabled to coal at the island of Denusa (August 8-10) and to keep on undisturbed to the Dardanelles, which they entered on the afternoon of August 10.

Admiral Milne's three British battle cruisers, and the light cruisers with them, never became a factor in the situation. On the night of August 6, after hearing of the escape of the two German ships, Admiral Milne came around the western coast of Sicily,⁴ and with the *Inflexible*, *Indefatigable*, and *Weymouth*, arrived at Malta at noon Friday, August 7, where it was necessary for these ships to coal. The *Indomitable*, after coaling at Bizerta, also arrived at Malta, shortly afterwards, and

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ A telegram from the Admiralty, directing him to follow the *Goeben* "through the Strait of Messina," was received when he was too far on the west coast of Sicily.

developed "boiler defects, which made it necessary to spend twelve hours in Malta repairing them."¹

Admiral Milne, with all these ships, left Malta "before 1 A.M.," August 8, "to search for the *Goeben* and *Breslau*."² At 2 P.M., August 8, when half way between Sicily and Greece, Admiral Milne received a telegram "ordering hostilities against Austria to begin at once."³ This was a "mistaken telegram,"⁴ which caused Admiral Milne to order his whole command to concentrate at a rendezvous 100 miles southwest of Cephalonia. This mistake was not definitely corrected for Admiral Milne until August 9, at noon, when he "received orders to resume the search."⁵

Of course it was then much too late to accomplish anything, but it should be noted that, even at this stage, the British Commander-in-Chief has stated: "Under these conditions it was clearly my duty to keep the German ships to the north. Therefore the battle cruisers must remain in the southwest part of the Aegean until definite information of the positions of the German ships could be obtained."

After the Admiralty had obtained information (August 11) that the two German ships had gone into the Dardanelles, Admiral Milne received "instructions to keep watch in case the German ships came out."⁶ On August 12 a Turkish military officer came out on a torpedo boat, and informed the commander of the *Weymouth* that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were at Constantinople and had been purchased by the Turkish Government.

¹ Admiral Milne.

³ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*


⁶ The first Admiralty order was "to establish a blockade of the Dardanelles." This was modified to the form given.

Thus was ended what can only be considered a chapter of errors on one side and an example of resolute conduct and initiative on the other. The results of this contretemps were out of all proportion to the force of the two German ships. As Admiral Tirpitz has expressed it, "The whole Turkish question received its definite favorable ending through the success of this breakthrough."

III. SITUATION IN MEDITERRANEAN, AUGUST 6, 1914, AND ITS RESULTS

(This map is diagrammatic only)

- (A) Italy had declared neutrality.
- (B) Austro-Hungarian Fleet unprepared and inactive.
- (1) French Fleet solely occupied in convoying transportation of troops from Africa.
- (2) *Goeben* and *Breslau*, after bombarding Bona and Philippeville, at Messina, constrained to leave after twenty four hours stay according to international law.
- (3) Concentration of all three British battle cruisers on the west to prevent escape of *Goeben* and *Breslau* in that direction.
- (4) British First Cruiser Squadron off northern coast of Greece.
- (5) British cruiser *Gloucester*, alone guarding eastern exit from Strait of Messina Course of *Goeben* and *Breslau* in escape from Messina, unopposed and only observed by the cruiser *Gloucester*.
- (6) *Goeben* and *Breslau* stopped to coal at Denusa August 8/10 and arrived in Dardanelles August 10, 5 P.M., and exerted a deciding influence in bringing Turkey into the World War on the side of Germany.



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CHAPTER VII

THE FAR EAST, AUGUST 1914

(See Map at page 138)

THE operations of the German cruisers in the Pacific make a most interesting part of the naval history of the World War. It is true that, in consequence of the explained German naval policy of relegating cruiser warfare to secondary importance, the strength of their Cruiser Squadron was so small that it could not have any lasting effect upon the course of the World War, and it was also inevitable that any local successes must be of short duration. But the conduct of Admiral Spee, and of the officers under his command, is well worth studying as an example of able direction and methods. It is for this reason that it is proper to give space to these operations in the Pacific out of proportion to the actual results obtained.

Two broad conditions, which existed for the German naval forces in the Far East, must be kept in mind. In the first place, in spite of the fact that Admiral Spee's few cruisers were a hopelessly inferior force, foredoomed to be shut off from regular bases and sources of supply, yet they possessed all the advantages of the years devoted to German preparation in the East, at the earlier stage when cruiser warfare was to be given a more important rôle in German naval plans. They thus had at their command the whole resultant efficient system, which the Germans had carefully developed, as described in a preceding chapter. This system had provided in advance for the German cruisers unsuspected

resources of secret fitting out places and organized outlying supply districts. The other condition was the fact that Admiral Spee was practically isolated and not controlled by the German Admiralty Staff.¹ Consequently Admiral Spee, and any of his detached officers, had to act upon personal initiative in the ensuing operations, and must be given the credit for any successes gained.

As has been explained, Admiral Spee had heard the news of the declaration of war by Great Britain when he was at Ponape, where he was joined by the light cruiser *Nürnberg* in the morning of August 6. Up to the time of this definite declaration of war, Admiral Spee had been hampered by the doubt as to Great Britain's attitude. The German naval plan, which had been prepared for cruiser warfare "in case of war situation B (with France and Russia only),"² had comprised an "advance against French-Indo-China" by way of the Palau Islands. But on August 4, even before the declaration of war by Great Britain, Admiral Spee had decided: "An undertaking against Cochin-China is not advisable under these circumstances. For the time being I must keep the Squadron in hiding."³

Consequently Admiral Spee determined to use one of the prepared secret fitting out places, Pagan Island. "This island, owing to its central location with respect to the region embraced in the East Asia Station — it is about equidistant from Hakodate, Tsingtau, Shanghai, Amoy, Manila and the Celebes — was selected as prin-

¹ "Any intervention by the home authorities might be disastrous. The Chief of the Cruiser Squadron must, as hitherto, be allowed entire freedom of action." — "The War at Sea."

² Ibid.

³ "The uncertainty as to whether England was hostile or not could considerably interfere with the procedure from Palau on." — Ibid.

incipal point of assembly for the colliers and auxiliary cruisers, which were to be sent out by the East Asia district and could be counted upon to arrive from August 10 on.”¹

In pursuance of this decision, after filling the bunkers of the *Nürnberg* with coal from the *Fukoku Maru*,² the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, and *Titania* sailed for Pagan at nightfall August 6. The voyage was arranged to include target and battle practice, and for the Squadron to arrive at Pagan on August 11.

As has been explained, Captain Müller of the *Emden* had been left Senior Officer at the German base of Tsingtau. This very efficient naval officer had two most important duties to perform. He had to be the means of communication, to keep Admiral Spee informed of the progress of events, and he had to put into operation the long planned secret services of supply.

In performing these duties, Captain Müller showed notable initiative. He decided that the most effective way to get out colliers from Tsingtau would be “by having the *Emden* endeavor to draw the enemy’s naval force away from Tsingtau by attacks upon his commerce in East Asia waters,”³ and it was vitally important that he should “also, under all circumstances, avoid being shut up at Tsingtau by the English forces reported present at Wei-Hai-Wei.”⁴

Accordingly he put to sea in the *Emden*, July 31, having previously directed the Tsingtau district, upon receipt of the announcement of “menace of war,” to trans-

¹ “The War at Sea.”

² “Which was then despatched to Samoa in accordance with her peace itinerary in order that the whereabouts of the Squadron should not be betrayed prematurely.” — Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

mit instructions to the Shanghai and Tokyo offices: "Five thousand tons coal to Pagan, five thousand tons to Point of Assembly A ($35^{\circ} 51'$ North, $120^{\circ} 20'$ East), further shipments to Point of Assembly B (25° North, 135° East)."

Upon reaching the open sea, the *Emden* proceeded about 20 nautical miles north of Socrates Rocks, standing off from the trade routes and avoiding British warships, in constant communication with the high power wireless station at Tsingtau. Through this station, after receiving at sea the "menace of war" message on August 1, Captain Müller issued the following additional orders:

1. To the Tsingtau office: "Endeavor to bring the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* to Tsingtau."

2. To the Tokyo office: "Requisition German steamers now at Japan for conveying coal, send *Yorck* with as much coal as possible as an auxiliary cruiser to Pagan."

3. To the Manila office: "*Princess Alice* to proceed to Pagan with all possible coal to be fitted out as an auxiliary cruiser."

4. To the Manila and Batavia offices: "Begin shipment of coal in accordance with instructions."

5. To all the offices: "Take measures to warn German merchant ships at sea."

After receiving the report of the outbreak of war with Russia (on August 3), the *Emden* steered eastward for the Nagasaki-Vladivostok steamer route, and, in the morning of August 4, captured the Russian steamer *Rjasan*. This ship Captain Müller thought suitable for arming as an auxiliary cruiser, and he determined to take it into Tsingtau. Even after receiving the news of Great Britain's declaration of war (on August 5), Cap-

tain Müller decided to keep on with his prize to Tsingtau, as he was short of coal, and would take the chances of evading a British blockade of the port.

At Tsingtau "the fitting out of the coal and supply steamers for the Cruiser Squadron was in full swing in the harbor."¹ The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was armed, using the equipment and crews of the gunboats *Luchs* and *Tiger*. The *Rjasan* was armed from the *Cormoran*, being in turn called the *Cormoran*.

On August 5 the information of Admiral Spee's decision was received at Tsingtau in a radio message: "*Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg* and *Titania* will probably reach Pagan on August 10. *Emden* to proceed thither. Colliers already on their way to Points of Assembly A and B to be directed to Pagan." The proper messages, to insure carrying out these instructions, were at once sent to the different districts from Tsingtau.

The *Emden*, the two newly armed auxiliaries, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and *Cormoran*, and the supply ships had no difficulty in getting away from Tsingtau. In fact the expected blockade by the British ships did not exist in time to stop them. Of Admiral Jerram's China Squadron, the Admiral himself, with the *Minotaur*, *Hampshire*, and *Newcastle*, had made a "detour"² to destroy the wireless station at Yap (destroyed August 12), while Captain Fitzmaurice, with the *Triumph*, *Yarmouth*, and the French cruiser *Dupleix*, with five destroyers, "went directly up the trade route to establish a watch on Tsingtau and prevent colliers and merchant cruisers getting out."³

¹ "The War at Sea."

² "It meant a big detour on the way to Tsingtau and only the *Minotaur*, *Hampshire* and *Newcastle* had sufficient coal endurance to do it." — Sir Julian Corbett.

³ *Ibid.*

Captain Fitzmaurice coaled at the Saddle Islands on August 8, and the next morning made a sweep to the northeast, after taking in some signals from the *Emden*. "He actually crossed her track, but it was forty-eight hours after she had passed Quelpart, and nothing was seen of her or the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and her convoy. Still he had now made good the ground as high as Shanghai and could advise all shipping to continue trading. This he did on the 9th, and the next day as he turned back to his rendezvous at the Saddle Islands another vessel came out from Tsingtau. This was the Russian volunteer ship *Rjasan*, the *Emden's* prize now converted as a merchant cruiser and named *Cormoran*." ¹

The *Emden* had left Tsingtau August 6, shortly before nightfall, with the *Eitel Friedrich* and the collier *Markomania*. "By a brief sweep as far as Cape Yatau, in which the torpedo-boat S 90 participated, the *Emden* ascertained there was as yet no blockade or guard of Tsingtau by enemy forces." ² The *Cormoran*, as has been shown, was able to break out August 10. Sir Julian Corbett has stated, of the British efforts to blockade Tsingtau, ". . . and though his squadron had been reinforced by the *Empress of Asia*, it was not till August 20, after the two detached cruisers had rejoined, that he was able to establish anything like a close watch upon the German base."

The ships, which came out of Tsingtau and joined the German Squadron, were: cruiser *Emden*; armed auxiliaries, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and *Cormoran*; supply ships, *Staatssekretar Kratke*, *Gouverneur Jaschke*, *Markomania*, *Longmoon*, *O. J. D. Ahlers*. This list is enough to show the harm that was done by the failure to close

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² "The War at Sea."

promptly the one regular German base, a measure which, in fact, had been feared by the Germans from the beginning.¹ This failure was more notable because the British had information that the only German naval forces at Tsingtau were the lightly armed *Emden* and her weak auxiliaries.²

It also should be pointed out that the long "detour" of Admiral Jerram's squadron to Yap was not in any sense an adequate expedition to gain information of the German armed forces and to seek contact with them. The British had better information than had Admiral Spee of the coming entry of Japan. Yet, even with this knowledge that Japanese naval forces would take over the China areas, there was no attempt to form a British naval force that would search for information of Admiral Spee's Cruiser Squadron and follow it up to an inevitable action. As has been stated, British naval strategy had neglected to make its primary object seeking the enemy's armed forces. The separate dispositions were continued. "From now onward Admiral Patey had his hands more than full with the Australian and New Zealand Expeditions which were being organized against the German possessions in the Bismarck Archipelago and Samoa, and Admiral Jerram had received orders to cover the passage of troops."³

It was also evident that, at this stage, the British were handicapped by their failure to provide for the use of colliers in company with their ships or met at rendez-

¹ As explained in the text, this was the reason for the first sortie of the *Emden* on July 31.

² "According to his latest intelligence there was nothing at Tsingtau except the German cruiser *Emden*, four German gunboats *Iltis*, *Tiger*, *Luchs* and *Cormoran* and one old Austrian cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*." — Sir Julian Corbett.

³ *Ibid.*

vous at sea. By these means the Germans had greatly increased their mobility and efficiency, but the British were at a disadvantage, especially in coaling. There was an illustration of this when Admiral Jerram was on his expedition to Yap. Sir Julian Corbett has stated: "On August 11 as he approached his objective he was rewarded by capturing the German SS. *Elsbeth* with 1800 tons of Government coal from Tsingtau to Yap. As a prize crew could not be spared and the weather was too bad to coal from her, she was sunk by gunfire." And of the very next day (August 12), the British naval historian continued, "By this time the *Hampshire* was so short of coal that the Admiral ordered her back to Hongkong with the *Elsbeth's* crew." To sink 1800 tons of coal, the day before he had to detach a ship to a distant port to coal, was a helpless performance.

At dawn, on August 11, Admiral Spee's Squadron had arrived at Pagan Island. On the next day the *Emden* and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* came in, and, by August 13, there were also anchored there coal and supply ships, as follows: *Holsatia*, *Mark*, *Gouverneur Joeschke*, *Staatssekretar Kratke*, *Yorck*, *Longmoon*, *Prinz Waldemar*, *Markomania*. The *Cormoron* was also in touch by wireless. This successful assembly of ships at a secret rendezvous was a testimonial to the efficiency of the German organization in the Far East, in spite of the fact that "new mobilization instructions" were not sent out until June.

"On the arrival of the German Cruiser Squadron at Pagan, the fitting out of the ships with materials and supplies of all kinds from the supply steamers began at once."¹ This meant that Admiral Spee was in a safe

¹ "The War at Sea."

position to make his decision as to the future operations of his Squadron, with ample supplies, and the enemy in complete ignorance of his location.

The hostile attitude of Japan was by this time so unmistakable, that Admiral Spee, before he arrived at Pagan, had become convinced that any idea of engaging his fleet in cruiser warfare in the East Asia areas should be given up. The naval superiority of Japan was so great in those waters that the German cruisers would be run down and destroyed in short order. On August 10 he made the following comment: "The news concerning Japan's attitude must hasten our advance to the southward in order that we shall not be caught here."

On August 13, after more alarming news as to Japan, "the considerations of the Chief of Squadron crystallized into a decision."¹ On that day Admiral Spee called a conference of his officers, which Captain Müller of the *Emden* has reported as follows: "The Chief of Squadron unfolded his views regarding the situation and the most suitable course for the Squadron to pursue. He referred to the threatening attitude of Japan, and to the advantage which the keeping of the Squadron together for the longest possible time and the uncertainty concerning its movement and objectives would represent by tying up a large part of the enemy forces, and also as to the difficulties of obtaining coal, especially in view of the great consumption of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. After a thorough study of the situation he had decided to proceed with the Squadron at once to the west coast of America."

Captain Müller suggested sending one small cruiser to the Indian Ocean, and the journal of the Squadron

¹ "The War at Sea."

Commander stated, in this regard: "A single small cruiser which requires comparatively little coal and can fill up her bunkers under favorable circumstances from captured steamers, will be able to remain longer in the Indian Ocean than the Squadron would and, since the spoils from cruiser warfare in that region (where the Indian, East Asiatic and Australian commerce is united) would in fact be very high, it appears desirable to detach the *Emden*, which is the fastest of the small cruisers, with the best steam collier for this duty." Admiral Spee resolved to put to sea at once with the German Cruiser Squadron.

Accordingly, at 6 P.M. August 13, the eight colliers of the Squadron, with the auxiliary cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* as leader, put to sea from Pagan. At 6.30 P.M. the German Cruiser Squadron followed (*Scharnhorst*, flag, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, *Emden*, and *Titania*, tender). In the morning of August 14 the signal "*Emden* detached" was made, and the *Emden* left for her commerce destroying voyage in the Indian Ocean, with the collier *Markomannia* in attendance.

The last paragraph of the order to the *Emden* was: "I intend to proceed to the West Coast of America with the remaining vessels."

CHAPTER VIII

TRANSPORTING THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE THE ACTION IN THE HELIGOLAND BIGHT

(See Map at page 238)

IN the home areas, at this time of tension and anxiety on the part of the British Navy, and as the preparations were being made for transporting the British Expeditionary Force, the German Navy, far from having any of the prepared plans, which had been expected by the British Navy, for the offensive use of its U-boats, was actually only making the first tentative experiment to determine the possibility of using submarines for such an offensive. This was entirely contrary to the reports and information of the British Fleet, but it was the fact nevertheless.

The defensive dispositions about the Heligoland Bight and the German bases have been described — and the German naval plans had not gone beyond this use of their U-boats. But Captain Bauer, in command of the German U-boats, became convinced that this restricted mission of the submarine was inadequate. “He therefore represented to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet that only the offensive use of U-boats could bring about a change. The number of boats employed must certainly be larger, but the prospects of success would be greater still. The justice of this argument was recognized, and a decision was taken which was extremely important for the further course of the war.”¹

Accordingly the experiment was tried by sending out

¹ Admiral Scheer: “Germany’s High Sea Fleet.”

ten U-boats on August 6, to make a sweep, "in line ahead with seven mile intervals between them," three hundred miles northwest, then to lie in wait on a line between Scapa Flow and Stavanger. This first tentative offensive was directed against the British battleships. The weather was misty with a strong wind, and the enemy battleships were not found. One U-boat had to put back with engine trouble; two were lost. "All the rest carried out their allotted task and were back by August 11."¹

The following from Admiral Scheer is unmistakable, and, with the "waiting" attitude of Admiral Tirpitz which has been quoted, is proof positive of the neglect of the Germans to plan for an offensive use of their U-boats. "Our naval operations took a decisive turn as a result of this cruise, and though the change was gradually introduced, it dates from this enterprise. For that reason it has been described in rather more detail than would be justified, seeing that a tangible success was not achieved. The first proof of the ability of the submarine to remain at sea for a long period had been given, and progress was made along the lines I have mentioned, thanks to the greatest perseverance, so that the submarine, from being merely a coastal-defence machine, as was originally planned, became the most effective long-range weapon."

Consequently, the passage of the British Expeditionary Force was not really threatened by any danger. But the Allies had not realized this apathy of the Germans in naval matters, and it was the prevailing opinion that the undertaking was at great risks, which must be faced as the urgent need of the British reinforcement for the

¹ Admiral Scheer.

French was self-evident. The German armies were then making their enveloping sweep through Belgium, with such strong forces that it was vital to strengthen the French left.

For "some years," in advance, there had been an agreement between the British and French General Staffs, and "the area of concentration for British forces had been fixed on the left flank of the French."¹ The British War Office and Admiralty had also worked out the plans for landing the Force in France. The main port for embarkation from England was Southampton, for troops, animals, and hospital ships. The main port of arrival was Havre, though some transports proceeded up to Rouen, and a few to Boulogne. The principal port for stores was Newhaven, and for mechanical transport Avonmouth and Liverpool. Some units stationed in Scotland were to embark at Glasgow, and units from Ireland at Dublin, Queenstown, and Belfast. But the 6 Division was actually sent from Ireland to England to "concentrate to the north of London about Cambridge,"² on account of the unfounded apprehension of a German invasion.

As it was only a matter of transportation over the short distance of the width of the English Channel, it was obvious that covering forces could be used instead of convoying. "The system of cover was based on closing both ends of the Channel against raids, while the Grand Fleet took up a position from which it could strike the High Seas Fleet if the Germans should choose to risk it in an effort to prevent our Army joining hands with that of France."³

¹ Lord French: "1914."—"The German menace necessitated some preliminary understanding in the event of a sudden attack."

² Sir Julian Corbett.

³ Ibid.

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The movement was to begin on August 7, but it was delayed until August 9 because the British railroads had been occupied with transporting a large number of Territorials recalled from training camps. "The utmost secrecy was observed, and it was not till the morning of the 7th that the Admiralty had the word to put their operation orders in action. At the same time the Channel Fleet was given a new organization adapted to the special work in hand."¹ The make-up of this powerful covering force, the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Battle Squadrons is given in the accompanying table.²

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² On August 7, the Channel Fleet was constituted as follows:

Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
 Fleet Flagship: *Lord Nelson*
 Attached light cruiser: *Diamond*

FIFTH BATTLE SQUADRON

Rear Admiral Bernard Currey
 Rear Admiral C. F. Thursby, C. M. G.

<i>Prince of Wales</i> (flag)	<i>Bulwark</i>
<i>Queen</i> (2d flag)	<i>Formidable</i>
<i>Venerable</i>	<i>Implacable</i>
<i>Irresistible</i>	<i>London</i>

Topaz, Commander W. J. B. Law

SEVENTH BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice Admiral The Hon. Sir A. E. Bethell, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
 (Commanding 3d Fleet)

<i>Prince George</i> (flag)	<i>Jupiter</i> *
<i>Cæsar</i>	<i>Majestic</i> *

Sapphire

EIGHTH BATTLE SQUADRON

Rear Admiral H. L. Tottenham, C. B.
 (2d in Command 3d Fleet)

<i>Albion</i> (flag)	<i>Glory</i>
<i>Goliath</i>	<i>Ocean</i>
<i>Canopus</i>	<i>Vengeance</i>

Proserpine *

* In dockyard hands.

The squadrons were assembled at Portland; Southampton and Newhaven were closed to commerce; and all squadrons were in position on August 9. With the Fifth Battle Squadron, "cruising between the longitudes of Dungeness and the Owers," were also cruisers from the southern area of the North Sea. The Straits of Dover were held by the Boulogne Flotilla of French destroyers and submarines and the Dover Patrol (6th Flotilla), with advance lines of submarines and aircraft, and the flotillas of the Harwich Force "ready to form an advance patrol in the waters off the Dutch coast, known as the Broad Fourteens, and elsewhere as might be directed."

The western end of the Channel was also closed. The Anglo-French cruiser squadron was examining the traffic to stop possible disguised minelayers, and the Seventh and Eighth Battle Squadrons were patrolling the line between St. Alban's Head and Cherbourg.

The whole operation was accomplished without any attempt at interference on the part of the Germans. There actually were no reports of any German ships until August 18, "the last heavy day of the transport work." On that day, a German cruiser was sighted, and the German light cruiser *Rostock* was engaged, well to the north of the Straits of Dover. But this rencontre was no menace to the transports, and the whole British Expeditionary Force was safely landed, and in position on the left of the French Armies in time to take part in the first fighting with the oncoming Germans (Charleroi, August 22; Mons, August 23). The same immunity from German attack was shared by the 4 Division which was afterwards sent at General French's urgent call for reinforcements ("by the 23d the bulk of the troops were across").

But, while this successful operation was going on, there was grave anxiety for the Grand Fleet. The reported presence of German submarines in the North Sea was deemed sufficient cause for the Admiralty to send to Admiral Jellicoe "an order directing him to take the whole of his heavy ships north-west of the Orkneys at once well out of the infected areas."¹ (August 9) "One of the chief anxieties" came from the continued reports that the Germans were to use the Faroes and Lofotens for submarine bases near the fleet anchorage. The idea that the Germans had located his anchorage at Scapa caused Admiral Jellicoe to ask for another anchorage as an alternative. Measures were at once taken to establish this second war anchorage at Loch Ewe, on the northwest coast of Scotland.

It was an indication of the uncertain information and nervous tension, at the time, that the invasion scare suggested the idea that the Germans were planning a counterstroke. "On August 12 the Admiralty informed Admiral Jellicoe that in view of a possibility of an attempt at invasion² he ought to be nearer the decisive area than had hitherto been contemplated. They proposed, therefore, that he should bring the fleet back east of the Orkneys."³

Accordingly the Grand Fleet was concentrated in a midsea position in the North Sea, with additional cruisers drawn from the Northern Patrol, and in combination with a sweep northward of the Harwich flotillas and the

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Admiralty to Admiral Jellicoe, August 12, 1914, "We cannot wholly exclude the chance of an attempt at a landing during the week on a large scale supported by High Sea Fleet."

³ Sir Julian Corbett. — "It was to meet this situation that the VI Division was to come over from Ireland and concentrate at Cambridge."

Seventh Cruiser Squadron. These naval forces in the south had been constituted as the "Southern Force," to operate under the direct orders of the Admiralty, in response to a request from Admiral Jellicoe, who found communication with the southern area very difficult.

During August 15-16-17, the transports made 137 passages, a total of over 500,000 tons, with these strong British naval forces keeping a close watch in the North Sea. But on the last of these days the squadrons were sent back to their stations, the Dreadnought Squadrons using the new base at Loch Ewe for the first time. After this, sweeps southward by the Grand Fleet were forbidden, and a new force was constituted, with the Humber as its base, the battle cruisers *Invincible* and *New Zealand*, with three new light cruisers of the *Arethusa* class. The idea of this force was to give a stronger support for the destroyer patrols, which had been shifted farther south, and to threaten the retreat of an enemy attempting anything to southward.

By these dispositions the Southern Force was strengthened — and, in view of the military situation, defense of the southern area was most necessary, as this implied also the defense of the lines of supply for the British Army in France.

It was typical of the confusion and anxiety of this period that "an idea was growing that the inexplicable inactivity of the High Sea Fleet possibly portended that the enemy was contemplating an organized attack with his heavy cruisers on our weak commerce protecting squadrons that were scattered on the great trade routes." ¹ For this reason the Admiralty decided to send to each of four of these squadrons an old battleship to

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

furnish "a rallying point" — and the British naval historian most aptly describes this measure as reverting to "the old days"!¹ The *Glory* had been sent to Halifax, the *Canopus* to the Cape Verde station, the *Albion* to the Cape St. Vincent—Finisterre station, the *Ocean* to Queenstown.

The Allied naval forces were soon facing another grave anxiety, as the crisis approached of the great German assault upon France through Belgium.

From August 24 the Allied armies were falling back before the apparently overpowering German envelopment on their left. At once there was apprehension for the Channel ports, which were left unprotected as the Allied left swung back into France, and the Admiralty was occupied in considering what assistance could be given from the sea to avert the threatened loss of these ports.

With the fixed idea of the British leaders that the Germans had a plan to invade England, the strong hold of the invasion scare caused the War Office to insist, at this time, upon keeping the remaining troops in Great Britain for Home Defense, and there was no idea of using them as a nucleus for a force operating from the coast. For the same reason, these troops were not considered available for service in defense of Ostend, which was the most exposed of the Channel ports. The French had given assurances as to Dunkirk and Calais, and the British decided to do what they could for the defense of Ostend. Sir Julian Corbett has stated: "There was nothing approaching readiness except the Marine bat-

¹ ". . . and as in the old days it was the practice to strengthen such squadrons with a lesser ship of the line, so now it was thought well to detach some of the oldest battleships to furnish them with a rallying-point." — Sir Julian Corbett.

talions at Devonport, Portsmouth, and Chatham, some 3000 men, but even these were mainly composed of as yet unseasoned reservists and recruits. Still with the pied-à-terre established, better troops might follow."

Accordingly on August 25 these Marine battalions were ordered to Ostend. They were carried on cruisers and battleships of the Southern Force, and, in addition, to cover the movement, a naval operation against the Heligoland Bight was carried out, which will be described later in this chapter.

Owing to a combination of delays and bad weather, it was three days before all the Marines were landed (August 28) at Ostend. But, very naturally, this occupation of the Channel port by so slight a force was found to be unsatisfactory. The only additions were exhausted troops from the retreating Belgian forces, and the decision to shift the army base of the British Expeditionary Force ended any idea of keeping the British Marines there. Consequently they were withdrawn August 31.

General French had decided on August 29 that the existing Havre base was too hazardous and that a new base must be established at St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire.¹

This was a great task, as, outside of the vast quantities of stores, including 60,000 tons of oil, the British transported 15,000 British troops, 35,000 French, mostly Territorials, 2000 Belgian. But it could be accomplished, as the British Transport Department, which had just carried over the British Expeditionary Force, was

¹ "Our communication with Havre being now dangerously threatened, it became necessary to effect a change of base and establish a fresh line. St. Nazaire and Nantes were fixed upon, with Le Mans as advanced base."
— Lord French: "1914."

ample and ready for immediate service. "In about a fortnight after the word was given, Rouen and Havre, as well as Boulogne, were clear, and by September 16 the last store ships had reached La Rochelle and Bordeaux."¹

But, as was said of the Antietam invasion which was the real crisis of the Civil War, "unknowingly, and with the narrowest possible margin of safety, the crisis had been passed."² Already, when the first moves were being made in shifting the British army base, General Joffre had been given time by the encircling movement of the German armies to shift French troops over to the Allied left, and the first days of September found sufficient forces in position against each of the German armies in their supposedly victorious advance.

This condition, which was entirely unsuspected by the Germans, had doomed the Schlieffen plan to failure. But, at this time, the Germans were swinging to the south-east, obsessed by their fixed plan and its apparent success, and not taking the slightest thought for the French Channel ports or anything else to the west of the area of Paris. Consequently the French Channel ports and the British base, which had been at the mercy of the enemy, were not even endangered by the actual operations of the Germans in their initial assault.³

The operation against the Heligoland Bight, which was carried out at the time of the occupation of Ostend, had been originally proposed by Commodore Keyes.

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Charles Francis Adams.

³ "So long as the Army hoped to capture Paris, I waited for the coast to fall into our hands of itself. I leave undiscussed the question whether it would have been right to treat the coast as the objective from the start."
— Admiral Tirpitz.

The British "Oversea" submarines had observed the German defensive dispositions about the Heligoland Bight, of which Admiral Scheer's description has been quoted. They had reported the shifts inward and outward of destroyers and cruisers, which regularly changed the defensive formations for daylight and for dark hours, and the possibility was pointed out of inflicting loss upon an enemy who was using this shifting system of defense.

A naval attack founded on this suggestion had been contemplated, but it was also intended as a diversion to cover the Ostend operation, and accordingly the attack was carried out on August 28. The original plan was for the Third and First Destroyer Flotillas, led respectively by the light cruisers *Arethusa* (flag of Commodore Tyrwhitt) and *Fearless*, to move in the night to a position southwest of the Horn Reef Lightship, and to proceed to a point twelve miles west of Heligoland at 8.00 A.M. The flotillas were then to begin their drive into the Bight, with the support of the two Humber battle cruisers, *Invincible* and *New Zealand*, thirty five miles to the westward. British submarines, under Commodore Keyes, were also disposed to attack any German ships that might be involved in the action by the destroyers.

This plan had been expanded by ordering, from the Grand Fleet, Admiral Beatty's three battle cruisers, *Lion*, *Queen Mary*, *Princess Royal*, to join up with the Humber battle cruisers, and Commodore Goodenough's Light Cruiser Squadron to proceed to the destroyer night rendezvous, to follow and support the Destroyer Flotillas.

There was one notable confusing element in these dis-

positions, owing to the fact that, although Admiral Beatty and Commodore Goodenough had received their orders in detail, the wireless had never reached the two Flotilla Commodores, and they did not know that the ships from the Grand Fleet were taking part in the operation.¹

At the outset, as a result of this lack of information, Commodore Tyrwhitt, in command of the British destroyers, had nearly engaged the British light cruisers as enemy ships, when they joined him at 3.30 A.M., but their identity had been discovered just in time.

After these light cruisers had joined, in the early morning of August 28, the British destroyers were proceeding south for the 8 o'clock rendezvous west of Heligoland, followed by the light cruisers. But, at about 7 A.M., they sighted a German destroyer, and Commodore Tyrwhitt detached his nearest division to give chase to the southeast into the Bight. Other German destroyers were also sighted and chased. These at once reported the British attack: "In squares 142 and 131 (that is 20 sea miles north-west of Heligoland) enemy cruisers and destroyers are chasing the 5th Flotilla." The German light cruisers *Stettin* and *Frauenlob* were sent to help in this area, and also two flotillas of U-boats took up station for attack.

The fleeing German destroyers had drawn the detached division of British destroyers, in pursuit, far away to the southeast out of sight of Commodore Tyrwhitt, in the misty conditions which prevailed inshore. And at 7.40 A.M., in the *Arethusa*, the Flotilla Commo-

¹ "The message was duly received in the *Euryalus*, but by some mischance it never reached either Commodore, and they began the elaborate movement with no knowledge that the Grand Fleet cruisers were taking part in it." — Sir Julian Corbett.

dore also led his command, including the *Fearless* with the First Flotilla, in a full speed chase to the southeast. Under these conditions he was unable to score on the German destroyers. But the *Arethusa*, just before 8 o'clock, ran upon the two German light cruisers, *Stettin* and *Frauenlob*, which had been sent to support the German destroyers, and the British cruiser suffered damage from the fire of both.

Shortly afterwards (8.05 A.M.) the *Fearless* drew near, and the *Stettin* sheered off. But Commodore Tyrwhitt's command had become scattered, and had approached too near Heligoland in the mist. Consequently signal was made to the flotillas "for the drive to westward to begin."¹ The *Arethusa* held on until 8.25 A.M., engaging the *Frauenlob*. Then, with only one gun left in action, after a destructive hit on the *Frauenlob*, the *Arethusa* also turned to the westward.

The First Flotilla had put out a German destroyer (V 187, finally sunk at 9.10 A.M.), and at 9 o'clock Commodore Tyrwhitt's command re-formed and held on to the westward.

"Elsewhere the situation was in considerable confusion."² Commodore Keyes, in command of the British submarines, with the two submarine leader destroyers, *Lurher* (flag) and *Firedrake*, did not know of the presence of the forces from the Grand Fleet, on account of the failure to deliver his instructions by wireless. While searching for submarines in the intended track of the Humber battle cruisers, he sighted two British cruisers, the *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft*, which Commodore Goodenough had just detached from his Squadron to support the destroyer action.

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

In utter ignorance that these two ships were British cruisers from the Grand Fleet, Commodore Keyes made signal to the *Invincible* that he was in touch with two enemy cruisers. Commodore Goodenough took in this signal (8.15 A.M.), and at once went to the assistance of the *Lurcher*, thus making a movement with the four remaining cruisers of his Squadron against his own two detached ships. After a search, Commodore Goodenough's Squadron sighted the *Lurcher* at 8.53 A.M., and Commodore Goodenough's four British cruisers were in turn also promptly reported by Commodore Keyes as four enemy ships, which he would try to lead to the *Invincible*.

Sir Julian Corbett's account of what followed should be quoted: "It was not, however, for long that Commodore Goodenough followed the false lead. Something was evidently wrong, and at 9.05 A.M. he turned to the westerly course laid down by the programme which he now knew the flotillas were taking. Unfortunately this led to further confusion, for it soon brought him upon the outer line of our submarines, of whose position he was still unaware. A little before 9.30 A.M. he came upon E-6 (Lieutenant-Commander C. P. Talbot) and made a prompt attempt to ram her. So close and quick was he that the submarine only escaped by diving under the flagship, but, thanks to Lieutenant-Commander Talbot's skilful handling, no harm was done, nor did he, being uncertain of his assailant's nationality, make any attempt to attack. Commodore Goodenough now continued his westerly course, while the *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft*, having quite lost touch, proceeded at 9.30 A.M. about north-north-west towards where they knew the battle cruisers were marking time.

But, in fact, Admiral Beatty was just moving from his first position, for having ascertained that the seaward drive had begun, he, too, held away W. $\frac{1}{4}$ S. (mag.) and signalled his intention to the three Commodores, but as the *Nottingham* and *Lowestoft* did not get the signal they held on as they were and were thrown out for the rest of the day."

"To complete the confusion, at a quarter to ten the other submarine leader, *Firedrake*, passed to the *Arethusa* the *Lurcher's* signal that she was being chased." Commodore Tyrwhitt at once "turned back eastward to go to her assistance." He had only a fleeting glimpse of a German cruiser in the mist, but, fearing he was again getting too near Heligoland, he turned about, 16 points to westward. With no enemy in sight, he closed the *Fearless* (10.20 A.M.) and stopped to repair the injuries the *Arethusa* had received.

It was not until 10 o'clock that the *Lurcher* recognized the British light cruisers as friends, but the British submarines could not be notified and were a danger to be avoided. Admiral Beatty had also moved to the westward, and ordered the light cruisers not to get too far south but to keep to the northward of the flotillas. The four light cruisers accordingly turned north at 10.30 A.M., being then about thirty miles to the westward of where the *Arethusa* was making repairs.

At this stage, as Sir Julian Corbett has stated, "it might have seemed that the whole affair was over with disappointing results," but the German light cruisers came out into this area in a reckless and unconcerted way that brought upon them destructive losses. The *Stettin* and *Frauenlob* had fought a wary and damaging

action, but the newcomers came out individually¹ and left themselves exposed to being overwhelmed by superior forces which unexpectedly drew near in the mist.²

The *Stralsund* first appeared (10.55 A.M.) and engaged the *Arctusa*, which could only do 10 knots, and in spite of the assistance of his flotillas, Commodore Tyrwhitt was obliged to send an urgent signal to Admiral Beatty asking for assistance. At his repeated call, Admiral Beatty ordered (11.30 A.M.) Commodore Goodenough's light cruisers to hasten to Commodore Tyrwhitt's assistance, and the battle cruisers were also led eastward by Admiral Beatty, in the *Lion*, at full speed.

The German light cruiser *Mainz* had come out from the Ems, and had repulsed destroyer attacks with damage, but she was suddenly surprised and overwhelmed by the cross fire of the four British cruisers, which came upon her in line-abreast out of the mist. The German cruisers *Köln* and *Ariadne*, in the same way, made helpless targets of themselves for Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers, which of course disposed of them in short order (1.10 P.M.).³ After sinking these three German cruisers, and having done all that was possible to rescue the crews, the British forces retired.⁴

The main interest, in the study of this first clash of the opposing navies in home waters, is its demonstration,

¹ "There are some who think that the way in which the light cruisers went out separately is open to criticism as a piece of temerity." — Admiral Scheer.

² "Very thick weather made a survey of the whole situation difficult." — *Ibid.*

³ "At 1.10, therefore, half an hour after his first shot was fired, he made the general signal 'Retire.'" — Sir Julian Corbett.

⁴ "It was not possible for our battle cruisers to put to sea before one o'clock owing to the state of the tide at the bar of the Outer Jade. Their intervention came too late." — Admiral Scheer.

by the haphazard conduct on both sides, of how little prewar methods had been prepared for the conditions of actual naval warfare. Of course the bare narrative of the events of the action is enough to show the British failure to coördinate the efforts of a number of vessels in a common undertaking. This was an object lesson of the prevailing fault in the British Navy of concentrating too much attention upon material, to the neglect of methods. The initial confusion, as to the forces that were engaged, cannot be accepted as excuse for all the errors that were made, as there was plenty of time for giving this information afterwards.

As to the Germans, the faults of their defensive dispositions, in the Heligoland area, were best shown by the means that were taken to correct them, which will be described. The German error of rushing the cruisers individually out into this area would have been more excusable if they had been reinforcing hard pressed forces — but Admiral Scheer has left no doubt of the fact that the reckless use of these cruisers was for the object of cutting off the enemy.¹

As to the effects of this action, there has been too much effort to give it importance. Admiral Tirpitz has complained that the Emperor's rebuke which followed, and the warning against such useless losses of cruisers, tended to confirm the policy of inactivity for the German Fleet. But this naval policy was already in force, with no signs of change, and this action could not be held to blame for its continuance.

On the other hand, this experience taught the Germans a lesson as to the defense of Heligoland Bight.

¹ "On the other hand, was a baffled enemy to be allowed to withdraw from the Heligoland Bight unpursued in broad daylight?" — Admiral Scheer.

The uselessness of rushing out cruisers to the outer lines was apparent, as was also the necessity for a more widely extended area of defense. Admiral Scheer has described the measures taken by the Germans, as a result of the action: "Far reaching changes were made in both directions. As regards the patrol service a large number of armed fishing steamers were secured and prepared with the utmost dispatch. They had previously been employed only in the harbour flotillas, which looked after the security of the estuaries. Moreover, in the middle of September two large minefields were laid west of Heligoland, which increased the danger for the enemy and offered a safe retreat for our patrols when they were hard pressed."

"The minefields before Heligoland proved effective, and in conjunction with progressive defensive measures such as aeroplanes and the equipment of our patrols with weapons which could be employed offensively against submerged submarines (such weapons were wholly lacking at the beginning of the war) kept the inner area so clear that the danger from submarines came at last to be quite a rare and exceptional possibility."

The proof of the truth of this statement, as to the strength of these new Heligoland defenses, lies in the fact that, throughout the war, no serious naval operation was undertaken against them, and, from this time on, the reader must think of this wide protected area as an outwork which gave the German Navy greater freedom of movement at its bases.

At this stage, the whole world was watching in suspense the progress of the German assault upon France, which at the time seemed irresistible. This absorbing

anxiety was reflected in apprehensions as to the naval situation. What are known now to have been merely the beginnings of German naval warfare with torpedoes and mines were undoubtedly exaggerated — out of all proportion to their real menae.

As Sir Julian Corbett has expressed it, “At Seapa the Grand Fleet was given no rest. In the old days when gales drove our fleet from its station it had at least a seeure port in which it could enjoy eomplete relaxation, but Admiral Jellieoe had none.” There were constant alarms. On September 1 there was the first report of a submarine in Seapa Flow — and the whole fleet was hurried to sea. In faet this was a period of strain and eonstant movement that was exhausting to the personnel of the naval forces.

The 6 Division was at length transported to Franee, without any molestation, and by September 11 was safely landed at St. Nazaire. There had been a projet for a sweep into the Heligoland Bight on September 10, with the Grand Fleet in waiting for any sortie of German heavy ships, but “the eonditions were very unfavorable for a fleet aetion owing to the low visibility eombined with the glare produced by the oeeasional sunshine and absenee of wind,”¹ and, after eoming down to 100 miles from Heligoland, Admiral Jellicoe led baek the Grand Fleet to the north.

By this time the Battle of the Marne (September 6–10) had decided the fate of the German “dry-land”² plan of war, and, with its defeat, the Germans had lost the superiority for the offensive which had been laboriously built up through so many years — and that period of the World War was ended.

¹ Admiral Jellicoe.

² Admiral Tirpitz.

CHAPTER IX

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE OUTLYING SEAS

IN the Mediterranean, after the Allied fiasco which allowed the *Goeben* and *Breslau* to get into the Dardanelles, there was no demonstration of British and French naval forces to counteract this potent German influence upon the Turks. Even though it had been known that the *Goeben*, "during the recent Balkan troubles had been dominating Turkish sentiment at Constantinople,"¹ the Allies did not at once grasp the extent of the harm that was being done by the presence of the German ships at Constantinople² — in the words of Sir Julian Corbett, "the world-wide results that ensued."³

The same material naval strategy which prevailed in the British Admiralty, with the idea of the "Fleet intact,"⁴ had resulted in "these tactics of total conservation and least effort, which was from the beginning of the war the rule of our Fleet."⁵ As explained, this limited naval viewpoint had prevented the Allies from giving the Dardanelles due importance in their naval strategy, and consequently from giving any thought to

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² "It was many months before it was possible to appreciate fully the combined effrontery, promptness and sagacity of the move." — *Ibid.*

³ "So completely, indeed, did the risky venture turn a desperate situation into one of high moral and material advantage, that for the credit of German statesmanship it goes far to balance the cardinal blunder of attacking France through Belgium."

⁴ Report of Naval Committee of French Chamber of Deputies.

⁵ *Ibid.*

“profiting from the Turks’ folly by throwing themselves upon the Dardanelles at the time when the operation could have been carried out, either in the track of the *Goeben*, or even some months later, a condition which could be easily foreseen.”¹

In accordance with the agreements before the war, the Convention of August 6 had been drawn, defining the relations between the British and French Naval Forces in the different areas, as follows:

“1. Outside of the Channel, for which some agreements already decreed are maintained, and the Mediterranean, the general direction of maritime operations will belong to the British Admiralty; and the French Naval Forces, outside of these two seas, will be placed entirely under the orders of the Senior British Commanders.”

“2. In the Mediterranean the general direction of operations will belong to France.”

“So long as the *Goeben* and *Breslau* are not destroyed or captured, the English forces at the present time in the Mediterranean will coöperate with the French Fleet for this destruction or capture.”

“As soon as these operations will be finished, the three battle cruisers and the two or three armored cruisers will retake their freedom of action, except in case Italy should break her neutrality.”

In accordance with this convention, the French had been invited to use Malta as their advance base. The transportation of the Algerian Army Corps had been completed, and on August 11 Admiral Lapeyrère had been ordered to concentrate his fleet at Malta. “Next day Admiral Milne was informed of the convention, and

¹ Report of Naval Committee of French Chamber of Deputies.

that he, as being senior to the French Admiral, would have to come home, leaving under the orders of the French Commander-in-Chief Admiral Troubridge and Admiral Carden, who was commanding at Malta.”¹

The French Admiral, after concentrating his fleet at Malta, received on August 13 the following significant telegram: “War declared by France and England against Austria. The Government counting on this to obtain a favorable decision from Italy, desires formally that you should make immediately hostilities against Austria. In consequence, get under way as quickly as possible with all the available English and French ships, and, after having passed ostensibly in sight of the Italian coast, make against the Austrian ships and ports all operations of war that you will judge possible, and of which the Government leaves you complete initiative.”

“Conserve the most cordial relations with Italy. Your ships left at Malta will rejoin you at the rendezvous you indicate. Acknowledge receipt and keep me in touch with your movements.”

The unmistakable tenor of this dispatch showed clearly that, at the time, the idea was to make an exhibition to the Italians of hostilities against the Austrian hereditary foe of Italy, instead of any question of using Allied naval forces to counteract the sinister influence of the German ships at Constantinople. In obedience to this order, Admiral Lapeyrère sailed from Malta on the same day (August 13), and was joined by the squadron of Admiral Troubridge on August 15 at a rendezvous northwest of Corfu.

The French Fleet followed the Italian coast to a

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

rendezvous off Antivari with Admiral Troubridge's British Squadron, which had followed the Albanian coast. The joint Allied Fleet then (6 A.M., August 16) executed "a raid in the Adriatic having for objective to surprise the Austrian ships which would be holding the blockade off the coast of Montenegro."¹ Only small craft were found, and one small cruiser (*Zenta*, 2500 tons) was sunk. Admiral Lapeyrère in his report then stated, "The necessity of getting out of the Adriatic before dark did not permit me to push further my reconnaissance under the penalty of being exposed to the attacks of torpedo boats in unfavorable conditions."

Sir Julian Corbett has summed up the finale of this joint operation as follows: "The opening operation was destined to be the last piece of combined work which the French and British Fleets were to carry out in those waters for many a long day. At midnight (August 16-17) as the Allied Fleet swept southward, Admiral Troubridge received an order from the Admiralty that he was to proceed at once to the Dardanelles in the *Defence*, taking with him all his destroyers and their parent ship *Blenheim*, and leaving the *Warrior* and the two remaining light cruisers, *Weymouth* and *Dublin*, with the French Admiral for the present."

The occasion for ordering Admiral Troubridge to the Dardanelles was "when a warning came from our Embassy at Constantinople of persistent rumors that two Austrian cruisers were going to try, with the connivance of the Porte, to join the *Goeben* in the Dardanelles, it was decided to strengthen the blockade."² This information, at its face value, was of no importance. But the whole Turkish situation was passing into the con-

¹ Report of Admiral Lapeyrère.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

trol of the Germans, with no retort from the Allies to offset the presence of the German ships at Constantinople.

The British Foreign Office could no longer fail to realize the seriousness of the danger,¹ but the British efforts were directed towards Egypt and safeguarding the transportation of troops from India. For service in watching over the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean route, the armored cruisers *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh* were used, and the *Warrior* was also withdrawn from the French fleet. The remaining light cruisers were also taken for this work, and on August 20 the battle cruiser *Indomitable* was ordered to Gibraltar.² Thus Rear Admiral Troubridge was left off the Dardanelles with the battle cruiser *Indefatigable* (flag) and the armored cruiser *Defence*, to watch the course of events.

Admiral Carden was appointed to the command in the Mediterranean September 20, and he took charge of the observation of the Dardanelles. The battle cruiser *Indomitable* rejoined the *Indefatigable*, and the *Defence* had been ordered to join Admiral Cradock on September 10.³ At the request of Admiral Carden,

¹ "The hand of the Germans overmastering our friends in the Ministry was plainly visible, and in Egypt it was no less strongly felt." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² The battle cruiser *Inflexible* had left Malta for home August 18.

³ The orders of the *Defence* were changed, as will be explained, and this armored cruiser unfortunately did not reinforce Admiral Cradock's Squadron before the disaster of Coronel. And here it should be pointed out that, in the British dispositions, no effective use was ever made of these four armored cruisers, which had been available for other service from the Mediterranean. "Of the three remaining ships of the First Cruiser Squadron, the *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* were on escort duty in the Red Sea, and the *Warrior* on guard at Alexandria as senior officer's ship in Egypt-

two older French battleships, *Vérité* and *Suffren*, were added to his fleet by the French Admiral, who did this reluctantly, as he maintained (September 25) that the French Fleet was only adequate to watch the Austro-Hungarian Fleet,¹ which was inactive at its Adriatic bases.

With only this watch upon the Dardanelles, which did not strengthen the hand of the British Embassy at Constantinople, the situation was hopeless for the Allies. There were tentative suggestions from the British Embassy of a use of force at the Dardanelles — and there was plenty of time, as events drifted along in the way characteristic of the Turks. But, with no provision for this use of force in their naval strategy, and with the prevailing ideas as to the dispositions of naval forces which have been described, there was no possibility of a combined expedition in force against the Dardanelles, to turn the balance against Germany and prevent Turkey from joining the Central Powers.²

tian waters, and to these minor services these three fine ships had been tied, notwithstanding the critical situation in South American waters.”— Sir Julian Corbett, who added in a footnote: “On November 1, the day Coronel was being fought, an Admiralty memorandum pointed out that the best value was not being obtained from these ships, and directed that as soon as possible they should be relieved by older light cruisers from the Irish station and reconstituted as a squadron for Home Waters.” As will be seen from the following narrative, even one of this type of ship would have turned the balance in the Pacific before the disaster of Coronel. It was a case of a class of ships never put to the right use. And it was a sequence of this malign destiny, that these four armored cruisers were put in a helpless position at the Battle of Jutland, and three out of the four were uselessly sacrificed.

¹ “. . . whereas I am liable to have at any instant all the Austrian squadron upon me, with, on my side, numerous ships in a disabled condition.” — Dispatch of Admiral Lapeyrère.

² “To follow it up at once, not, as they have so often said, by going into the Dardanelles in the wake of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, because this operation would have rested without any support upon the vessels which at-

In this way, the stage of the failure of Germany's great offensive had passed, without any show of Allied force at Constantinople that would produce the moral effect of the actual German defeat. On the contrary, the situation there was growing more unfavorable for the Entente Allies, and German influence at Constantinople, instead of diminishing, was steadily increasing. As Sir Julian Corbett has stated: "The Germans were doing everything in their power to force Turkey into the war: the *Goeben* and their Military Mission were gradually dominating the situation, and our Ambassador was reporting that the Turks could not be got to believe in any successes except those of the Germans."

This last sentence well described conditions at Constantinople, where, even after the decisive German defeat, the Germans were the ones who were allowed to take the attitude of dominating strength, and the Entente Allies did not make any demonstration of strength to counteract this attitude, and back up the influence of their own representatives. Consequently, this situation was allowed to drift along to its natural result — the entrance of Turkey as an ally of the Central Powers in the World War.

In the East the entrance of Japan on the side of the Entente Allies (August 23, 1914) had at once relieved the British Navy of the responsibility for the waters of the China Station north of Hongkong. The special interest of Japan in the war was to gain the German Shantung holdings in China, and a Japanese military and naval force was constituted to reduce Tsingtau. This tempted it, but prepared without delay, under the form of one of those combined expeditions of which the strength was founded upon the mastery of the time and the choice of place, the success was certain." — Report of the Naval Committee of French Chamber of Deputies.

was bound to be only a matter of a siege, as there was no hope of relief for the German garrison.

The first landing of the Japanese was on September 2, and on September 18 the fortress was isolated. A contingent of British troops from Wei Hai Wei arrived on September 22, under escort of the *Triumph* and her attendant destroyer, which had been taken from Admiral Jerram and added to the Japanese Fleet.¹ In exchange, Admiral Jerram had received a powerful Japanese armored cruiser, the *Ibuki*, and a fast Japanese light cruiser, the *Chikuma*. These two ships were much better adapted than the *Triumph* for seeking information of the enemy armed forces with a view to contact.

In addition, the Japanese had constituted the First and Second South Sea Squadrons of fast ships, whose sphere of operations was in the Pacific, covering the wide areas of the Ladrone, Caroline, and Marshall Islands, from which area Admiral Spee had departed on his cruise to the South American coasts.

Of Admiral Spee's Squadron the British Navy had gained no information whatever. After his secret rendezvous at Pagan Island, he had been able to start on his voyage across the Pacific² with a bountiful supply of coal, and also to detach the *Emden* for her commerce destroying mission in the Indian Ocean, without any intimation as to his location or intentions reaching his enemies. His whereabouts was a mystery to the British. The German Cruiser Squadron was at Eniwetok, August 19-22. After leaving this atoll in the Pacific, the *Nürnberg* was detached, to proceed to Honolulu, to send messages to the German Government, to gain in-

¹ See Table of Japanese Fleet, pages 310 *et seq.*

² For ensuing movements in the Pacific, see Chart, p. 138.

formation as to the war situation, and to place orders for coal and supplies for the future movements of the Cruiser Squadron.

Admiral Spee's Squadron was at the atoll of Majuro, in the Marshall Islands, from August 26 to August 30, where he was joined by the *Cormoran* and two colliers. Here the German Admiral distributed coal and supplies for his Squadron so that he was able to cut down the number of his attending ships. From here he also detached the auxiliaries, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and *Cormoran*, with an attending collier, "for the purpose of conducting cruiser warfare in the Australian waters."¹ On August 30 the German Cruiser Squadron sailed for a rendezvous with the *Nürnberg* west of Christmas Island, in the middle of the Pacific.²

Yet the threat of Admiral Spee's Squadron, although it actually was far out in the Pacific, continued to hamper the movements of the British naval forces. Even with the help of the Japanese Navy, there was great perplexity as to the situation, and one bad feature was that each Station was too much occupied in its own scheme. Protection of the transports carrying troops from India³ was necessary,⁴ but naval forces were also being diverted by local expeditions undertaken by dif-

¹ "The War at Sea." — "If it is no longer possible to carry on these operations, they shall endeavor to join the armored cruisers."

² Carrying 16,953 tons of coal and 3,170 tons of water in four steamers.

³ "Being urgently needed for the security of Egypt, its first two groups were timed to sail on August 24 and 25." — Sir Julian Corbett.

⁴ "As the *Königsberg* was still unlocated, and believed to be cruising in or near the Indian Ocean, escort was a grave difficulty, since each group must be guarded by at least one ship capable of dealing with the German cruiser, and the Indian Marine ships did not come up to this standard. There was also the possibility that Admiral von Spee might appear on the scene." — Ibid.

ferent stations. The seizure of Togoland and the expedition against the German Cameroons did not make much of a drain upon British naval forces. But the New Zealand and Australian Expeditions, undertaken by these two Dominions against the German island possessions, did actually absorb the efforts of Admiral Patey's Squadron on the Australian Station, and, although German communications were damaged, Admiral Patey's force was kept from seeking out the enemy armed force.

Admiral Patey had in his fleet, of which the make-up is given in the accompanying table,¹ ships well adapted for seeking information of Admiral Spee's whereabouts, and for following up the German Cruiser Squadron. The battle cruiser *Australia* would have given a superiority over Spee's whole force,² and the German Chief of Squadron, in his deductions at the beginning of the war, had only considered cruiser warfare feasible in East

¹ AUSTRALIAN FLEET

	Tons	Trial Speed	Guns
<i>Australia</i> , battle cruiser	18,800	25.8	8 12"
<i>Sydney</i> , light cruiser	5,400	25.7	8 6"
<i>Melbourne</i> , light cruiser	5,400	25.7	8 6"
<i>Encounter</i> , light cruiser	5,880	20.8	11 6"
<i>Pioneer</i> , light cruiser	2,200	19.7	8 4"
<i>Yarra</i>	} destroyers	26.0	1 4"
<i>Parramatta</i>			
<i>Warrego</i>			
Submarines A. E. 1 and A. E. 2.		Parent Ship <i>Protector</i> .	

NEW ZEALAND SQUADRON

	Completed	Tons	Trial Speed	Guns
<i>Psyche</i>	1899	2,135	20.5	8 4"
<i>Philomel</i>	1891	2,575	19.0	8 4.7"
<i>Pyramus</i>	1899	2,135	20.7	8 4"

² "By utilizing the *Australia*, England could at any time present a positive superiority over the German naval forces in the Far East." — "The War at Sea."

Asia waters "as long as the Australian battle cruiser *Australia* did not definitely drive the German forces from their field of activity."¹

Admiral Patey, on information that the German cruisers intended to concentrate near Australia, had gathered his fleet (August 9) and made a search of Simpson Harbor (August 12). But he found no German ships, as Admiral Spee was at the secret rendezvous of Pagan. Neither could his landing parties find any German wireless station, either at Rabaul or Herbertshöhe. That night (August 12-13) Admiral Patey first received information of the New Zealand Expedition to occupy Samoa,² which was ready to start, and an inquiry was made as to the safety of the route.

"Admiral Patey inclined to belief that the pressure was growing too great for the Germans and that they were going away to Maurn, possibly by way of Samoa, and that their destination was South America. Here, again, he was on the right track."³ However, Admiral Patey approved of the projected operations against Samoa and New Guinea, and met the New Zealand Expedition at Noumea (August 22) with the *Australia*, *Melbourne*, and *Montcalm*, "while the *Sydney* and *Encounter* escorted the Australian transports to Port Moresby in readiness to act at the earliest possible moment."⁴

The New Zealand Expedition was at Suva August 25,

¹ "The War at Sea."

² "It was the first word he had heard of the expedition." — Sir Julian Corbett.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.* — "In Australia, however, so keen was the desire to strike the blow that had been prepared, that a postponement of the attack on Rabaul was very unpalatable."

and on August 30 Apia, the capital of Samoa, was occupied without any resistance. As has been stated, on the morning of the same day Admiral Spee left Majuro for Christmas Island. At Samoa Admiral Jerram had asked Admiral Patey to make a search of the Mariana and Marshall Islands, "being unable to do it himself."¹ "But this was out of Admiral Patey's power, for not only had he the Herbertshöhe Expedition on hand, but he had also been warned that before long his ships would be required to escort homewards the large Australian contingent which was rapidly being enrolled for Europe."² Consequently, after seeing the New Zealand garrison in possession, Admiral Patey sailed to accompany the Australian Expedition, while Admiral Jerram limited the efforts of his own Squadron to a concentration at Singapore. As a result, both forces were disposed as a protection against an incursion of Admiral Spee, at the time when the German Cruiser Squadron was, in fact, proceeding eastbound for the middle of the Pacific. At the same time the *Emden*, having come down through the Molucca Passage, was steaming westward south of the Java Coast to begin her raid upon commerce in the Indian Ocean.

Admiral Spee's Squadron on September 6, at the designated rendezvous west of Christmas Island, met the *Nürnberg*, which had accomplished the mission to Honolulu and returned. On the same day, the *Nürnberg* was again detached, with the *Titania* which was equipped for cable cutting, and sent to destroy the Australia-Canada cable station at Fanning Island. The station

¹ Sir Julian Corbett. — "The inability of Admiral Jerram to make a sweep out into the Pacific was due to his feeling compelled to concentrate his fighting force in the south-western part of his station."

² *Ibid.*

was destroyed, the cables cut, and the *Nürnberg* and *Titania* rejoined the Cruiser Squadron on September 8 at Christmas Island.

Admiral Spee knew from the report of the *Nürnberg*, and from the wireless messages which he had picked up, that Samoa had been occupied by the New Zealand garrison. The German Chief of Squadron then decided that it was worth while to make a sudden attack upon Samoa, as he had plenty of extra coal, with the hope of destroying any supply ships that might be there.¹ "Moreover, a military undertaking in which the burning desire of the crews of the Squadron, after weeks spent under way with frequent periods of coaling, to get in touch with the enemy would be fulfilled and could but have a favorable effect on the morale of the men. There was of course no idea of recovering the Samoa Islands."²

This was to be a sudden raid undertaken by the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, while the *Nürnberg* and train were to proceed to a rendezvous in the Marquesas Islands. The two armored cruisers had been put in the best possible fighting trim, and appeared off Apia on the morning of September 14. There were only an American three-masted schooner and a small sailing vessel in the harbor, and, as the radio tower was 100,000 metres range, there was evidently nothing to be done. Accordingly, the two German cruisers left at 7.30 A.M., without firing a shot, steaming westward to confuse the

¹ The following from Admiral Spee's war journal gave his reasons for attack. "The latter (New Zealand volunteers) would require constant supplies from steamships which must be covered: it is therefore to be supposed that warships and train are lying off Apia. An attack upon the ships lying at anchor at dawn promises success. There is sufficient coal (about 3000 tons extra)."

² "The War at Sea."

enemy. The British radio was interfered with until evening, when it reported, "Two German cruisers off Apia this morning, now steam northwest."

As a matter of fact, Admiral Spee turned east, met his attendant steamer *O. I. D. Ahlers* off the Suvarof Atoll on September 17, and proceeded to make a similar sudden attack at Papeete, island of Tahiti (September 22). At Papeete the German cruisers were fired upon, and there was a short bombardment. The only enemy ship at Papeete was the small dismantled French gun-boat *Zélee*, which was sunk, as was a German prize steamer. But this raid, like the attack at Samoa, did not accomplish any military result, and the German official account has stated "this enterprise should rather be regarded as a disadvantage, above all since we had now to take into account that the enemy would know of the general intention of the voyage to the East from the appearance of the Squadron off Tahiti." From Tahiti the two German cruisers proceeded to the rendezvous in the Marquesas Islands, and on September 26 joined the *Nürnberg* and the four steamers of the train in Comptroller Bay.

The British received the news on the same day (September 14) both of Admiral Spee's appearance at Samoa, and the presence of the German raider *Emden* in the Indian Ocean. The *Emden*, with her attendant steamer the *Markomannia*, had turned northward into the Bay of Bengal,¹ striking the Colombo-Caleutta track. On

¹ "That she should have slipped through the net which Admiral Jerram had spread and suddenly appeared far up in the Bay of Bengal was beyond all calculation. No part of the Eastern Seas was regarded as more secure. . . . Had the most ordinary precautions been taken there must have been a much milder story to tell, but as it was, the *Emden* had an easy task." — Sir Julian Corbett.

September 10 she made her first capture, and she had taken six prizes when she was reported by the wireless of the *City of Rangoon* (September 14), upon the information of an Italian steamer which had been stopped by the *Emden* and released.

This double news had an astonishing effect upon the situation.¹ Of Admiral Spee's appearance at Samoa, Sir Julian Corbett has stated: "In the second place, his presence in the vicinity of Australian waters tended to shake the conviction that the pressure of the Allied fleets was forcing upon him a concentration in South American waters." This doubt, coupled with the sudden appearance of the *Emden* in the Bay of Bengal, bred fears for the New Zealand and Australian convoys. The two Dominions were reluctant to allow their troops to be risked at sea without assured protection. The effect of the continued immunity of the *Emden* was increased by the sudden reappearance of the *Königsberg* at Zanzibar (September 20), where she destroyed the old British cruiser *Pegasus*, and then put to sea again. So strong was the impression of insecurity, that even the news of Admiral Spee's being at Tahiti on September 22 did not have a sufficiently reassuring effect, and the sailings of the New Zealand and Australian convoys were delayed.² And yet the *Australia*, *Sydney*, *Montcalm*, and *Encounter*, were still kept in service with the Australian expedition against New Guinea (Friedrich Wilhelm Harbor surrendered September 24).

¹ "Indeed, there was other news which had suddenly and profoundly disturbed the whole system in the East. The convoy arrangements were thrown into confusion and a far reaching distribution of force became inevitable." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² "In face of it all the Admiralty at once acquiesced, and, as it was impossible to provide a separate escort for the Australian convoy, both of them had to be delayed for the full three weeks." — *Ibid.*

There was another far reaching effect of the confusion which arose from these incidents. On September 10 the British armored cruiser *Defence* had been ordered from the Dardanelles to reinforce Admiral Cradoek in South American waters. These orders were cancelled,¹ after the news of September 14, and Admiral Cradock was thus deprived of his necessary reinforcement.²

As has been stated, Admiral Jerram's Squadron had been concentrated at Singapore, when the news was received of the advent of the *Emden* in the Bay of Bengal. The *Hampshire*, *Chikuma*, and *Yarmouth* were ordered to chase the *Emden*, but the *Yarmouth* "developed machinery troubles and had to put into Penang."³ The *Emden*, after taking more prizes, evaded this pursuit by going westward south of Ceylon, to the Colombo focal area (September 26), where she resumed her depredations. Here, as in the Bay of Bengal, the *Emden* used one of her prizes to receive the crews of the captured ships, as she sank them, and here again the German raider was also able to add a collier to her train.⁴ From the Colombo area also Captain Müller was able to es-

¹ "The *Defence*, which had reached Malta, had her orders cancelled: for now the immediate care was not South America, but the main Australian Convoy and the New Guinea Expedition whose work was still unfinished, and on September 16 were issued new instructions for the China and Australian Squadrons which had brought Admiral Patey back to Rabaul." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² "On the 18th she was ordered back to the Dardanelles, but no intimation to this effect had been sent to him." — *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ "She was a ship of 4300 tons, with a full cargo of Welsh coal for Hong-kong on Admiralty charter, and yet she, too, gave herself away by steaming on the direct track with all her lights burning. She was naturally added to the little squadron, and by sheer neglect of ordinary precautions Captain von Müller's potentiality for prolonging his depredations was appreciably increased." — *Ibid.*

cape. He coaled and cleaned ship in the Maldive Islands, and, after dismissing his prisoners in his attendant prize, the *Emden* on September 29 disappeared to the south into the middle of the Indian Ocean.

At this stage, the British were also disturbed as to the whereabouts of the other German cruisers, which had eluded them in the early days of the war. The *Leipzig* had disappeared from the western American coast, and was in reality on her way to join Admiral Spee. From the West Indies, the *Dresden* had broken away to the South Atlantic, and had reappeared in the Pernambuco area. Here the German cruiser had taken some prizes in the middle of August, and was supposed to be operating from a secret base. But, in fact, the *Dresden* kept on to the south and around into the Pacific to join Admiral Spee.

The *Karlsruhe*, which had also escaped from the British in the West Indies, actually did carry on operations in the area northeast of Cape San Roque, destroying commerce on the main trade route between Europe and South American ports. Captain Kohler was most ingenious in making use of secret rendezvous with his supply ships, and even the extent of his ravages was not realized until he sent into Teneriffe the steamer *Crefeld* with the crews of thirteen ships which the *Karlsruhe* had destroyed, between August 31 and October 11. Captain Kohler was never taken, but, after sending in another shipload of captured crews and passengers, the *Karlsruhe*, on her way to a raid in the West Indies, was destroyed by an explosion (November 4) with the loss of Captain Kohler and 260 others.

The whereabouts of the *Königsberg* was also a mystery at this time. "Ever since, on September 20, she

had destroyed the *Pegasus* at Zanzibar she had been lost, and had consequently remained a standing menace to the convoy route, and absorbed an annoying amount of our cruiser force. From the last day of September onwards an extremely active search had been kept up by a division of three light cruisers, *Chatham*, *Dartmouth*, and *Weymouth*. . . ." This description, by Sir Julian Corbett, was typical of the perplexities of the British as to these elusive German cruisers. It also was an illustration of the drain upon British naval forces, which had resulted from the lack of information concerning the inferior enemy armed forces and the consequent failure to police these weaker German cruisers.

The *Geier* was also somewhere on the seas, but she was small, old, and slow, and consequently not dangerous. The German auxiliary cruisers were also not a great menace. The only regularly armed and fitted out ship, the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, had been sunk by the British cruiser *Highflyer* off the Rio de Oro on August 26, before this German commerce destroyer had been able to do much damage. The *Cap Trafalgar* was sunk by the British armed auxiliary cruiser *Carmania* on September 14 at a coaling rendezvous, the Island of Trinidad, off the South American coast. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and *Cormoran*, armed at Tsingtau, and the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, were also footloose on the seas, and an additional perplexity to the British. But these ships were lightly armed and had no great speed, which kept them from being very dangerous.

In the middle of the Pacific, Admiral Spee had kept his Squadron in the Marquesas Islands until October 2, after sending on the *Titania* to the next rendezvous at Easter Island. There is a reminiscence of Porter's Diary

of the cruise of the *Essex* in the German Admiral's giving his crews opportunity "to enjoy a little recreation together with bathing, excursions, and so forth in Nukuhiva Island, so marvelously endowed by nature. It was also possible to stock the ships with an abundance of fresh vegetables of all kinds, and with live and butchered meats at very small cost."¹


At the Marquesas Admiral Spee again cut down his attending train by emptying two steamers, which he dispatched to make Honolulu, with reports for the German Government, and instructions to German agents at San Francisco and Valparaiso as to providing coal and supplies for his squadron on the west coast of South America. Here he also received news "from the radio press service"² of the operations of the *Emden*, the repulse of the German offensive at the Marne, and Hindenburg's victory in East Prussia.

After leaving the Marquesas Islands (October 2), Admiral Spee established communication at sea with the *Dresden* and *Leipzig*, and was assured that both light cruisers would join the German Squadron at Easter Island. He was also informed that there was no fear of a shortage of coal, as the two cruisers were bringing with them attending colliers with an ample supply. This was another example of the superiority of the Germans in insuring the mobility of their naval forces by the use of colliers in attendance upon their warships. The British were far behind in this respect. Through these outlying cruisers Admiral Spee also received news of Admiral Cradock's movements against him.

Consequently, at Easter Island on October 14, there were concentrated under Admiral Spee the *Scharnhorst*,

¹ "The War at Sea."

² *Ibid.*



IV. CRUISER OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC, 1914

(This map is diagrammatic only)

Showing the dispositions and movements of the German Cruiser Squadron which led to the naval actions of Coronel and Falkland Islands.

On this map Admiral Spee's course may be followed from Ponape, whence he set out on August 6, after receiving information of the outbreak of war. At Pagan Island, the secret fitting out place provided in the German prewar plans, he gathered his cruisers and attendant steamers (August 11-13), and left for the coast of South America, after detaching the *Emden* on her commerce destroying mission.

Gneisenau, *Nürnberg*, *Dresden*, *Leipzig*, *Titania* tender, and six attending steamers, with good information, abundance of coal, and ample supplies. Moreover, this concentration had been effected in such a way that the German Admiral had freedom to operate without immediate pressure from a superior enemy — a remarkable record for the German cruisers, which were scattered and apparently hopelessly weak at the outbreak of war.

CHAPTER X

LOSS OF THE BELGIAN COAST. LORD FISHER IN THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY

(See Map at page 238.)

AFTER their defeat at the Battle of the Marne (September 6-10, 1914), the German armies had withdrawn to the line of the Aisne, and there intrenched. Although, as has been shown, the Germans had hopelessly lost the offensive, because their faulty plan of envelopment had given the Allies time to constitute armies facing the German armies, yet this situation only meant that a balance of forces had been established. In spite of the fact that the German armies had been halted and driven back into intrenched defensive positions, this established balance of the opposing forces left the Germans too strong to be dislodged by the counter attacks which were undertaken by the Allies (Battle of the Aisne).

By September 16, General Joffre had given up these attempts, but was endeavoring to turn the flank of the Germans¹ by extensions of his own left. To these moves of General Joffre the Germans successfully countered by constantly moving troops to their right, to oppose each flanking operation of the Allies.²

¹ "We were still hopeful of effecting a great flanking movement." — Lord French: "1914."

² "It only remained, therefore, to carry out with greatest speed movements behind the German front corresponding to the enemy's movements." — Falkenhayn.

These successive extensions of the flanks of both opposing armies to the northwest were afterwards called the "Race to the Sea" (*La Course à la Mer*), but the original purpose of the Allies had nothing to do with reaching the sea. Their plan had been to push to a junction with the Belgian Army in Antwerp and keep the Germans east of the River Scheldt. These hopes were set at naught by the easy capture of Antwerp by the Germans. The great fortress of Antwerp proved to be only another quick prey for the new howitzer artillery. The bombardment began on September 29. On October 8 the fortress was no longer tenable, and was evacuated by the Belgian Army (Antwerp surrendered October 9).

The British Army had been moved over to the left of the Allied armies, and this extended left of the Allies was under strong pressure as the Germans drove south, after the fall of Antwerp. But the Allied left flank was at last safely established on the coast of the North Sea at the mouth of the Yser, with the help of flooding this area of dikes and canals (Battle of the Yser), and, by October 20, the whole line of the Allied armies was complete to the coast. The Germans made belated attempts to break through and also win the French Channel coast (Battle of Ypres, October 21–November 17), but here again an equality of forces had been established, which enabled the Allies to bring the Germans to a standstill in the regions attacked. In fact, this established line on the Western Front became the fighting line for over three years. This only swayed back and forth in battle areas, and showed more vividly than anything else how completely the World War had been transformed from a sudden terrific German assault into

a long drawn test of strength, which was destined to call upon the uttermost resources of the opposing nations.

The resultant military situation at this stage of the war should be kept in mind as an established condition, and here it should again be emphasized, as explained before in this work, that Sea Power was exerting an increasing influence upon the course of events. As the World War settled down into a long test of strength and endurance, it was once more proved that possession and use of the waterways of the seas must always be the greatest factor in gathering strength for waging war, and in sustaining this strength to endure the strain of a protracted struggle.

In this military readjustment of the dispositions of the opposing armies, naval forces did not have an important part. As early as September 18 there had been tentative plans for a coöperating force from Great Britain, as the 7th Division and 3d Cavalry Division were being formed. But when it became evident to the Belgian Government that Antwerp would not be able to resist the Germans without the support of the Allies, a hasty attempt was made to improvise a supporting force which would concentrate at Ostend, and Mr. Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, arrived in Antwerp on October 3 to assure the Belgian Government that British support was to be provided. "At the same time, as an earnest of what was to come, the Royal Marine Brigade was ordered to proceed at once to Antwerp to assist in holding the place."¹ The Belgians then agreed to hold on, and the British agreed "that within three days we would state definitely if and when we could launch a large operation for their relief."²

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

The Marine Brigade was transported from Dunkirk to Antwerp, and the 1st and 2d Naval Brigades followed, all being in the Antwerp defenses on October 6. But nothing came of the plan for a supporting operation,¹ and this British naval contingent was only involved in the retreat from Antwerp, losing many in the confusion, through capture and internment. But it should be considered that even this unavailing aid gave the moral effect of a British effort to help the Belgians.

Ostend and Zeebrugge were also evacuated by the Allies. At the Yser, where the German advance was stopped by flooding the area, the British Navy gave support, chiefly by means of the three monitors *Severn*, *Humber*, and *Mersey*, which had been purchased from Brazil. Admiral Hood was given a command separate from the other Patrols, with the designation "Rear-Admiral Commanding the Dover Patrol and Senior Naval Officer, Dover," and for a time the British hoped "with the support of the squadron, to attempt a counter offensive up the coast in order, if possible, to recover Ostend and to deprive the Germans of the support of the sea on the right flank."² But the nature of the coast was against an advance by either side along the sea, and, after the Germans had placed guns among the dunes, it became evident that ships' guns had a difficult task in attempting to dominate this strip of Belgian coast. "During this period the position of the

¹ "By this time, indeed, the idea of raising the siege by operating as originally arranged had been practically abandoned. In view of the way the situation in Belgium was developing, General Joffre and Sir John French had held a conference, at which they agreed that the best way of relieving Antwerp was to carry on as rapidly as possible the great operation for turning the German right flank about Lille." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

squadron had been getting every day more precarious, particularly from submarines, while, owing to the guns the Germans had now placed all along the coast, it was increasingly difficult for the vessels to get any result from their fire. Only by constantly keeping on the move could heavy casualties be avoided.”¹ Under these conditions the “coastal push” was given up.

On the other hand, from this time on, the necessary means of safe communication by water between Great Britain and France must be considered as established by the British Navy. The problem of defending the Channel waterway was simplified by the fact that the shore terminals remained free from attack. For, after the one threatening situation of the first German offensive of 1914, which had caused the British to change their bases in anticipation of losing the French Channel ports, the Channel bases were never again seriously threatened until 1918. The British had returned to them, and the after events showed that, when the Germans neglected to seize these uncovered French Channel ports at the first of September, their chance was gone for the rest of the war. But even the task of guarding this narrow stretch of water involved constant effort on the part of the Dover Patrol, to defend transportation from raids, mines, and submarines.

The Channel was protected against these dangers by the use of nets, minefields, and later in the war by barrages of mines. But the labors of watching over these defenses were constant and demanded ceaseless vigilance. All sorts of craft were employed by the Dover Patrol in this great task. Occasionally German U-boats penetrated these defenses and worked their way into

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

the Channel, and there were raids at times. But it should be stated at once that communication by water between Great Britain and France was maintained, practically without interruption from the enemy, and the great volume of men and supplies that were transported met only nominal losses.

For the British Grand Fleet, this stage of the war was the period of "the submarine and mine menace in the North Sea," and this was the title given by Admiral Jellicoe to the chapter of his book in which the British Commander-in-Chief described it. The reason for this was the progress that the Germans were making, after their first tentative efforts, in the use of mines and submarines. From their early feeble experimental attempts the Germans were developing real tactical uses of these new weapons for the offensive.

So much farther afield were the German U-boats extending their operations, that the British, from their own lack of belief in any wide use of submarines, even thought that the Germans must be operating "from a short or from a floating base."¹ This mistake showed the slowness with which the new possibilities of the submarines were grasped by naval experts. There were constant and harassing alarms, which were very exhausting to the British naval forces, "as they frequently involved a great deal of unproductive cruising, for it was impossible to ignore anything which would enable us to find out the enemy's movements or intentions."²

¹ Admiral Jellicoe.—"It was not thought—from experience with our own submarines—that they would be self-supporting at this distance, and the best method of limiting their activities, if not destroying the submarines, was to find their base. Later experience, and a closer knowledge of German submarines, however, showed that they were independent of such bases."

² Ibid.

On September 22 came the first great object lesson of what could be accomplished by the U-boat. Three old type British cruisers, *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, and *Hogue*, were patrolling the Broad Fourteens. They were without the attending destroyers, which had been taken back to Harwich, as there was a high sea running on September 21. In the night the weather had moderated, and Commodore Tyrwhitt had started for the Broad Fourteens with the *Lowestoft* and eight destroyers. But, before they were anywhere near supporting distance, the three British cruisers were attacked in the early morning of September 22 by the German submarine U-9.

In spite of the fact that the sea had gone down, "the squadron was proceeding abreast two miles apart without zigzagging and at barely ten knots,"¹ under the command of Captain Drummond of the *Aboukir*. Without warning, just before 6.30 A.M., a torpedo exploded under the *Aboukir's* starboard bow. At first Captain Drummond, "believing he had to do with a line of mines, signalled the other two ships to close, but to keep ahead of him."² The *Aboukir* at once took a list, and, twenty five minutes after the blow, turned over. Only a single cutter was available, as her other boats had been broken up by the explosion. The *Hogue* and the *Cressy* got out their boats to rescue the crew, and Captain Nicholson of the *Hogue* intended "to steam through them to give what help he could, but for some minutes he could not move as the boats were in the way."³ As he signaled

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.—"Since the sea had gone down the better course, so the Admiralty held, would have been to keep to the southward until the destroyers returned. But for some reason which we do not know this was not done, and to make matters worse the squadron was proceeding abreast two miles apart without zigzagging and at barely ten knots."

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

"Ahead," the *Hogue* was struck by two torpedoes. In five minutes her quarter deck was awash. She sank in ten minutes — "and then at 7.17 the *Cressy* (Captain R. W. Johnson) began calling for help, still without moving."¹ The track of the torpedo was seen, which struck the *Cressy* before she would gather way. This was followed by another hit, and the *Cressy* turned over on her beam ends, sinking in fifteen minutes.

It was not until an hour afterwards that the Dutch steamer *Flora* came to the rescue, which was promptly undertaken by the Dutch captain, regardless of risks. Consequently the loss of life was very great — over 1400. The German U-9, which had sunk the three cruisers, returned unharmed to the base the next day.

In his comment on this event, Admiral Scheer has pointed out its stimulating effect upon the German Navy as "a release from the oppressive feeling of having done so little in this war in comparison with the heroic deeds of the army" — but in the same paragraph he again unconsciously gave the reason for the German Navy's inactivity with the submarine until "after it had given such unexpected convincing proof of its ability to remain at sea." In fact, all the trouble caused to the British by the tardy German development of offensive submarine warfare was only an example of what might have been accomplished if the Germans had prepared for an immediate U-boat offensive at the outbreak of war. The comment of the British Admiralty's historian upon the sinking of the three British cruisers, on the other hand, although it pointed out the errors in conduct which made the tragedy possible, yet emphasized too strongly the "change that had come over naval war-

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

fare.”¹ Of course it was a startling loss, at this time of strain and anxiety — but, more than this, was it a lesson in the dangers of not observing the obvious precautions against the U-boats.

But this loss of the three British cruisers added to the difficulties of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. There had been increasing anxiety for the safety of the Battle Fleet at its bases, with many alarms and hasty movements, which caused much wear and tear, both for the material and the personnel. This even went to the extent of forcing Admiral Jellicoe to decide “that it was necessary to seek for a temporary base which could be used with safety whilst the submarine obstructions at Scapa were being perfected.”² Lough Swilly in the north of Ireland was chosen for the main base, with Loch-na-Keal in the Island of Mull “for the ships for which berthing-space could not be found at Lough Swilly.”³

In the morning of October 15 five cruisers of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were patrolling on their station between Peterhead and the Naze. One of these, the *Hawke*, had stopped to take in mail, and, “having hoisted in her boat, was proceeding at 12 or 13 knots to regain station when about 10.30 there was an explosion abreast the foremost funnel.”⁴ The *Hawke* turned over and

¹ “Nothing that had yet occurred had so emphatically proclaimed the change that had come over naval warfare, and never perhaps had so great a result been obtained by means so small. The result of the Inquiry that was held was that the disaster might have been avoided had the senior officer complied more closely with the general instructions which the Admiralty had issued to provide as far as possible for the safety of ships exposed to the new danger; but at the same time it was held that his error of judgment was amply atoned for by the exemplary conduct he displayed during the attack.” — Sir Julian Corbett.

² Admiral Jellicoe.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Sir Julian Corbett.

sank so suddenly that only a raft and one boat escaped, and nearly five hundred were lost. After this loss "the advanced line between Peterhead and the Naze" was drawn back. "It, of course, left the North Sea itself more open, but this drawback was to be met by southern sweeps of the light cruisers at high speed."¹

Another significant indication of the harassing situation at this time was the fact that the Admiralty did not feel that the Canadian Convoy of troops could be safely taken to Southampton, as requested by the War Office, but the convoy was diverted to Plymouth (October 14). Convoys of troops from Egypt and India were also diverted to Liverpool (October 22).²

But, although there had been grave anxieties as to these convoys, all transportation of troops had been accomplished by the Allies practically without loss, and the use of the waterways controlled by Sea Power had continued to render the great service that was first demonstrated by the passage of the French Colonial troops and the British Expeditionary Force. Five divisions had been brought thus from India, replaced by three divisions of Territorials from Great Britain; two divisions from garrisons throughout the British Empire, which had also been replaced. Two divisions had come from Canada, and, later, two divisions were transported from Australia and New Zealand to Egypt. "The effect of this concentration was to add a reinforcement of 5 British Regular divisions (7th, 8th, 27th, 28th, and 29th) and 2 Anglo-Indian divisions to the regular forces immediately available to support the 6 regular divi-

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² "Nor was this the only dislocation of the War Office arrangements which the German effort entailed. Two other convoys of troops which were approaching had also to be diverted." — Ibid.

sions with which we had begun the war, raising our forces in France by the end of November to approximately 13 divisions of highly trained long-service troops.”¹ All this was accomplished, in spite of the new menace of destruction which was causing so great a change in the situation in the Home Area.

Nor was it alone the threats of the U-boats that had brought about this situation. The Germans had also done a great deal of minelaying, which became a grave source of apprehension for the British, as the German minelayers had been able to operate off the British coasts. Four German destroyers of an old type,² which had been sent to strew mines, were caught off the Texel (October 17) and sunk, but so many other German minelayers succeeded in their tasks that the British were obliged to give warning of areas of danger off the Thames, Humber, and Tyne.

The North German Lloyd liner *Berlin*, an auxiliary cruiser which had been fitted out with minelaying gear, eluded the British patrolling ships, and, after getting out well toward Iceland, worked back to the west of Scotland and north of Ireland. In these areas, near the British bases, the *Berlin* scattered mines (October 21-23), afterwards running out again toward Iceland. On her way home the *Berlin* put into Trondhjem, Norway, with the excuse of damaged engines, where she was interned by the Norwegian Government.

The British dreadnought battleship *Audacious* struck one of the *Berlin's* mines at 9 A.M., October 27, when preparing for battle target practice of the Grand Fleet

¹ Winston Churchill: “The World Crisis, 1914.”

² “These older boats had been chosen with an eye to the possibilities of casualties, because they were no longer fit for other duties.” — Admiral Scheer.

northwest of the Lough Swilly base. Attempts to tow the *Audacious* were unsuccessful in a heavy sea, as the great weight of the settling ship parted the towing cables. At 9 A.M. she blew up and sank, long after her crew had been taken off. The loss of this fine battleship was kept secret by the Admiralty at the request of Admiral Jellicoe, but it soon became a matter of common knowledge, as the stricken battleship had been photographed by passengers on the liner *Olympic*, which had assisted in the attempts at towing.

At this stage there were no serious attempts on the part of the British Navy to harass the Germans in turn by offensive naval operations. On September 17, at Loch Ewe, there had been a conference of the First Lord, the War Staff, and the Chief Officers of the fleet. The question of attempting "the bombardment and capture of Heligoland"¹ was discussed, and very properly rejected, as ships' guns could not be considered a match for the heavy guns mounted on the island fortress. "Another subject touched on during Mr. Churchill's visit was that of operations in the Baltie, but as no large operations of this nature could be attempted without the assistance of Allied battleships, in order to maintain supremacy in the North Sea during such operations, no steps were taken."²

In October two British submarines, E-1 and E-9, had been sent into the Baltic, but they had put into Lapvik on the Gulf of Finland, "where they were definitely placed under Admiral von Essen's orders. As an assistance to the Russians in disputing the command of the Baltic, their presence was little more than a token of good will."³ Consequently the situation in the Baltic,

¹ Admiral Jellicoe.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

³ Ibid.

the one area where attacks were most dreaded by the Germans, was best expressed by the report of the United States Naval Attaché at Berlin (October 26): "The Baltic Sea, south of the Gulf of Finland, has remained a German lake."

The British had continued to keep their submarines active in the neighborhood of Heligoland. On September 13 the German light cruiser *Hela* had been sunk by the E-9, but the new German minefields were a good defense, and "the area inside Heligoland was given a wider berth."¹ Consequently, it should be understood that there had been no offensive developed by the British Navy that would be a counter to the increasing offensive activities of the Germans — that would give them a taste of their own medicine. In the matter of an offensive use of submarines, both sides had practically started at zero, but unquestionably the Germans were progressing much faster than the British.

On October 29 Lord Fisher became First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, "the office which he had vacated four years before."² This active control of Lord Fisher had a far reaching effect upon the strategic plans of the British Navy. The returning First Sea Lord was a man of boundless energy — and with a great faculty for imposing his ideas upon his associates. His régime, as explained, had already great power in the British Navy, and Lord Fisher came back to the Admiralty with full confidence in his own leadership.

With characteristic enthusiasm, Lord Fisher had become an ardent advocate of a plan for landing an army

¹ Admiral Scheer.

² Sir Julian Corbett.—"In view of the rising agitation in the Press against everyone German or of German descent, Prince Louis of Battenberg thought it right to offer his resignation as First Sea Lord."

on the Pomeranian coast to invade Germany. This plan had been a matter of academic discussion before the war, and was an echo of the times of Frederic the Great, when, in 1761, the Russians threatened to overthrow the Prussian King by using Pomerania as a base for a campaign of invasion, which was averted by the death of the Czarina. The idea of duplicating this plan of campaign had taken such a strong hold in Lord Fisher's mind that he came to his great responsibility in the World War with this preconceived scheme as his war plan for British naval strategy¹ — and he held to this plan with unchangeable tenacity.²

Without any delay Lord Fisher made this scheme a reality, and it was formulated at a Conference at the Admiralty on November 3, only four days after he became First Sea Lord.³ "Lord Fisher explained to those present that this Conference had been summoned with the approval of Mr. Churchill, primarily with the object of expediting the delivery of 20 submarines which were to be at once commenced, *but in the second place a big*

¹ ". . . my main scheme of naval strategy." — Lord Fisher.

² So convinced was Lord Fisher of the value of this plan that, even after the Russian collapse and revolution, he wrote: "Had another policy been pursued and the British Fleet, with its enormous supremacy, cleared the Baltic of the German Navy and landed a Russian Army on the Pomeranian Coast, then the War would have been won in 1915!" This, when the Russian armies, in 1915, had been disastrously defeated and could not possibly have provided an army of invasion.

³ "Tuesday, November 3d, 1914. The First Sea Lord (Lord Fisher) presided at a Conference this day at the Admiralty. Present: Second Sea Lord, Third Sea Lord, Additional Civil Lord, Parliamentary and Financial Secretary, Secretary, Naval Secretary to First Lord, Engineer in Chief, Assistant Director of Torpedoes and another representative of the Director of Naval Ordnance, Commodore (S) and Assistant, Naval Assistant to First Sea Lord, Director of Naval Construction and an Assistant, Superintendent of Contract Work, Superintending Electrical Engineer, Director of Dockyard Work, Director of Naval Contracts and an Assistant."

further building programme for a special purpose had been decided on."¹

This special building program for carrying out Lord Fisher's Baltic project comprised:

" 5 Battle Cruisers of 33 knots speed of light draught	19 Whaling Steamers
2 Light Cruisers	24 Submarine Destroyers
5 Flotilla Leaders	50 Seagoing Patrol Boats
56 Destroyers	200 Motor Barges, oil engines
64 Submarines	90 Smaller Barges
37 Monitors	36 Sloops
24 Light River Gunboats	—
	612 Total." ²

"After this a meeting of all the shipbuilding firms of the United Kingdom took place at the Admiralty under the presidency of Lord Fisher, and the programme mentioned above in italics was parcelled out there and then."³ Thus suddenly and completely were the efforts of British naval strategy tied to Lord Fisher's military project.

Of any merit in this project, which diverted and absorbed Lord Fisher's undoubted capacities for energetic action, there is very little left for discussion. Outside of the question of its value, it was set at nought by the fact that, before these naval preparations could be completed, the Spring of 1915 had brought upon the Russians the series of disastrous defeats,⁴ which ended any possibility of an invasion of Germany. All that can be said in its favor, from a practical point of view, is that many of the vessels in this special building program were afterwards useful for other purposes. But this benefit cannot be considered an offset to the harm caused by

¹ Lord Fisher: "Memories and Records." ² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Battle of the Dunajec (Gorlice Tarnow), May 1, 1915.

practically halting British naval offensive efforts in the Baltic, to wait for a military operation which could never take place. Even when this academic plan had been laid before the Russian Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Churchill, in the first month of the war, the secret Russian reply had contained the cautious proviso, "We therefore gratefully accept in principle the First Lord's offer, but we add that we could avail ourselves thereof only should the general military situation lend itself to its application." It is needless to say that this was as near as the Russians could come to a project for invasion by Russian armies, as the "general military situation" became so unfavorable that no Russian armies were ever available for this plan of invasion.

Consequently a sharp distinction must be made between this Baltic project, as formulated by Lord Fisher, and any British naval plan that would have aimed to attack the German control of the Baltic. No fault could have been found with a project for British naval attacks in this area — and it is known that these were most dreaded by the Germans. As has already been explained, the control of the Baltic should have been one of the main aims of Allied naval strategy.

The same distinction should be made between Lord Fisher's scheme and any well considered plan for a co-ordinated operation shared by the Army and the Navy. Support of the Navy to secure a decision by the Army should always be considered a primary mission of the Navy — and the error of the Germans, in not providing naval support for their "dry-land" offensive, has been pointed out. But Lord Fisher's "Armada"¹ program

¹ "Armada" was the ill omened word used by Lord Fisher as a name for the special craft which were being built.

definitely tied British naval strategy to a project, of which the military part was nothing more than vague anticipations of "Russian Millions,"¹ which could never be realized.

Consequently, the innate defect of Lord Fisher's scheme was that it did not provide for the much needed naval offensive in the Baltic until the visionary superior military force could be produced for an invasion of Germany, and this meant that it put aside other naval means of disputing the German control of the Baltic. It should also be said that, even supposing that an invading army had been evolved from somewhere, a study of the map will show the difficulties the British Navy would have encountered in maintaining it.² But any discussion of this is idle, as Lord Fisher's scheme could never have a chance of accomplishment. It only stood in the way of other accomplishments.

It was a strange anomaly that the naval leader was chosen, as First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, who had the greatest reputation in the British Navy for energy and action, and yet, after being given full hand, this man of action plunged so impetuously into an impracticable plan that his very energy had the effect of paralyzing British naval strategy. This is not too strong a word to use when describing the unfortunate influence of this preconceived plan of Lord Fisher's upon the naval oper-

¹ "Her guns with their enormous shells were built to make it impossible for the Germans to prevent the Russian millions from landing on the Pomeranian Coast." — Lord Fisher: "Memories and Records."

² "Any one who studies the approaches to the Baltic and who reflects that the Pomeranian expeditionary force must have entailed the continuous passage backwards and forwards of supply vessels and transports, can only come to the conclusion that the project, if translated into action, would have led infallibly to a disaster of the first magnitude." — Lord Sydenham. The scheme had comprised the seizure of the island of Borkum as a naval base.

ations of the ensuing months of the World War. In fact the reader must realize this new situation, which existed in the British Admiralty, as one that actually stood in the way of other means of undertaking offensive naval operations against the Germans. Not only did Lord Fisher's project tie up British naval strategy to a vague future military operation, but its special building program absorbed the British naval increase for one special future effort — and called a halt upon the hope of developing offensive naval operations as increased forces became available.¹

¹ “ . . . and the effects of this diversion of the energies of the Admiralty Staff from naval to military objects cannot be estimated.” — Lord Sydenham.

CHAPTER XI

THE BATTLE OF CORONEL

(See Chart at page 176.)

AT this same stage of the War, the British Navy was also confronted by the sudden unfavorable situation in the Pacific, which was the result of Admiral Spee's concentration of German cruisers on the coast of South America.

As has been explained, the German Admiral had been able to gather at the secret rendezvous at Easter Island the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, *Dresden*, and *Leipzig*, with their attending steamers, on October 14. Admiral Spee did not delay taking advantage of this opportunity for an offensive stroke against the armed forces of the enemy.¹ As stated, he had received information of Admiral Cradock's flagship *Good Hope* and of the *Monmouth*. The *Glasgow* had also been reported, and "the Squadron had to be prepared also for the appearance of additional forces."²

The war journal of the German Admiral gave his reasons for his course of action: "The presence of strong enemy forces on the coast makes it impossible for the present for the Squadron to carry out its original intention of carrying on a war against commerce. This purpose is therefore renounced and the destruction of the enemy forces is substituted for it." "On the supposition that the enemy forces would proceed in separate

¹ See Map at page 138.

² "The War at Sea."

detachments in their search for the German cruisers, Count Spee hoped that he would have an opportunity to engage single groups of the enemy, with his combined forces. . . . The success of the operations depended in a high degree upon keeping the Squadron reliably informed: of equal importance was the question of supplies and coal.”¹

Acting upon these well thought out conclusions, Admiral Spee left Easter Island on October 18 for the Chilean island of Mas a Fuera, about 500 miles west of Valparaiso. The *Dresden* and *Leipsig* were set apart for intelligence service, which was highly organized to gather information, and at the same time deceive the enemy by artificial messages. In addition to the regular stations, it was arranged that a number of steamships of German lines would receive and transmit messages. Careful arrangements were also made for coal and supplies, while operating off the South American coast.

The conditions of the anticipated naval action were also discussed in conference, especially as to British methods and the ranges to be chosen.² The voyage to Mas a Fuera was made a battle practice cruise, the German Squadron was exercised in range finding, target practice, and steaming in battle formations. The *Leipsig* was sent ahead to locate the colliers at the rendezvous, and the Cruiser Squadron arrived at Mas a Fuera early in the morning of October 26. There the auxiliary cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* rejoined Admiral Spee, and became again the leader of his train.

¹ “The War at Sea.”

² “The initial range to be striven for, if the sea were rough as was generally to be expected on the ocean, was from 7000 to 7500 meters, and if the condition of the sea would permit, still higher.”

Coaling and taking on of supplies were quickly completed, and a defective blade of the *Nürnberg's* propeller was repaired. A final conference of Admiral Spee and his commanding officers was held on October 27, and that night the German Cruiser Squadron sailed "with full equipment and in condition for battle on its advance into the zone in which our encounter with the enemy was to be expected at any moment."¹

In contrast to the German Admiral's successful preparations against the enemy armed forces, the British dispositions of naval forces were inadequate. As Admiral Cradock was proceeding south in the *Good Hope*, he received the following Admiralty instructions (of September 14, 1914) at Santa Catharina, 250 miles south of Rio, where he was joined by the *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*, and *Otranto*:

"There is a strong probability of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* arriving in the Magellan Straits or on the West Coast of South America."

"The Germans have begun to carry on trade on the West Coast of South America."

"Leave sufficient force to deal with *Dresden* and *Karlsruhe*. Concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, making Falkland Islands your coaling base."

"*Canopus* is now en route to Abrolhos. *Defence* is joining you from Mediterranean. Until *Defence* joins, keep at least *Canopus* and one County class with your flagship."

"As soon as you have superior force, search the Magellan Straits with squadron, being ready to return and

¹ "The War at Sea."

cover the River Plate, or, according to information, search north as far as Valparaiso, break up the German trade and destroy the German cruisers.”

“Anchorage in the vicinity of Golfo Neuvo and Egg Harbor should be searched.”

“Colliers are being ordered to Falkland Islands. Consider whether colliers should be ordered south.”

These dispositions, if carried out, would have established, at the south of the continent of South America, a squadron adequate to follow up and engage Admiral Spee upon information, either on the east coast or the west coast — and this would have been the proper way to meet the situation. But, as has been explained, in the confusion caused by the news of Admiral Spee at Apia and the appearance of the *Emden*, the orders of the *Defence* were recalled.

After the interruption, the Admiralty did not again take measures to constitute a squadron that would be able to seek out Admiral Spee and bring him to action with a superior British force, and, in all the discussions that have obscured the issue, this one fact stands out among the reasons for the British disaster.

As the Admiralty's naval historian has stated, “The situation, however, was now more clearly defined, for it was on the day before Admiral Cradock started to search Hermite Islands that the Fiji wireless station was intercepting the message from the *Scharnhorst*, which, as we have seen, left very little doubt that Admiral Spee was making for Easter Island.”¹ Upon this information, the following Admiralty telegram was sent to Admiral Cradock, October 5: “It appears from in-

¹ Intercepted message of October 4: “*Scharnhorst* on the way between the Marquesas and Easter Island.”

formation received that *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* are working across to South America. *Dresden* may be scouting for them. You must be prepared to meet them in company. *Canopus* should accompany *Glasgow*, *Monmouth*, and *Otranto*, and should search and protect trade in combination."

This clearing of the situation was, in reality, a strong reason for reverting to the Admiralty's interrupted plan of providing one superior British squadron, with the mission of seeking out Admiral Spee and destroying his squadron. But, on October 12, the Admiralty received the following from Admiral Cradock (sent October 8): "Without alarming, respectfully suggest that, in event of the enemy's heavy cruisers and others concentrating West Coast of South America, it is necessary to have a British force on each coast strong enough to bring them into action. For, otherwise, should the concentrated British Force sent from the South East Coast be evaded in the Pacific, which is not impossible, [? and] thereby [? get] behind the enemy, the latter could destroy Falkland, English Bank, and Abrolhos coaling bases in turn with little to stop them, and with British ships unable to follow up owing to want of coal, enemy might possibly reach West Indies."¹

After the receipt of this telegram from Admiral Cradock, the British Admiralty adopted what Sir Julian

¹ Admiral Cradock had also sent on the same day (October 8, received October 11) a telegram reporting evidence "that *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* may be joined by *Nürnberg*, *Dresden*, and *Leipsig*," and stating, "I intend to concentrate at Falkland Islands and avoid distribution of forces. I have ordered *Canopus* to proceed there, and *Monmouth*, *Glasgow* and *Otranto* not to go farther north than Valparaiso until German cruisers are located again. With reference to Admiralty telegram No. 74, does *Defence* join my command?"

Corbett has called a "compromise,"¹ and on October 18 the following telegram was sent to Admiral Cradock: "Concur in your concentration of *Canopus*, *Good Hope*, *Glasgow*, *Monmouth*, *Otranto*, for combined operation.

We have ordered Stoddart in *Carnarvon* to Montevideo as Senior Naval Officer north of that place.

Have ordered *Defence* to join *Carnarvon*.

He will also have under his orders *Cornwall*, *Bristol*, *Orama* and *Macedonia*.

Essex is to remain in West Indies."

On October 18 Admiral Cradock telegraphed: "I consider it possible that *Karlsruhe* has been driven West, and is to join the other five. I trust circumstances will enable me to force an action, but fear that strategically, owing to *Canopus*, the speed of my squadron cannot exceed 12 knots."²

The *Canopus* arrived at Falkland Islands October 22, where Admiral Cradock was waiting in Stanley Harbor. As she required overhauling, Admiral Cradock ordered her "to meet him on the other side by way of the Straits,"³ and he himself in the *Good Hope* "went round the Horn to see the enemy did not escape that way unobserved"⁴ and joined the *Monmouth* and *Glasgow* on the west coast.

After getting round the Horn, Admiral Cradock on October 26 (7 P.M. at sea) sent this dispatch: "Ad-

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.—"It was not entirely on the principle of a single concentration, nor on that suggested by Admiral Cradock for two adequate squadrons, that the Admiralty formed their plan. Something of a compromise between the two was adopted."

² Churchill has stated, of the *Canopus*, that "actually in the operations she steamed 15½."

³ Sir Julian Corbett.

⁴ *Ibid.*

miralty telegram received 7th October. With reference to orders to search for enemy and our great desire for early success, I consider that owing to slow speed of *Canopus* it is impossible to find and destroy enemy's squadron."

"Have therefore ordered *Defence* to join me after calling for orders at Montevideo."

"Shall employ *Canopus* on necessary work of conveying colliers." This order for the *Defence*, the Admiralty countermanded, sending a dispatch to Admiral Cradock on the evening of October 28: "*Defence* is to remain on East Coast under orders of Stoddart. This will leave sufficient force on each side in case the hostile cruisers appear there on the trade routes. There is no ship available for the Cape Horn vicinity. Japanese battleship *Hizen* shortly expected on North American coast. She will join with Japanese *Idzumo* and *Newcastle* and move south to Galapagos."¹ This message was received on the *Glasgow*, but it did not have any effect upon the movements of the approaching battle.² It should also be pointed out that the expectation of having the *Defence* with his squadron could not have had any influence upon Admiral Cradock's ensuing movements, as he moved north before the *Defence* could have joined him in any event.

On October 27 Admiral Cradock had detached the *Glasgow* to Coronel, where he expected to hear from the

¹ ". . . and by these means they (the Admiralty) calculated that if Admiral von Spee had gone north he would meet a superior squadron and be forced down to the *Glasgow* and *Monmouth*, and that these ships would be able to draw him on to the *Good Hope* and *Canopus*." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² Churchill has stated: "But neither this nor any further message reached Admiral Cradock."

Admiralty by way of Montevideo, and also to intercept a German sailing ship which was said to be heading for Santa Maria Islands off Coronel. Admiral Cradock had decided to proceed northward with his squadron and to coal at Juan Fernandez, and he signaled this rendezvous to the *Canopus* on October 28. On October 29 and 30, the *Glasgow*, off Santa Maria, began to take in many German signals, and on the 31st, off Coronel, the *Leipzig* was heard "very close."

"Upon this or other indications Admiral Cradock seems now to have formed the opinion that Admiral von Spee was making for the Northern objective area,"¹ and he changed the rendezvous with the *Canopus* to St. Felix, "a lonely island over 500 miles to the northward of Juan Fernandez, the place where previously he had intended to coal."²

The *Glasgow* was sent into Coronel on October 31 to send and collect telegrams, and was ordered to meet the squadron at noon November 1, at a rendezvous fifty miles west of Coronel. Upon receipt of Admiral Cradock's dispatch telling that he was to move northward, the *Defence* was ordered to join him by Lord Fisher's new Board in the Admiralty, "and in informing him of this they made it clear he was not expected to act without the *Canopus*."³ But, before this dispatch was delivered, the dénouement had come with startling suddenness.

At the rendezvous of Admiral Cradock with the *Glasgow* on November 1, strong German signals were taken in. "They still seemed to indicate that the *Leipzig* was somewhere to the northward calling up merchant vessels, and the Admiral formed a line of search."⁴

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

This search for the *Leipsig* ran into the whole German Cruiser Squadron.

As Admiral Spee approached the South American Coast, his first object was to fetch out from Valparaiso the collier *Santa Isabel*, which was lying there "with 3900 tons of Cardiff coal, supply for one month, and information."¹ On the night of the 29th Admiral Spee "sailed in the rain to within 40 knots of Valparaiso."² After delays due to the weather, the *Santa Isabel* was at last picked up at sea on the morning of October 31. After receiving information from this ship, Admiral Spee resolved to cruise in the zone of Valparaiso, as English mail steamers were due. "There was a very good prospect not only of capturing enemy merchant ships but also, under favorable conditions, of surprising the forces of the enemy which were occupied in protecting trade in this zone or in searching for the single German cruiser which had been reported in the vicinity."³ The skill with which the German wireless had been used, to give the impression that only the *Leipsig* was in this zone, was already bringing about this very result of a search for the *Leipsig* alone.

On November 1 (at 2.50 A.M.) a German steamer signaled that the *Glasgow* had anchored in the Coronel Roads at 7 P.M.⁴ At once Admiral Spee resolved to trap this light cruiser, when she would be obliged to come out of the Chilean port, after the twenty four hour sojourn allowed by international law in a neutral port. Accordingly, the German Admiral spread his squadron

¹ Order of October 29: "1. I propose first to fetch the *Santa Isabel* from Valparaiso."

² "The War at Sea."

³ Ibid.

⁴ "This information influenced the operations of the squadron which later, on November 1, led to the battle of Coronel." — Ibid.

and moved south toward Coronel. The German sweep southward, in search of the *Glasgow*, was thus taking place at the very time the British Squadron was sweeping north in its search for the *Leipsig*, which the deceptive German signals had described as being alone. Consequently the unusual condition was presented of each squadron seeking one ship of the other squadron, in belief that it was an isolated enemy ship — and each squadron in ignorance of the fact that finding the enemy single ship would mean finding the whole enemy squadron.

This was the strange situation which brought on the Battle of Coronel. In regard to this situation on November 1, 1914, it must be kept in mind that, for any naval action on that day, Admiral Cradoek was without the tactical support of the *Canopus*. This British battleship was 250 miles to the south, proceeding to the northern rendezvous at St. Felix, to which the *Canopus* had been ordered by Admiral Cradock, as explained, in the belief that the German Cruiser Squadron had gone to the north.

In the British sweep to the north, Admiral Cradock's flagship *Good Hope* had taken a course N. W. by N. (mag.). The rest of the squadron had been ordered N. E. by E. (mag.) with fifteen mile intervals between the *Monmouth*, *Otranto*, and *Glasgow*, in order from the flag. After steaming two hours, by 4.20 P.M., this disposition resulted in the British flagship being wide to the west of the rest of the squadron. The weather had "cleared with a continually freshening south wind and an occasional squall,"¹ and there was a good deal of sea.

¹ "The War at Sea."

At this time the German Cruiser Squadron was moving south, nearer the South American coast. The *Nürnberg* had been sent inshore "at a distance of 25 knots,"¹ and the *Dresden* had been dispatched in her direction "for the purpose of maintaining communication."² Shortly after 4 o'clock the *Leipzig* was ordered to investigate a cloud of smoke to starboard. This was the British Squadron. At 4.17 P.M. two ships were sighted, and at 4.25 a third ship, which were identified as probably the *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*, and *Otranto*. At almost the same time (4.20 P.M.) the *Glasgow* had sighted the smoke of the Germans. At 4.40 the *Glasgow* was able to report the presence of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and at 4.45 gave their course as "between S. E. and S." At 4.47 the three British ships turned west at full speed to close the flagship.

Admiral Spee pursued at 22 knots in the *Scharnhorst*, but the *Gneisenau* could not raise her speed at first, as two of her boilers were being cleaned, and Admiral Spee's command at this time was consequently dispersed. But the wide interval between Admiral Cradock's flagship and the rest of his ships also delayed the concentration of the British Squadron. This disposition of the British ships, with the flagship wide to the west, was a part of Admiral Cradock's scheme for a sweep in search of the *Leipzig* alone. But when the whole German Cruiser Squadron happened to be encountered on the east of the British Squadron, this position of the most powerful British ship, so far away on the west, was a disadvantage against the chance of Admiral Cradock's forcing an early fight upon Admiral Spee, by a prompt move to the east, which the British

¹ "The War at Sea."

² *Ibid.*

naval historian has emphasized as Admiral Cradock's best resort.¹

A move to the east, the German Admiral's report and the German official history showed, was one thing Admiral Spee felt anxious to oppose,² because he wished to keep the British Squadron away from the neutral coast. But the disposition of Admiral Cradock's Squadron gave Admiral Spee over an hour to get up speed and close up his ships, before the British made the first move to force an early engagement. Consequently there was no chance of an early action.³ The *Good Hope* had been reported by the Germans as moving to join the other three British ships, but it was not until 5.47 that Admiral Cradock had made signal for his squadron in line ahead in order *Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto*, "to cross in front of the enemy, who was then distant about twelve miles."⁴

This course was soon abandoned, and the following explanation has been given by the British naval historian: "As, however, the *Otranto* could do no more than 15 knots, he seems quickly to have found that on the course he was steering he could not effect his purpose, for at 5.55 he inclined away to starboard (S 20° E).

¹ "And that the little chance he had was to bring it on while he still had the advantage of the light." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² "Count Spee who at Coronel at first went on alone with his flagship in order to keep his opponent from the coast and from gaining a lee position." — "The War at Sea."

³ "In anticipating such a manœuvre by his enemy he (Admiral Spee) was not far wrong. . . . It is probable that having regard to the relative speeds and positions of the two squadrons he (Admiral Cradock) judged it impossible to fall back on the *Canopus* without first being brought to action, and thought his best chance, as the sun was setting behind him, lay in forcing an engagement while he had the advantage of the light." — Sir Julian Corbett.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Even this would not do, and judging apparently that nothing was left to him but to force an action on parallel courses he signalled to alter to south (mag.).”¹

Admiral Spee has stated that, in the meantime, he was “careful not to be forced into a lee position,”² which would have been a great disadvantage in the heavy sea, with the wind which “was blowing with a force of six from the south.”³ In addition, the German Admiral wrote in his report, “also the course chosen served to cut the opponent off from the neutral coast,” showing, as stated, that it was an influence in his mind to guard against a move to the east.

At 5.30 the *Good Hope* was identified as the enemy flagship, and the German Admiral observed that the British were to form their line. Admiral Spee used this time (“from 5.35”) to close up his ships at a decreased speed on a southwestward, “and later a southerly course. At seven minutes after six the two lines (*Dresden* was still about one nautical mile behind) with the exception of the *Nürberg*, which was far away, were running on approximately parallel southerly courses at a distance of 13,500 meters.”⁴

At this phase of the situation Admiral Spee had worked into a position where he would have a great advantage from the setting of the sun (“at about 6.25”). If Admiral Cradock had been able to bring on the action earlier the British Squadron would have fought with the low sun in the eyes of their enemy. After sunset, this advantage would pass to the Germans, as the British would be silhouetted against the afterglow. “The moon, which had risen at six o’clock, was not yet full

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

³ Ibid.

² Admiral Spee’s report.

⁴ Ibid.

and was frequently hidden by clouds.”¹ Both squadrons, on their southerly courses, found heavy going against wind and sea, pitching and rolling, with the waves dashing over the bows.

The comparative forces of the opposing squadrons are given in the accompanying table.² The *Otranto* was an auxiliary merchant cruiser, and worthless for battle, except for moral effect and to divert enemy fire. She would have been a large target, and her guns were too small to have effect at battle ranges. For these reasons she was not used in the serious action. The German light cruiser *Nürnberg* was too far away, and did not get up in time to be in the German line of battle.

Between the two squadrons, there was not much difference in tonnage, but the German cruisers were better ships, and the armament of the two armored cruisers, *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, gave them a definite superiority over the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*. In addition to this, the German Cruiser Squadron was notably at high efficiency, which had been attained by constant effort on the Pacific cruise. This was not the case with the British Squadron, and the historian of the British Admiralty leaves no doubt of the fact that the British were far inferior in methods and training of their personnel.³ Consequently, as was proved by the event, it was not a case in which the inferior force was so efficient

¹ “The War at Sea.”

² Page 173.

³ “Under such conditions of light, with heavy seas breaking over their engaged bows, what chance had our comparatively old ships which had had no opportunity for doing their gunnery since they were commissioned for the war, against the smartest shooting squadron in the German service, and that squadron superior in numbers, design, speed and gun power?” — Sir Julian Corbett.

that it could hope to inflict disproportionate losses, and thus justify an engagement.

Under these conditions, the conduct of Admiral Cradock, in putting the British Squadron into position to fight the Battle of Coronel, cannot be justified. It is natural to feel sympathy for the British Admiral in his battle against great odds, and the tribute of admiration is due to the gallant fight to the end of the British ships, but these considerations must not be allowed to obscure the real situation. The conclusion cannot be avoided that, in this situation, there were no special circumstances that would make the British sacrifice of value to their cause.

Admiral Cradock's Squadron, if reinforced by the *Canopus*, would have been a force Admiral Spee could not have stood up against. The German Admiral would have had to give ground, his movements were impeded by his supply train, and Admiral Cradock had the fast light cruiser *Glasgow* to keep touch. The fact that Admiral Spee's Squadron was located, in itself, was an assurance to the British, and naval forces could have been concentrated that would force a losing battle on Admiral Spee. But Admiral Cradock's sweep to the north, beyond the tactical support of the *Canopus*, put him in the position of an inferior force, that could have been reinforced, engaging a superior enemy without the special causes that would justify the risk. Reinforced by the *Canopus*, Admiral Cradock would have had a superior force. Lacking the *Canopus*, he was an inferior force, and yet he engaged without the justification of a special object that would be worth the hazard of his inferior force.

BRITISH FORCES AT THE BATTLE OF CORONEL

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Good Hope</i> (Flag)	Cruiser	1902	14,100	23.5	2-9.2"; 16-6"
<i>Monmouth</i>	"	1903	9,800	23.0	14-6"
<i>Glasgow</i>	Light Cruiser	1911	4,800	26.0	2-6"; 10-4"
<i>Otranto</i>	H. M. Cruiser	15.0	4-4.7"

GERMAN FORCES AT THE BATTLE OF CORONEL

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Scharnhorst</i> (Flag)	Cruiser	1907	11,600	23.2	8-8.2"; 6-6"
<i>Gneisenau</i>	"	1907	11,600	23.5	" "
<i>Leipzig</i>	Light Cruiser	1906	3,250	23.0	10-4.1"
<i>Dresden</i>	" "	1909	3,600	24.5 (designed speed)	"
<i>Nürnberg</i> (Delayed joining action)	" "	1908	3,450	23.5 (designed speed)	"

With the two opposing squadrons steaming to the southward on slightly converging courses, Admiral Cradock increased speed to 17 knots, at 6.18 P.M., and altered course one point toward the enemy. At this time he signaled to the *Canopus* his position, "and informed her he was going to attack the enemy then and there."¹ The *Canopus* took in this signal, and gave her own position, 250 miles away to the southwest proceeding to the northern rendezvous at St. Felix, as ordered by Admiral Cradock. In his report Admiral

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

Spee stated: "At 6.20 o'clock they were 12,400 meters apart, and I made turn of one point towards the enemy's line and opened fire at 6.34 P.M. at a distance of 10,400 meters."

The squadrons fought ship against ship, the two flagships engaging one another, the *Gneisenau* engaged with the *Monmouth*, and the *Leipzig* and *Dresden* occupied with the *Glasgow* and *Otranto*. The *Otranto* soon pulled out of action and drew off to the westward, as she was useless in a naval battle. The result of the action was not long in doubt, as the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* simply overwhelmed the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*.

The reason for this was the quickness with which the two German ships found the range and landed salvos on the two British ships, which at once had their fighting powers reduced. The *Scharnhorst's* third salvo made a hit on the forward big gun turret and conning tower of the *Good Hope*, putting out that heavy gun and causing fire to break out. An early salvo of the *Gneisenau* destroyed the forward turret of the *Monmouth* and set fire to the fore part of the ship. Thus, from the beginning, both British ships were unable to fight at full force.¹ During the battle the *Scharnhorst* was only hit twice, with no wounded, the *Gneisenau* was hit four times, with two slightly wounded. Consequently there was nothing to impair the German gunfire, which was very rapid and effective.

At about 6.50 the *Monmouth* sheered to starboard out of the line. She was on fire in many places, and she ceased firing at 7.20, after darkness had fallen. The

¹ "The War at Sea" states of the *Good Hope* that "a full salvo was not observed"—of the *Monmouth*, that her salvos "soon gave place to ordinary gunfire."

Good Hope was attempting to close the Germans,¹ but her fire was growing weaker, and at 7.23 there was a "great explosion,"² which destroyed the forward part of the flagship. After a few shots even her stern guns ceased fire. The after part of her hull was seen in the darkness on fire, and she sank shortly after 8 o'clock. The two German armored cruisers had ceased fire at 7.26. The helpless *Monmouth* was still afloat lost in the darkness, and had signaled to the *Glasgow* that she wished to make in to the shore, being down by the head and taking in much water, which had, however, put out the fires on board.

The *Glasgow* had followed the fight "chasing such targets as were offered."³ She had been under fire from the *Dresden* and *Leipsig*, and had been hit many times, five on the water line, but her coal had saved her from great injury. After the disaster to the two principal British ships, she could be of no use, and, after the signals from the *Monmouth*, she made off at full speed to the westward, as did the *Otranto*. Both British ships escaped in the darkness.

Still uncertain of the fate of the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*, which had been lost sight of in the darkness, Admiral Spee had signaled his cruisers: "Pursue enemy; attack with torpedoes." In this search the *Leipsig* ran through the wreckage of the *Good Hope*, though at the time this was not realized, and the Germans were in doubt for a while as to her fate. The *Monmouth* eventually received her finishing stroke from the *Nürnberg*, which had followed up the German Squadron from too

¹ "At 6.53 Admiral Spee had made a turn of one point to port to avoid possible torpedo attack." — "The War at Sea."

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

great a distance to take part in the general action, but had taken in Admiral Spee's signals to pursue the enemy. This German light cruiser found the helpless *Moumouth* in the darkness, and sank her by gunfire at about 9 o'clock, as she would not surrender. The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* came to this firing, and Admiral Spee disposed his squadron, with his light cruisers in scouting line, to proceed in the night to the north along the coast.

“When, on the following afternoon, after the assembling of the small cruisers, the flagship steamed up the line, the crews gave three cheers for the victorious captain. Count Spee thereupon signaled by flag to the squadron: ‘With the help of God a fine victory, for which I express appreciation and good wishes to the crews.’”¹

¹ “The War at Sea.”


V. BATTLE OF CORONEL, NOVEMBER, 1, 1914

(This chart is diagrammatic only)

British Courses —————

German Courses

- (1) German Cruiser Squadron on southerly sweep to find *Glasgow* reported in Coronel. *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig*, *Dresden* (with *Nürnberg* to the east "at a distance of 25 knots").
- (2) Noon, November 1, Rendezvous of Admiral Cradock's squadron to meet *Glasgow* from Coronel.
- (3) *Canopus* 250 miles away to south.
- (4) Sweep north of Admiral Cradock's squadron in search of *Leipzig*, on diverging courses, as shown, with *Good Hope* far to west.
- (5) 4.20 P.M. Opposing fleets sight one another.
- (6) 4.47 P.M. *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*, *Otranto* turn west to close flagship *Good Hope*, which turns east toward them.
- (7) 5.47 P.M. Admiral Cradock signals to form line ahead, *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*, *Otranto*. In meantime Admiral Spee had closed up his squadron.
- (8) 6.34 P.M. Action opens at 10,400 meters. *Otranto* soon sheered out of action.
- (9) 6.50 P.M. *Monmouth* out of line.
- (10) 7.23 P.M. Explosion on *Good Hope*.
- (11) 7.26 P.M. German armored cruisers cease fire.
- (12) *Good Hope* sinks about 8 P.M.
- (13) *Monmouth* disabled and helpless, and, after signaling *Glasgow* to escape, found by the *Nürnberg* in the darkness and sunk about 9 P.M.
- (14) *Glasgow* and *Otranto* escape in darkness, as indicated.



CHAPTER XII

THE NEW NAVAL SITUATION AND THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

(See Chart at page 206.)

THE news of Admiral Cradock's disaster at Coronel followed closely upon the more important news of the break with Turkey (November 1, 1914), which was the natural result of the course of events wherein German influence had been allowed to become dominant at Constantinople. With no counteracting show of strength on the part of the Entente Allies at the Turkish capital, the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had been permitted to carry out their mission for Germany, under the thin veneer of being in the Turkish Navy, even to the extent of embroiling Turkey with Russia by clashes in the Black Sea.

With a deliberate plan for causing the rupture between Turkey and the Entente Allies,¹ in the last days of October the German Admiral Souchon, who was still in command in spite of the fiction of the Turkish nationality of the two ships, on his own initiative took into the Black Sea the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, with the

¹ To show that this plan to cause a break was deliberate, it is only necessary to quote from the letter of the German Admiralty Staff of October 10, 1914, sent out to Admiral Spee in advance of the event: "*Situation in the Mediterranean.* An attempt will be made to induce Turkey to declare war on Russia and to undertake an expedition against Egypt (Suez Canal Zone). The *Goeben* and *Breslau* are at Constantinople and later will advance into the Black Sea against the Russians, with the available Turkish ships the crews of which will be trained by them."

Turkish cruiser *Hamadieh*, Turkish destroyers and mine-layers. His first move was a hostile demonstration against Sevastopol, which made the Russians fire upon him. A Russian transport was sunk in the Black Sea, and there were also bombardments of the Crimean and Circassian coasts. The reports of these naval events were distorted by the German Admiral, to put the Russians in the wrong. Even at that, there was still enough opposition in the Turkish Ministry to show that the balance might have been turned by a different conduct of affairs on the part of the Entente Allies, but German influence had been allowed to grow too strong, and the Turks refused to dismiss the Germans from their Navy. Consequently the Russians declared war, and the British and French Ambassadors, who had been instructed to follow the lead of the Russians, left Constantinople on November 1.

Thus Turkey entered the World War on the side of the Central Powers, a far reaching calamity for the Entente Allies. There is no avoiding the evidence that this was brought about because, on the one hand, the Germans had given the Dardanelles due importance in their prewar strategy, and after the outbreak of war had used every means in their power to gain their object. On the other hand, the Entente Allies had not awaked to this, and British prewar naval strategy had so neglected this vital point that nothing was accomplished to offset the German efforts.

Consequently, the Germans had prevailed, "and in pursuance of the terms of the joint ultimatum delivered the previous evening, Admiral Carden was given orders to commence hostilities."¹ A futile bombardment of the

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

outer forts took place on November 3 — of which it is sufficient to quote from the British Admiralty's historian, "Each group of ships made one run at long range, lasting about ten minutes, during which time the British (2 battle cruisers) fired forty six rounds of 12" and the French (2 old type battleships) thirty rounds."¹ Some damage was done, but the following expressed the actual effect upon the Turks: "At Constantinople it was put about that the ships had been driven off, and as the attack was not renewed it is to be feared that the impression made was rather the reverse of what had been intended."² Thus helplessly was relinquished the control of the most important waterway in the European situation.

Compared with the incalculable harm done to the Entente Allies by this vital reverse, the episode of Coronel had little effect upon the War. Of course it was a shock, especially coming at this time, when also the German submarines were causing so much anxiety for the Grand Fleet at its bases.³ But it was going too far when the British naval historian stated, "Apart from fresh anxieties in Home Waters and the Mediterranean, every vulnerable point all over the world lay exposed to a telling blow from Admiral Spee."⁴ This undoubtedly reflected the first exaggerated estimate of the defeat at Coronel, but it was conceding to Admiral Spee an omnipotence which he was far from possessing.

Even in South American waters, although the German Admiral had gained temporary control of the west

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Ibid.

³ "As we have seen, the activity of the German submarines had recently made the Grand Fleet's bases for the moment untenable, with the accidental consequence that we had lost one of our finest battleships." — Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

coast, it was possible to gather a stronger British squadron on the east coast, by concentrating Admiral Stoddart's *Defence*, *Carnarvon*, and *Cornwall*, with the *Canopus*, *Glasgow*, and *Otranto*.

This concentration was ordered at once (November 4), and the *Kent* was also ordered to Admiral Stoddart, who was directed to concentrate these ships at Montevideo.

North of the area in which Admiral Spee had gained control, the projected Anglo-Japanese squadron was gathered,¹ and Admiral Patey was ordered to join it with the battle cruiser *Australia*, and to take command in a move south to find the enemy. The Japanese First South Sea Squadron was strengthened until it was superior to Admiral Spee's Squadron,² and was "to replace Admiral Patey between Fiji and the Marquesas in case the Germans should break back" — an improbable supposition.

"Now that the German squadron had been located so far away,"³ there was no need of such strong protection for the convoys, and it was an easy task to cover even the Cameroons Expedition on the Southwest African coast by another squadron. The *Warrior* and the *Black Prince* were at last recalled from their unsuitable tasks and made a nucleus of a squadron for Admiral de Robeck at Sierra Leone.

The fact that these ships were available showed that the first gloomy anxieties of the British Admiralty were exaggerated, but the one thing most needed, which should have been constituted long before, was a superior British squadron that would be able to follow

¹ *Newcastle*, *Idzumo*, *Hizen*, *Asama*.

² *Kurama*, *Tsukuba*, *Iwate*.

³ Sir Julian Corbett.

up Admiral Spee and bring him to action. This necessary factor was provided by the Admiralty, on November 4, in secret orders to Lord Jellicoe to detach two British battle cruisers, *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, for urgent foreign service. Admiral Sturdee was ordered to hoist his flag on the *Invincible* as Commander-in-Chief in the South Atlantic and Pacific, an unprecedented command. With these two battle cruisers, Admiral Sturdee was given the mission of seeking out and destroying Admiral Spee's Squadron.

At last the right means were being used to end this situation, and it should be noted that the invaluable aid of secrecy was obtained for this mission. This secret was so well kept that the German official naval history has stated that the German Admiralty Staff had no suspicion that the two British battle cruisers were to be sent out,¹ although of course the Germans assumed that superior naval forces would be directed against Admiral Spee.

Coaling and supplying the two battle cruisers, and necessary repairs on the *Invincible*, were hurried as much as possible, and Admiral Sturdee sailed on the afternoon of November 11, with orders of November 9 to proceed by way of St. Vincent, Cape Verde. There had been anxiety lest "Admiral Spee might move north to the Panama Canal," and in Admiral Sturdee's instructions "he was warned that he might be diverted on passage to the West Indies."² But this was obviated by secret orders of November 10 to send the British battle cruiser *Princess Royal* to the American North Atlantic.

¹ "At any rate, it is certain that the Squadron Commander had no news of the sending of British battle cruisers from the North Sea, which fact was also unknown to the Admiralty Staff at the time." — "The War at Sea."

² Sir Julian Corbett.

The following from the First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, written to Admiral Jellicoe on November 12, 1914, is most interesting, as showing the wide effect, out of all proportion to the real value of this German cruiser force, which Admiral Spee's Squadron exerted upon British naval dispositions. As has been shown in this narrative, the continued disturbing effect of the German Cruiser Squadron was the result of the failure of the British to obtain information, and the accompanying failure to make the enemy armed forces the main objects of British naval strategy. When the slight strength of Admiral Spee's Squadron is remembered, this memorandum of Lord Fisher is instructive:

“Personal.

I want to make it clear to you what the *Scharnhorst* Squadron means as regards our dispositions.

1. We have not heard of them since November 4.
2. They may have adopted the following courses:—
 - (a) Go through the Panama Canal, smash our West Indian Fleet and release all the armed German liners from New York — hence the *Princess Royal*.
 - (b) Go to south-east coast of America and stop our vital food supplies — hence the two *Invincibles*.
 - (c) Go to the Cape and raid the Army base at Walfish Bay — hence the *Minotaur* to reinforce *Albion*.
 - (d) Go to Duala and relieve the Germans, destroying our ships and military expedition — hence the *Warrior*, *Black Prince* and three *Edgar Quinet*.

I hope to send Bartolomé to you tomorrow with information which is too secret to be written or telegraphed.”

This “secret information” was also another reason for detaching the *Princess Royal* from Admiral Jellicoe's Fleet, in spite of the protests of the British Naval Commander-in-Chief. It was an unfounded report that the Germans were to send out battle cruisers at this time. Sir Julian Corbett has stated, “the reports came

from sources that could not be denied," but it is now known that there was no intention of anything of the kind. Sending out the German battle cruisers had been suggested, but the plan had not been adopted, and the following unmistakable dispatch was sent to Admiral Spee by the German Admiralty Staff, "Advance of large cruisers from Germany into the North Atlantic impossible." This was in accordance with the doctrines then prevailing in German naval strategy — and it is useless to discuss any such naval operation in coöperation with Admiral Spee's Squadron.

But the "strain" upon the British Admiralty at that time has been thus described by Winston Churchill, who was then First Lord: "The strain upon the British naval sources in the outer seas, apart from the main theatre of naval operations, was now at its maximum and may be partially appreciated from the following approximate enumerations: —

Combination against von Spee, 30 ships.

In search of the *Emden* and *Königsberg*, 8 ships.

General protection of trade by vessels other than the above, 40 ships.

Convoy duty in the Indian Ocean, 8 ships.

Blockade of the Turco-German Fleet at the Dardanelles, 3 ships.

Defence of Egypt, 2 ships.

Miscellaneous minor tasks, 11 ships.

Total, 102 ships of all classes.

We literally could not lay our hands on another vessel of any sort or kind which could be made to play any useful part. But we were soon to have relief.

This relief came from the improvement of the situation as to the outlying German commerce destroying cruisers."

The improvement of the situation, as to the German commerce destroyers, came about through the following events. On October 30 the *Königsberg* had been found in the Rufigi River, on the east coast of Africa, where she could be easily blockaded. The *Karlsruhe* had come to her end by explosion, as stated, on November 4, although this was not known to the British for a long time. The *Geier* had been interned at Honolulu on November 8, and the commerce destroying cruise of the *Emden* was ended on November 9.

Captain Müller had been able to heel the *Emden*, clean her bottom, and coal at leisure at Diego Garcia, a lonely British colony where the inhabitants did not know that a war existed. His attending steamer *Markomania* was captured on October 12 with the *Pontoporos* from which she was coaling. But the *Emden* by October 20, between Minikoi and Ceylon, had captured six more British ships. Among these was the Admiralty collier *Exford* with 6000 tons of Welsh coal, and this prize gave Captain Müller a new lease of life, when his resources were at a low ebb. From the Ceylon area, the *Emden* eluded her pursuers far to the east, and made a daring raid at Penang north of the Malacca Strait on October 28. Disguised by an extra funnel, she entered the port unsuspected, destroyed by a surprise attack the Russian cruiser *Zhemchug* and a French destroyer, and afterwards escaped without damage.

From there, Captain Müller moved south to a rendezvous with his prize, the collier *Exford*, off the island of Cocos. After dismissing the collier, Captain Müller determined to destroy the Cocos cable station. This was a fatal risk for the *Emden*, as this British station had been instructed to give notice at once of the ap-

pearance of any strange ship, with a special warning as to the *Emden*, and at this very time the Australian convoy was only fifty five miles north of Coeos, with an escort of three cruisers all of which were superior to the *Emden*. Consequently, upon the approach of the *Emden* early in the morning of November 9, not only was a message at once sent from the British station, but there was an equally prompt response by the detachment of the cruiser *Sydney* from the Australian convoy to destroy the *Emden*.

In ignorance that a superior enemy was so near, and had been notified of their presence, the Germans were wrecking the cable and wireless, when they were surprised by the appearance of the *Sydney*. The *Emden* attempted to close the *Sydney*, which was her only hope, and the Germans scored the first hits at 9500 yards, as the shooting of the *Sydney* was wild at the start. But the 4.1 inch guns of the German cruiser had little chance at this range, and the superior speed of the *Sydney* enabled her to keep the ranges open, and thus get the full benefit of her heavier guns.¹ As a result, the *Emden* was badly shot to pieces, with little damage to the *Sydney*, and, after enduring the unequal ordeal from 9.40 A.M. until 11.20 A.M., she was run ashore on a reef of North Keeling Island, on fire fore and aft and in a sinking condition.

With the elimination of these German cruisers there was no longer any reason for the elaborate precautions as to protection for the convoys, and the stream of troops moved westward without interruption. At the same time the Germans lost their possessions in China, of which Admiral Tirpitz wrote, "A work of nineteen

¹ *Emden*, 24.12 knots, ten 4.1" guns; *Sydney*, 25.7 knots, eight 6" guns.

years is thereby wiped out." On October 31 the grand attack upon Tsingtau was in readiness, and the fortress was obliged to surrender on November 7. By this capture the Japanese had won the coveted Shantung area, and thus gained their great object in entering the World War.

From the foregoing, it will be evident that Admiral Spee had narrow opportunities for successful operations after his victory at Coronel. The German Admiral on November 3 put into Valparaiso with the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and *Nürnberg*.¹ He had a consultation with the German Ambassador and Consul General, in which he received first hand information as to the war situation and the possibilities for coal and supplies. He also transmitted reports and received orders. After the twenty four hour sojourn allowed and "after 127 seamen and stokers had been chosen from the large number of Germans applying for service,"² he sailed for his rendezvous at Mas a Fuera.

Admiral Spee found that the German Admiralty Staff had decided that a continuance of cruiser warfare "promised few results,"³ and that the German cruisers

¹ "Only three vessels belonging to a belligerent power were allowed to visit the Chilean port at the same time." — "The War at Sea."

² Ibid.

³ "Cruiser warfare in the Pacific promises few results."

"In the Atlantic Ocean, owing to the strict watch kept by the enemy on the principal trade routes it may be carried on only if several ships operate together."

"On the other hand, the supplying of coal will become increasingly difficult as, owing to the pressure exerted by the English, neutral countries are continually allowing new restrictions on exportation. A coal supply through the medium of the New York supply districts can hardly be reckoned upon. Also, the supply of coal from captured ships will hardly be sufficient for groups of cruisers working together." — German Admiralty Staff, letter of October 10, 1914.

should try to get home. The deductions of the German Admiralty were contained in a detailed letter of October 10, 1914, sent *via* San Francisco. In letter form it never reached Admiral Spee, but both the attitude of the German Admiralty Staff and Admiral Spee's comprehension of this attitude are conclusively shown in the following exchange of messages, all of which were received.

Telegram from German Admiralty Staff, November 4, 1914: "For the Cruiser Squadron. It is recommended that you make an attempt to break through and return to Germany with all ships." Followed on November 16 (upon delay in transmission to Admiral Spee) by message, "What are your intentions? How large a stock of ammunition have you?" Answers from Admiral Spee, November 16, "Cruiser Squadron intends to break through and return to Germany." November 17, "Stock of ammunition as follows: each large cruiser 445 large caliber, 1100 medium caliber, 1860 small caliber."

Admiral Spee had received information as to the make-up of Admiral Stoddart's Squadron on the east coast of South America, "and that a Japanese force of superior strength was to be expected from the North on the South American west coast."¹ Admiral Spee had also received a message from the German agent at San Francisco, "In case the Cruiser Squadron decides to return home, an immediate start is recommended, as it is my opinion the Squadron is in a dangerous position." The Germans have explained Admiral Spee's delay in leaving the west coast for home by stating that, on account of the information he had received as to the in-

¹ "The War at Sea."

creased difficulties in procuring coal, "he must have considered it the wiser plan to lay in all the coal which could be procured on the west coast before going farther." ¹

The idea of detaching the *Leipsig* for commerce destroying, as the *Emden* had been detached, was proposed to Admiral Spee and rejected by him. At this stage the German Admiral preferred to keep his whole force together. Another point should be noted. Admiral Tirpitz, influenced by "the consideration that the impression made by the victory at Coronel must not be nullified by a failure," ² urged the German Admiralty Staff to inform Admiral Spee that "he would not be expected to engage in a second battle before breaking through into the North Sea." ³ The Admiralty Staff did not act on this wise suggestion, and Admiral Spee was left with discretionary powers as to a new operation. "To complete the picture the fact must be mentioned that, as was consistent with their personal attributes and their training, both Count Spee and his Chief of Staff were more inclined — as was the case with the majority of German naval officers — to consider it of greater importance to obtain a military success than to endeavor to injure the enemy's trade." ⁴

From Mas a Fuera Admiral Spee left on November 15 for St. Quintin Bay in the Gulf of Penas on the south of the Chilean coast, where he arrived November 21. At this hidden and secure anchorage Admiral Spee completed his preparations for his voyage. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had been left at Mas a Fuera, with instructions to attempt to keep up the impression, by

¹ "The War at Sea."

³ Ibid.

² Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

constant signaling, that the whole German Cruiser Squadron was still in that area. The *Titania* had been scuttled "owing to her slowness and unseaworthiness," and the German Admiral at this time made every effort to cut down his train, and yet carry all the coal he could obtain. Consequently the Cruiser Squadron, with all coal possible on the ships, left St. Quintin Bay, November 26, for the trip around Cape Horn, attended by the colliers *Baden*, *Santa Isabel*, and *Seydlitz*, carrying 17,000 tons of coal.

Admiral Spee passed the Cape on December 2, and on the same day captured a Canadian sailing ship with 2750 tons of Cardiff coal. To utilize this supply, the German Squadron coaled off Picton Island. This was sure to betray the presence of Admiral Spee, but it made no difference in the result, as the German Admiral divulged to his officers his plan of an expedition against the Falkland Islands, "with the purpose of destroying the radio station and the naval arsenal as well as counter measure to the taking prisoner and unworthy treatment of the governor of Samoa — capturing the governor."¹ This plan was Admiral Spee's undoing.

By November 9 the British had inferred that Admiral Spee had not left Mas a Fuera. "It was possible therefore, that he would have to be sought out on the west coast, and if this was so the Falkland Islands became essential as a base and must be protected."² On that date, in consequence, the *Canopus* was ordered to remain at Port Stanley, moored as a floating battery to command the entrance, to coöperate with the Governor in defense of the place. Admiral Sturdee had coaled at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, where he arrived on November 17.

¹ "The War at Sea."

² Sir Julian Corbett.

From there the two British battle cruisers proceeded to the Abrolhos Rocks rendezvous with Admiral Stoddart's Squadron. There, Admiral Sturdee found waiting the *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*, *Glasgow* (repaired after *Coronel*), *Bristol*, and *Orama*. The *Defence* was also there, but she had been ordered to leave, upon the arrival of the two battle cruisers, to help protect the bases of General Botha's expedition against German Southwest Africa, after the failure of De Wet's rebellion.

At this rendezvous Admiral Sturdee found Admiralty orders, of November 24, "that after joining up with Admiral Stoddart he was to move south to the Falklands, which he was to use as his base, and then to move to the Chilean coast, searching the channels and inlets of Tierra del Fuego and keeping his big ships from being seen in the Straits."¹ The Admiralty had received certain information from the British Consul General at Valparaiso of the names of all the German ships at Mas a Fuera November 15, and on November 23 this information was amplified "from an intercepted German message, which left little doubt that Admiral von Spee was at St. Quintin Bay."²

Accordingly, after having dispatched his three fastest colliers in advance by separate routes to the Falklands, and the other five under escort of the *Orama*, Admiral Sturdee on November 28 left with the united Squadron for his new base. He was afterwards joined by the *Macedonia*, which had coaled and repaired at Sierra Leone. On his way down, Admiral Sturdee decided to make a sweep for the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, not knowing that this German ship had already gone northward. But Admiral Sturdee was also drawn off in the direction

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

of Montevideo by a sudden false report, from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Rio, of the presence of Admiral Spee's Squadron. It was not until December 1 that the British Admiral learned from the *Bristol*, which he had sent to Rio, that the report was false, and he then resumed his course for the Falklands.

In the meantime there had been a report of Admiral Spee off the north coast of Chile, which had caused the *Princess Royal* to be ordered hurriedly to Jamaica, as "this looked so much like a move for the Panama Canal." ¹ But on December 4, Admiral Sturdee "got a message which left him in no doubt he could safely carry on as he was. It came from our Consul General at Valparaiso, and stated that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had been sighted off the port early that morning. From this fact the Admiral concluded that the whole German squadron was probably there." ² This was the identical false impression that Admiral Spee had hoped to create by the presence of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* in that area, and yet it was an irony of fate that it was the very success of the German Admiral's ruse that drew his overpoweringly superior enemy to the Falklands — to the German Admiral's own destruction. As a matter of fact, this information ended all hesitation on the part of Admiral Sturdee, and his squadron arrived at the Falkland Islands in the forenoon of December 7. Consequently Admiral Spee was approaching a fatal trap.

The German official naval history has not approved Admiral Spee's decision to make the attack at Falkland Islands, outside of any question of the unexpected presence of the two British battle cruisers. While giving allowance for the idea of "rendering useless the only

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

British base on the South American coast," "The War at Sea" has stated: "This injury to the opponent *could only be temporary because the control of the base by the German squadron could not last long.* A necessity in the interest of further operations in no way called for an attack on the Falkland Islands. By this undertaking Count Spee, who had to count on the sending of warning signals by the British Radio Station before its destruction, gave up the advantage of concealing his own movements which was of the greatest importance to him in carrying out the plan of the dash to the Fatherland." This German official history has also recorded the fact that there was a serious difference of opinion among Admiral Spee's officers, as to the attack, and three of his captains "considered that to go around the Falkland Islands would be more correct strategically."

The German official history has also thus explained Admiral Spee's decision: "Count Spee, as well as his Chief of Staff, Captain Fiedlitz, believed that every opportunity of obtaining a military success must be taken advantage of, so that the squadron would be certain to have an honorable part in the successes of the Navy in the World War." In the preface this motive was again emphasized: "The desire for further military successes led Count Spee to advance with his cruisers to the English base on Falkland Islands."

The fact that even the Germans thus condemned the attack upon the Falkland Islands Station is a true index of Admiral Spee's fatal error. He had left the west coast of South America with the definite object of attempting to return to Germany. The instructions of the German Admiralty, and Admiral Spee's understanding of this important object, are matters of official record. Yet the

German Admiral chose to jeopardize his main object for the sake of winning what could only be a local and temporary success. For the success of this German main object it was also of the first importance to preserve the secrecy of Admiral Spee's movements, and, outside of the unjustifiable risk, the Falkland attack meant throwing away this necessary factor of secrecy.

Admiral Spee's decision to attack the Falkland Station was all the more inexcusable, in view of his own scheme to lure the British naval forces around Cape Horn by using the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* to give the impression that the German Cruiser Squadron was still on the west coast of South America. By keeping wide of Cape Horn, thus avoiding these forces, and disappearing into the broad South Atlantic, Admiral Spee would not only have been in the area made safer for him by this movement of British naval forces to the west coast of South America, but he would also have prolonged the existing situation, wherein the mystery of his movements was a cause of grave anxiety to his enemies and was diverting enemy naval forces from other uses. Even when considered only from the viewpoint of scoring a military success for his squadron, nothing could have been better than to make the daring attempt to break through and add the German Cruiser Squadron to the German Battle Fleet.

It is known that, before making his attack on the Falkland Islands, Admiral Spee had provided for the contingencies of meeting British naval forces up to the full strength of Admiral Stoddart's Squadron.¹ But

¹ "In the most unfavorable case the presence of the *Defence*, *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*, *Glasgow*, *Bristol*, besides *Canopus* was to be expected." — "The War at Sea."

beyond this his calculations had not gone, and the presence of the British battle cruisers was a complete surprise.¹ Preparations for minesweeping and landings had been made, and the *Nürnberg* and *Gneisenau* were to lead in. The order, signaled from the flagship the evening before, was for the morning of December 8: "From 5 A.M. on, the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* were to steer for a point five nautical miles from the Pembroke Lighthouse which was to be reached at 8 A.M. The main body of the fleet was to follow at a distance of fifteen nautical miles. Steam up for eighteen nautical miles."²

It is hard to see any merit in this way of approaching the Falkland Station. To destroy the radio station as soon as possible was one of his principal intentions. For this, and for the best chance of destroying enemy vessels in the harbors, a surprise attack at daybreak by the whole German Cruiser Squadron would offer the best opportunities. For a cautious observation against forces too heavy to be attacked, a light cruiser might have been used without involving the main force. But the leisurely advance of the *Nürnberg* and *Gneisenau*, long after daylight, to send boats ashore, provided none of the advantages of either method, and gave notice far in advance of the presence of Admiral Spee's Squadron.

As the Germans approached the Falklands, "towards 8.30 A.M.," December 8, 1914, "the two harbor basins at this time were still invisible because of the hills."³ But above these rose increasing clouds of smoke, which at first were thought to be caused by burning oil and

¹ "The War at Sea" has stated that it had been reported on November 24 that the *Invincible* had appeared at Abrolhos Rocks, but that it was impossible to transmit the news from La Plata to the *Scharnhorst*.

² "The War at Sea."

³ *Ibid.*

supplies, as was the case at the attack on Tahiti. By 9 o'clock tops and funnels were seen, and the *Macedonia* was sighted near the entrance. There was no longer any doubt as to the presence of the enemy warships. Shortly before 9.30 A.M. the two leading German ships were fired upon by the *Canopus*, which was moored in the mud at the eastern end of the harbor basins. The *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* turned off eastward to make it difficult to get the range, but, as the *Gneisenau* was again turning back toward the entrance, a radio message came from Admiral Spee, "Do not begin a battle, combine forces on a course east by north, proceed at high speed" — followed by the order, "Get up steam in all boilers." Admiral Spee had realized that the odds were against him in an action at the Falkland Station.¹

For the British, the advent of Admiral Spee had been utterly unexpected. The situation in the harbor basins, when the approach of the Germans was first sighted at 7.50 A.M., has been described by the Admiralty's historian as follows: "The surprise was complete. Admiral Sturdee was not intending to sail till the evening, and there had been so many false alarms of late that little notice was taken at the moment. Indeed so busy was the flagship coaling that the *Glasgow* in the inner harbor, who took in the signal, fired a gun to ensure immediate attention. That Admiral Sturdee had reached the Falklands just in time was a stroke of luck which the energy of the Admiralty fully deserved, but he had been caught at a disadvantage, and the prospects, should the Germans press home an attack without delay, were far from pleasant."

¹ Table, page 196.

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BRITISH FORCES AT THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Inflexible</i>	Battle Cruiser	1908	17,250	26.5	8-12"; 16-4"
<i>Invincible</i>	" "	1908	17,250	26.5	" "
<i>Carnarvon</i>	Cruiser	1904	10,850	22.1	4-7.5"; 6-6"
<i>Cornwall</i>	"	1904	9,800	24.0	14-6"
<i>Kent</i>	"	1903	9,800	24.1	"
<i>Glasgow</i>	Light Cruiser	1911	4,800	26.0	2-6"; 10-4"

GERMAN FORCES AT THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Scharnhorst</i>	Cruiser	1907	11,600	23.2	8-8.2"; 6-6"
<i>Gneisenau</i>	"	1907	11,600	23.5	" "
<i>Leipzig</i>	Light Cruiser	1906	3,250	23.0	10-4.1"
<i>Dresden</i>	" "	1909	3,600	24.5	"
<i>Nürnberg</i>	" "	1908	3,450	(designed) 23.5	"

But Admiral Spee's method of approach had ended the possibility of any such sudden attack by the German Cruiser Squadron upon Admiral Sturdee's command, at the time when the British ships had colliers alongside. This could only have been accomplished by getting the German Squadron into position unobserved for a close surprise attack, before the British ships had time to prepare for action. On the other hand, the long warning given by the approach of the *Nürnberg* and *Gneisenau* in broad daylight had provided time for clearing the British ships. But Admiral Sturdee was

certainly caught at the disadvantage of not being able to get his superior force to a chase at once — to spring the trap into which Admiral Spee had ventured.

Fortunately Admiral Sturdee had put the engineers' overhauling at two hours, and his unreadiness was also to a great extent neutralized by the fact that the Germans, as explained, did not take the alarm that heavy enemy forces were present until toward 9.30 A.M. Even then, Admiral Spee did not realize the presence of the two British battle cruisers. The German official account has stated that some officers on the *Gneisenau* thought they saw tripod masts, but the commander believed that only armored cruisers and light cruisers were in the basins, and so reported to Admiral Spee. At any rate, it was a long time before the German Squadron took to flight, which was its only chance, and the unprepared British Squadron was thus enabled to make ready for the chase.

“The *Glasgow* and *Bristol* were at once ordered to raise steam for full speed, but as the *Glasgow* was also repairing machinery she could not be ready for two hours, while the *Bristol*, who had both engines opened up, reported she would be unable to move till 11.00. The battle cruisers had not completed coaling, but the general signal to prepare to weigh was made and at half past eight ‘Action’ was sounded and coaling ceased.”¹

The *Kent* was outside the entrance, but it was not until 9.45 A.M. that the British Squadron, with the exception of the *Bristol*, had steam up. The *Glasgow* was then ordered to join the *Kent*, and the two were instructed to follow and keep touch with the fleeing Ger-

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

mans. The *Glasgow* passed well ahead of the *Kent* and signaled the movements of Admiral Spee's cruisers, which were out of sight of the main British squadron coming out at 10.00 A.M. Admiral Sturdee had made signal for "general chase." The sea was calm; the sky clear; there was a light cold northwest breeze; visibility was at its maximum.

Admiral Spee had at once dismissed his train to a rendezvous southwest of the position of his squadron, but, even then, he paid more attention to assembling his squadron than to getting it as far away as possible from his overwhelmingly superior enemy. "The *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* steered at high speed a southeastern course to accelerate the assembling of the squadron."¹ "Soon after ten," the German account has stated, a tripod mast was observed by the *Leipzig*. At 11.00 A.M. the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* had slowed down, to let the rest of the squadron close up, and then took position ahead of the flagship. It was not until after this that Admiral Spee gradually increased speed by signal to 22 knots on a southeast course. "To diminish the mutual interference of his vessels, and if possible to increase the speed Count Spee had signalled that the line astern formation need not be maintained. The *Nürnberg* kept well alongside the *Gneisenau*. The *Dresden* requested and obtained permission to sail according to its own steam, soon afterwards therefore moved up to the port side; the *Leipzig*, the oldest vessel, remained somewhat behind."²

As a result, the Germans, instead of breaking away to the south, had not increased their initial lead on the battle cruisers, which they might have done with a quick

¹ "The War at Sea."

² *Ibid.*

appreciation of the emergency. A prompt flight of the Germans to the south, which would have delayed action for the unprepared British Squadron, might have saved some of the German ships, especially in view of the rain which came on in the afternoon. But, as it was, the *Glasgow* had been enabled to signal to Admiral Sturdee that the enemy was twelve miles distant, and the British Admiral from this stage felt that he could take his own time.¹ He changed from "general chase" to a formation of his ships, slowing down in speed with the flagship to 19 knots to allow his ships to take position. He ordered the *Inflexible* "to get gradually on his starboard quarter and keep clear of the smoke."² He also thought it wise to close up the *Cornwall* and *Carnarvon*, of which the *Carnarvon* could only do 20 knots. "His idea was to avoid getting his squadron scattered too widely, and there seemed no reason for excessive hurry."³ With this object the signal was made at 11.26 A.M. to proceed at 20 knots.

At this time there was a strange episode in the chase, of which the following is the account of the British Admiralty's historian: "The *Bristol*, who by the extraordinary exertions of her engine room staff had managed to get out, signaled that three strange ships were off Port Pleasant. The information had come from two ladies at Port Darwin who had been watching the proceedings, and had seen Admiral von Spee's colliers arrive. While one remained on the lookout the other went to the telephone and warned the Governor. The message, which reached the *Canopus* at 10.50 just as

¹ "It was clear he had the speed of them and could follow their motion."
— Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

the *Bristol* was coming out, was passed on to her. Owing to the German jamming of our wireless much time had been lost, and prompt action was needed. There had been numerous reports of German reservists gathering at South American ports, and though the strange ships might be colliers, it was quite possible they were transports carrying a landing force to seize the islands. Captain Fanshawe of the *Bristol* was therefore ordered to take under his command the *Macedonia*, which was not intended to follow the squadron, and with her to seek out and 'destroy the transports.' These orders were obeyed so literally that the two German colliers *Baden* and *Santa Isabel* were sunk by gunfire, with their valuable cargoes of coal and supplies, after they had been easily overtaken in the afternoon, their character ascertained, and their crews in their boats. The third attending steamer, the *Seydlitz*, had been wide of the others, and had escaped.

At 11.30 A.M. the British Admiral had "signaled that there was time to take the next meal."¹ But at 12.20 P.M. "Admiral Sturdee decided to seize the moment to press the chase,"² although Admiral Stoddart's slower cruisers could not get up and were about six miles astern. Speed was, therefore, increased to 22 knots, and at 12.50 P.M. was 25 knots. Shortly after, the *Inflexible* opened fire at 16,000 yards on the *Leipsig*, which was falling behind the German Squadron, as described. No hits were made, but, as the shots fell closer, the hopelessness of the situation caused Admiral Spee to use the last resort to save some of his ships. He signaled "towards 1.15 P.M." "*Leipsig* turn off," and at 1.20 P.M. to all his light cruisers, "Turn off, attempt to escape."

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

The German light cruisers at once all turned off to starboard on southerly courses. The *Gneisenau* then received signal, "Follow the leader," and Admiral Spee turned to port on an east northeasterly course, the *Gneisenau* falling back into position behind the *Scharnhorst*.

Admiral Sturdee had provided in his battle instructions for this breaking away of the German light cruisers, and three British cruisers (*Glasgow*, *Kent*, and *Cornwall*) without any signal promptly turned south in pursuit. The two British battle cruisers held to the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* as their prey, turning 7 points into line abeam of the enemy, before the two German cruisers could complete their turn to the northeast.

"So about 1.20 the main action began."¹ The *Invincible* was at first on the *Gneisenau*, but changed as the *Scharnhorst* passed ahead, and from that time the *Invincible* was on the *Scharnhorst*, the *Inflexible* on the *Gneisenau*. The range was 14,000 yards, and was too great for the Germans, their return fire falling 1000 yards short. Admiral Spee led two points inward and reduced the range to 13,000 yards, at which the Germans soon scored a hit on the *Invincible*. Admiral Sturdee at once (1.44 P.M.) turned away 2 points to port and opened up the range again, beyond the distance of the German guns, but the British ships were not scoring and at 16,000 yards both sides ceased fire.

As the British were turning to close (2.05 P.M.), Admiral Spee, "blotted out in the smoke,"² had turned 10 points and was making off to the southward. The two British battle cruisers followed in a stern chase

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

until the range was down to 15,000 yards (2.45 P.M.) and then, turning 2 points to port, reopened fire with broadsides brought to bear. At first Admiral Spee did not reply, but attempted to close by turning 9 points to port to cross the British course. To this Admiral Sturdee replied by turning away to port 6 points. At 2.59 P.M. the range was 12,500 yards and the British Admiral kept edging away to keep this range, so that the German cruisers could not use their secondary battery. Under these conditions, which Admiral Sturdee could easily maintain through his superior speed, the heavy 12 inch guns of the British battle cruisers at last had their effect upon the German cruisers. By 3.10 P.M. the *Gneisenau* had taken a list and the *Scharnhorst* was on fire.

The smoke interference was very great, and at 3.15 P.M. Admiral Sturdee made a sharp turn (18 points) to windward to clear it. In vain Admiral Spee attempted again to close at 3.30 P.M., for, when the range was down to 12,000 yards, Admiral Sturdee again opened it out beyond the range of the German secondary batteries. At this time both British battle cruisers concentrated on the *Scharnhorst*. The German flagship continued the hopeless struggle, losing speed, with a heavy list and on fire. At about 4.00 P.M. the *Inflexible* left her and again engaged the *Gneisenau*, which had received a last signal from the *Scharnhorst*, "If your engines are still intact try to escape." The *Invincible* still held on the *Scharnhorst*, which shortly afterwards turned over on her beam ends, and sank at 4.17 P.M. "Not a soul of her crew was saved: there could be no thought of rescue, for the *Gneisenau* demanded all his attention." ¹

Admiral Sturdee had then turned back to starboard,

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

and engaged on the opposite course the *Gneisenau*, which was on a southwesterly course and under fire from the *Inflexible*. Both British battle cruisers turned, and were joined by the *Carnarvon*, which had at last been enabled to get up. Admiral Sturdec signaled to form line ahead, but in that formation the smoke interference was so great that the *Inflexible* was obliged to turn to port 14 points out of the line to get clear. The *Gneisenau* still held on, firing upon the enemy, but her case was hopeless, as she was under the concentrated fire of all three British ships. After 5.00 P.M. her speed had dropped to 8 knots, and she was on fire fore and aft.

The end came in a drizzling rain which had come on. At 5.30 P.M. the *Gneisenau* turned toward the British ships and stopped with a heavy list to starboard. She still fired intermittently as the British ships closed, but suddenly turned over on her beam ends and sank. Her sea cocks had been opened to prevent her falling into the hands of the British. It had taken over four hours to dispose of the two German cruisers. In the case of the *Gneisenau* it was possible to rescue survivors, and about two hundred were picked up.

The three German light cruisers, when they broke away to the south, had a lead of "ten or twelve miles"¹ ahead of their pursuers, the light cruiser *Glasgow* and the armored cruisers *Kent* and *Cornwall*. At first the German cruisers kept together although the *Dresden* had much greater speed than the other two. Outside of the fact that the German ships could not be at their best after their long wearing cruise, the *Leipsig* was a bad steamer and her chance was hopeless from the start. At first the *Glasgow* was to attempt to use her speed in

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

chase of the fast *Dresden*, but this idea was abandoned in favor of bringing the enemy to action by engaging the rearmost enemy ship, the *Leipsig*.

Accordingly the *Glasgow* at 2.15 P.M. allowed the two British armored cruisers to close, while still gaining on the *Leipsig*. At 2.53 P.M. the *Glasgow*, still ahead of her consorts, opened fire on the *Leipsig* at 12,000 yards. The British light cruiser was not strong enough to engage the *Leipsig* alone, but the German cruiser was falling back to the *Cornwall* which had been told off to engage her. At about 3.30 P.M. the Germans resorted to scattering their cruisers, the *Nürnberg* turning away to port, and the *Dresden* to starboard. The *Dresden*, with full use of her speed, made good her escape to the southwest, disappearing into the rain which came on later.

At 4.15 P.M. the *Nürnberg* was making away to the westward with the *Kent* in chase. The *Leipsig* was soon engaged by both the *Glasgow* and *Cornwall* and she was doomed, as her speed was so reduced that her enemies could choose their ranges and positions. Yet, as in the case of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, it required a long time to destroy this inferior German ship. The *Leipsig* held out until 6.00, when the rain began, and the British ships closed in, as their target was being obscured. Even then it was after 7.00 P.M. before the last gun of the *Leipsig* was silenced, and her flag was still flying at 7.50 P.M. At that time she was fired upon again, but her survivors burned green lights and the British ships slowly drew up to her. At 8.45 P.M. boats were ordered out to save the survivors from the flaming wreck, which finally turned over and sank at 9.23 P.M. Only five officers and thirteen men were saved.

The *Kent* had a long chase after the *Nürnberg*. It was

not until after 5.00 that the German cruiser was under fire in the gathering mist and rain. But the boilers of the *Nürnberg* were in such bad condition that many tubes had given way, and her speed dropped until she was obliged to turn and fight at 5.45 P.M. The *Kent* closed until, at 6.00 P.M., the range was down to 3000 yards. The *Nürnberg* tried to turn away but she had lost speed to such an extent that the *Kent* could pass her and rake her at 3500 yards. In the next half hour the *Nürnberg* had lost nearly all her way, was down by the stern, and on fire. The *Kent* closed to 3300 yards and fired upon the wreck, as the flag was still flying. But before 7.00 the *Nürnberg* ceased to resist, and efforts were made to save the crew. The only two boats of the *Kent* that could be floated were sent to rescue lives from the German cruiser, which sank within half an hour, but only seven men were saved.

For the British the victory was incomplete solely because the *Dresden* had escaped. This does not appear to have been necessary in view of their great superiority, not only in force but in numbers and speed. At the beginning, as has been shown, the Germans had not availed themselves of the opportunity to escape offered by the unreadiness of the British for the chase. The escape of the *Dresden* was only made possible by the diversion of the two British battle cruisers, through being occupied in the destruction of the two German armored cruisers, toward the east, while the German light cruisers broke away to the south.¹ The cautious delib-

¹ Winston Churchill has stated, "The First Sea Lord was displeased with Sir Doveton Sturdee for not having succeeded in destroying the German light cruiser *Dresden* with the rest." But it should be stated, as a reason for Admiral Sturdee's cautious deliberate methods, that he had been instructed to take care not to expose his two battle cruisers to serious injury.

erate methods, adopted by Admiral Sturdee in his long range action, made it a protracted process to put out the two inferior German ships, and both British battle cruisers were kept busy on this task until the last gasp.

However, the results of the Falkland action were of great importance. Admiral Spee's disaster meant that the only factor had been eliminated which threatened, at this stage, to disturb traffic over the seas to an extent that would influence the broad conduct of the war. After the destruction of the German Cruiser Squadron, attempts to impair the Allied control of commerce on the surface of the seas were only isolated cruises of furtive German raiders, which were not even sufficient to harass Allied shipping on any large scale. It was not until the later development of the U-boats that the Central Powers were able to threaten seriously the traffic of the Entente Allies over the waterways of the world.

The reader must keep constantly in mind the vast extent of this traffic overseas, which was constantly bringing from all parts of the world maintenance for the cause of the Entente Allies in the World War. Often this was lost to sight in the excitement over conspicuous incidents in the fighting. But, more important than the petty fluctuations of battles, the gains of ridges or hills, were the streams of men and supplies which were coming to the Allies over the seas. As a result, Sea Power was influencing the war on a scale that was never dreamt before.

CHAPTER XIII

CHANGES OF NAVAL STRATEGY

(See Map at page 238.)

AT the time of the break with Turkey, and the naval defeat at Coronel, the new Board of the British Admiralty had decided upon a naval policy that was destined to have great influence upon the course of the war. The growing anxiety caused by the German mines, which had been scattered in the Home Waters, had been brought to a focus by the loss of the dreadnought *Audacious*. Admiral Jellicoe had made a proposal for a prohibited area "and under the stress of the recent outrage the new Board received sanction for something even stronger than he had suggested."¹ On November 2, 1914, this decision of the Admiralty was published in a declaration.

After reciting the recent German minelaying, and protesting against "sowing them, as was then believed, under neutral flags,"² this declaration announced: "They therefore give notice that the whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Ibid. — The prevailing opinion in the Admiralty at the time was that such was the fact. The text of the declaration is as follows: "These mines cannot have been laid by any German ship of war. They have been laid by some merchant vessel flying a neutral flag which has come along the trade route as if for the purpose of peaceful commerce, while profiting to the full by the protection enjoyed by neutral merchant ships. . . ."

necessary to lay, and from warships searching vigilantly by night and day, for suspicious craft. All merchant and fishing vessels of every description are hereby warned of the dangers they encounter by entering this area except in strict accordance with Admiralty directions. Every effort will be made to convey this warning to neutral countries and to vessels on the sea, but from November 5 onwards the Admiralty announce that all ships passing a line drawn from the Northern point of the Hebrides through the Faroe Islands to Iceland do so at their own peril."

After this warning, the declaration defined routes and sailing directions for "ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark, and Holland," ending with, "By strict adherence to these routes the commerce of all countries will be able to reach its destination in safety, so far as Great Britain is concerned, but any straying, even for a few miles from the course thus indicated, may be followed by fatal consequences."

It should be stated at once that this declaration, in the words of the British Admiralty's historian, was "a new departure,"¹ and this departure afterwards gave the Germans a chance to seize upon a pretext for proclaiming an entirely different "War Zone" in their later development of illegal submarine warfare.² Outside of

¹ "Admiral Jellicoe, as we have seen, in his proposal for a prohibited area had already indicated the lines on which a new departure should proceed." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² The following is from the Mem. of German Government of February 1915, "As England has declared the waters between Scotland and Norway to be part of the War Zone, so Germany declares all the waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, to be in the War Zone, and she will combat hostile shipping in those parts with every weapon at her disposal."

this harmful result, the new policy of the British Admiralty, as a means of enforcing a blockade of Germany in conjunction with increasing lists of contrabands, was much criticized because these means did not produce a definite policy for the immediate exclusion of goods from Germany.¹

Although these measures of the British Admiralty were influenced, in addition to other influences of trade, by consideration for the neutral nations, including the United States, their new policies for a blockade caused much irritation among the neutral nations,² as the efforts to exclude goods from Germany became more strict. The trouble was, there were no fixed policies that would put the thing on a definite basis. In the words of Lord Sydenham, "Any clear and consistent plan would have aroused less irritation to neutrals than arrangements constantly varying which left the neutral in constant doubt as to what he could do and what he could not do."³

In studying the history of the World War, we must realize that there was another course open to the Allies.⁴ The perfected established ease of a legal blockade by the United States in the Civil War was a precedent ready at hand for the Entente Allies to follow. This American blockade of the Confederate States had been a deciding factor in the Civil War. It was the first

¹ "Since August 4, 1914, there have been seven Proclamations and Orders in Council, most of them contradictory."—Speech of Lord Sydenham, H. of L., February 22, 1916.

² There were protests from the United States in a line with the Declaration of London.

³ H. of L., December 20, 1915.

⁴ "When the war broke out it was open to us to follow the course taken by the Northern States in the great Civil War."—Speech of Lord Sydenham, H. of L., December 20, 1915.

blockade after the definition by the Declaration of Paris, 1856 ("A blockade to be legal must be effective"), and the case of the United States had been so carefully built up that there was no question of its legality, after it had been, piece by piece, made effective along the long coast lines of the Southern States.¹

As the geographical positions of neutral countries in proximity to the Central Powers was the most difficult feature of the problem for the Entente Allies, in excluding supplies from Germany, it must be kept in mind that the Civil War blockade had set up two fixed principles of great importance. In the first place, as a precedent for the Entente Allies to follow, this established case of the United States not only covered goods for an enemy port but all goods whose ultimate destination was the enemy country, "the doctrine of continuous voyage."² In the second place, the Civil War precedent had also produced the germ of taking the measure of a neutral country's normal consumption of supplies as a test for goods passing through a neutral country to belligerents. In fact the American ruling, that the abnormal imports of the Bahamas were evidently destined for the Confederacy, had actually established the essentials of the "rationing" policy, which the Entente Allies eventually adopted in regard to neutral nations in the World War.

¹ "As to the legal efficiency of the blockade after the first six months there can be no question." — Professor J. R. Soley, U. S. N. An account of the development of this Civil War blockade will be found in the Appendix, pages 320 *et seq.*

² "I therefore have no hesitation at all in saying that Abraham Lincoln was quite right when he extended the then existing principles of International Law so as to cover the doctrine of continuous voyage as it was applied to contraband coming into America." — Opinion of the British Lord Chancellor, H. of L., February 22, 1916.

These two principles of the American Civil War doctrines were afterwards made a part of the policies of the Entente Allies, but unquestionably, in their first vacillations, the Allies did not have as firm a basis for their policies as if the established American case of the Civil War had been followed from the beginning.

The whole problem was one of many complications. It has been, and in the future will be, a matter of many controversies. The complication should be pointed out that, although the Allies could blockade the approaches to Germany over the high seas, the neutral nations on the Baltic had undisturbed access to Germany, as the British Navy had not developed any disturbance of traffic in the Baltic. But, on the other hand, there was available an established case, which would have put the whole question on a definite basis, instead of the changing policies which were used by the Entente Allies.

The real reason for this error in the naval policies of the Entente Allies, in regard to the exclusion of goods to Germany, has been well expressed as follows: "In this, as in every other sphere, the arrangements made during peace were based on a conception of war as a struggle between military forces and not between whole populations."¹ It was one of the many extraordinary developments of the American Civil War that, in addition to revolutionizing tactics and weapons, it became an object lesson of a war "between whole populations." And this, as well as the other great lessons of the Civil War, had not been understood by Europe.

In the legal blockade of the Confederate States, the Federal Government had taken the stand that supplies of all kinds were maintaining the Southern people in

¹ "Allied Shipping Control," British series Carnegie Endowment History.

warfare, and that for this reason all supplies should be excluded. The problem of the Federal Government included the same complication of nearby neutral countries, through which goods could be brought into the Confederate States. Yet, by establishing the two principles which have been cited, this problem was solved in the Civil War. The prewar doctrines of Europe had not foreseen this problem, and consequently only piecemeal measures were taken before these principles were adopted and applied in the World War.

The provisions of the Declaration of London, which Great Britain had not adopted, did not approach a solution of this new European problem of a war between whole populations, and the early British efforts to pick and choose among these provisions were only productive of irritation, for Americans as well as for Europeans. To quote again from the valuable "Allied Shipping Control," "It gradually became apparent that the distinctions in the Declaration were inapplicable to a war in which the whole effort of the combatant nations was engaged." But, while this situation "gradually became apparent," there were months of opportunity for the Germans to gather supplies which might have been excluded.

In the meantime, there was a great leakage of commodities into Germany through the neutral countries, which were allowed to import goods out of all proportion to their normal consumption. Their industries also were thus supplied and enabled to manufacture for Germany. All this should have been stopped early in the war. But it is tragic to realize that even British exports helped Germany on a large scale. Through supervision of British coal alone, there might have been a vast dif-

ference, but it is established that factories were actually operated by British coal to produce supplies for Germany. These great quantities of goods allowed to go into Germany through neutral countries became a definite factor in the ability of the Germans to prolong the war, and this should be clearly set forth in any naval history of the World War.

It also should be emphasized that this vital support to Germany was given, not only by material from neutral countries, but also by material actually exported from Great Britain in the mistaken period before these principles of the American Civil War were applied to the similar situation in the World War.

This situation will be treated more fully in the following volumes of this work, but it was ever present, in the first period of the war on the sea, as a disadvantage for the Entente Allies.

In the Home Waters the development of German offensive tactics, by the use of submarines and mines, had an increasing effect upon the naval situation. Admiral Jellicoe has stated that he went to the Admiralty soon after the new Board came into office, and that conferences were held as to defending the fleet bases, and as to the future general naval policy. In regard to this last, Admiral Jellicoe prepared a formal letter to the Admiralty (dated October 30, 1914) ¹ giving his ideas as to tactical methods in relation to attacks by means of submarines, torpedoes, and mines. These ideas were formally approved by the Admiralty in a note to Admiral Jellicoe of the date of November 7, 1914.

Nothing could show the effects of the new German offensive tactics more clearly than this official written

¹ Quoted in full in Appendix, page 315 *et seq.*

record. The British Commander-in-Chief stated: "The Germans have shown that they rely to a very great extent on submarines, mines and torpedoes, and there can be no doubt whatever that they will endeavor to make the fullest use of these weapons in a fleet action, especially since they possess an actual superiority over us in these particular directions."

After conceding this German superiority, Admiral Jellicoe argued that the Germans would be able to concentrate these new weapons in a fleet action in the southern area of the North Sea, and he stated: "My object will therefore be to fight the fleet action in the Northern portion of the North Sea." The British Admiral also made suggestions for tactical methods of the Fleet and dispositions of light forces to act with the British Grand Fleet, with the following explanation: "The object of this letter is to place my views before their Lordships, and to direct their attention to the alterations in preconceived ideas of battle tactics which are forced upon us by the anticipated appearance in a fleet action of submarines and minelayers."

But the most notable index of the great moral effect that had been produced by the new German weapons was the following in Admiral Jellicoe's letter: "If, for instance, the enemy battlefleet were to turn away from an advancing Fleet, I should assume that the intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, *and should decline to be so drawn.*"

"I desire particularly to draw the attention of their Lordships to this point, since it may be deemed a refusal of battle, and, indeed, might result in failure to bring the enemy to action as soon as is expected and hoped."

“The situation is a difficult one. It is quite within the bounds of possibility that half of our battleships might be disabled by under-water attack before the guns opened fire at all, if a false move is made, and I feel that I must constantly bear in mind the great probability of such attack and be prepared tactically to prevent its success.”

That these deductions should be a matter of official record, as approved by the British Admiralty, has shown how widely the pendulum swung in the first months of the German use of new forces in naval warfare. The British naval historian has also described this first gloomy reaction from the former confidence in British control of the sea: “In Home Waters there was a different tale to tell. There the conditions were making it more evident every day that the command could no longer be measured by the old standards. If command of the sea meant the power to move fleets, troops and trade freely where we would, then our command was not undisputed, and indeed it seemed to be growing more precarious, as the mining activities of the enemy extended to our western coasts and their submarines with increasing power and range spread further and further afield. By the time we had freed the ocean highways there was scarcely an area in the Narrow Seas where movements could be considered safe.”

This reflected the first depression caused by the German activities with submarines and mines. Yet from the urge of this unexpected situation, there grew, to equally unexpected proportions, the great supplementary fleet, made up from craft and seamen following the sea as a trade. This abrupt change of conditions brought naval warfare, from being a thing apart for the navies

of the world, back to the original basis where fighting was implied in all seafaring. Before the war, the British Admiralty had realized that there might be need for sweeping channels free of mines, and that trawlers of the fishing fleet were best adapted for this work from the practice of their trade. For this purpose the Trawler Section of the Royal Naval Reserve had been organized, and at the outbreak of war in 1914 it comprised 82 fishing trawlers subject to call.

From this nucleus grew the Auxiliary Patrol, which was only a part of the great Auxiliary Navy that was recruited from the merchant service, in response to the unforeseen demands of the new warfare on the sea.¹ The reader must realize that, from this stage, in addition to the vast amount of shipping needed for the transportation of men and supplies, there was a constantly increasing demand for auxiliaries of the fleets, that must take a part in the actual fighting, against the unexpected new forces which had been developed. It must also be understood that this enormous growth had not been foreseen by the Admiralties of the world.² It was a parallel to the situation on land in the World War. No one had been able to prophesy the course of events which produced the four-year deadlock of millions of troops, draining all the man-power of the nations, instead of the expected decisive battle campaign of former

¹ "It had not been foreseen that it would be necessary to organize what at length reached the proportions of a second fleet under Admiralty control, consisting of craft which were never intended for the violence of warfare, but when the need arose it was met with complete success." — Archibald Hurd: "The Merchant Navy."

² "It may be said of the Admiralties of the world, even those responsible for ocean commerce on a large scale, that none foresaw the course which the war by sea would take, and consequently there was a great deal of hasty improvisation to meet its needs." — *Ibid.*

wars. In the same way, on the sea, it had not been foreseen that the naval war would not be fought by the fleets alone but would call upon all seafaring folk and all seagoing craft. The full scope of these unprecedented demands upon the nations, on the sea as well as on land, must be understood in order to grasp the vast proportions of the World War.

Admiral Jellicoe, at this momentous conference with the new Admiralty Board, had given his first needs for trawlers at the fleet bases as 72 for the Orkney and Shetland areas, and 36 for the Minelies. These were only the beginnings of the calls that were made for increased patrols in the Home Waters. The situation was also made more confining for the British Navy by the revival of the invasion scare at this stage.¹ There were unfounded reports of German preparations, and it was thought that, as the season advanced, there was greater danger, "while on the other hand the long winter nights were specially favorable for a combined expedition across the North Sea against our own shores. In any case the possibility could not be ignored, particularly as the propaganda which had been so active during the years preceding the war in connection with the movement for introducing compulsory service had done nothing to diminish our national sensitiveness to threats of invasion."²

¹ "To add to the distractions of this hard month of November, 1914, an invasion scare took a firm hold of the military and naval authorities. It was argued by the War Office that the lull on the fighting line would enable the Germans to spare large numbers of good troops — 250,000 if necessary for the invasion of Great Britain." — Winston Churchill: "The World Crisis."

² Sir Julian Corbett, who also quotes "Sir Arthur Wilson, the highest authority amongst them," as asking greater dispersion of the fleet "because the object of the German main fleet in courting an engagement would probably be to enable a landing to be effected on the coast."

It was, therefore, thought necessary to take elaborate precautions against a German landing, and the British Admiralty's historian has stated that on November 12 "the new plan for meeting any attempt of the Germans to land troops upon our coasts had been completed." The whole system of patrols against the submarine menace was being reorganized by the Admiralty and a scheme for coastal areas was being devised which would use for this purpose 74 yachts, 462 drifters and trawlers, in addition to motor boats for inshore work.

The temporary absence of the three battle cruisers from the British Grand Fleet gave cause for anxiety while they were on their missions, although, as has been explained, the German Admiralty had decided against any stroke to coöperate with Admiral Spee. It was also true that the British Grand Fleet even then was not inferior to the German High Sea Fleet in battle cruisers, as the newly commissioned *Tiger* had joined the Grand Fleet. Of course the new arrival could not be at her best so soon after going into commission, but the fourth German battle cruiser, *Derfflinger*, was also a new ship. The British battle cruisers, in addition, had a heavier armament than the German battle cruisers of the High Sea Fleet.

The naval situation at this stage, with the Germans making inroads upon what had been assumed to be the established British control of the Home Waters, had led to what has been called the "defensive" policy of the British Navy, which was then occupied in defending its control, instead of attempting by offensives to extend British naval control and to make an answer to the unexpected German harassing naval offensives by British counter offensives.

Even after the anxieties for the outlying seas had been ended, by the destruction of Admiral Spee's Cruiser Squadron, there was no change. Of outlying enemy naval units there were only left the *Dresden*, which was in precarious hiding in the South American area, and the slow converted cruisers, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and *Cormoran*. This situation had released many British warships, but there was no British offensive that would turn the tables upon the Germans.

There had only been an isolated bombardment of Zeebrugge by the old battleships *Russell* and *Exmouth* (November 23, 1914), and all plans for retaking the place were found impracticable. It should be stated here that the Germans had soon put the strip of Belgian Channel coast in such a condition of defense that nothing was accomplished to regain it by naval operations for four years.¹ As soon as it was evident that the German coast fortresses were not to be threatened, "it seemed wise to form out of the men thus released a Marine Corps for the defense of the Flemish Coast."² This was done under Army control, and this coast was consequently guarded by regiments of marine artillery, and ships' guns were unable to win results against the German guns placed along the coast.

There was no attempt at this stage to gather a naval force against the Dardanelles, and the Germans were left practically undisturbed in the Baltic. Consequently Admiral Tirpitz was enabled to write of the Baltic situation for the German fleet, "Its virtually

¹ Admiral Scheer wrote of the Naval Corps in Flanders, at the time it ceased to exist in 1918, "Hitherto they had repelled every attack from the sea."

² Admiral Tirpitz.

unlimited mastery of the Baltic ensured the free import of the materials, and in particular of the ores, which formed an urgent need of our war industries" — and this expressed forcibly the harm done by leaving the Germans undisturbed in the one area where they feared, most of all, naval attacks. Admiral Scheer's narrative has shown that even the reports of British submarines in the Baltic had a marked influence upon the Germans. The only two British submarines which had entered the Baltic (in October, 1914, as stated) were inactive at a Russian base, and there was no attempt to send in others or to conduct any form of harassing naval operations in the Baltic.

The British Admiralty's history has given the key to this inactivity in two sentences: "Elaborate as was the defensive system, the Admiralty were not content to rely upon it. They were pushing forward with all speed the building programme, by means of which they hoped to open the second phase of the war by a vigorous offensive against the enemy's North Sea ports." This cryptic reference described Lord Fisher's building program, which has been detailed in a preceding chapter. The British naval history has been very reticent about this scheme of the new First Lord. In fact its readers are left in the dark as to Lord Fisher's cherished plan. But no doubt is left of the fact that it absorbed the efforts of the British Navy for the offensive.

The following not only shows the vagueness with which the scheme has been described in Sir Julian Corbett's history, but is unmistakable as to its effect in killing any chances for an early British naval offensive: "Now that the outer seas had been cleared the paramount need was to obtain a closer hold on the North

Sea, with a view to the possibility of ultimately pressing our offensive into the enemy's waters. Such operations would involve coastal attack and inshore work, and required a special class of vessel. The necessary programme had been inaugurated when Lord Fisher returned to the Admiralty, and was being pressed on with energy. The ships designed were mainly of the monitor type, made as far as possible unsinkable by mine or torpedo, and certain very fast ships of battle cruiser size lightly protected, but with heavy gun power. *But until the programme was well forwarded nothing could be done*, and in the meanwhile the enemy might be expected to use the opportunity for operating in the North Sea in a way which would require the utmost activity and vigilance from our fleet."

With the Germans in Home Waters thus freed from any pressure of harassing British offensives, there arose in the German Navy a desire to follow up their submarine and minelaying campaign by activities of the Battle Fleet. This grew into a demand for an active part in the war. Admiral Scheer has written: "Strategical reasons had made it necessary to keep our Fleet back, and this looked like a want of confidence and affected the *morale* of the men, and gradually lowered their belief in their own efficiency to a regrettable degree." An impressive recital of these facts with the request that the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet should be allowed greater latitude was met with a decided rebuff. The grounds of this refusal, as communicated by the Naval Staff, ran somewhat as follows:

"The existence of our Fleet, ready to strike at any moment, has hitherto kept the enemy away from the North Sea and Baltic coasts and made it possible to

resume trade with neutral countries in the Baltic. The Fleet has thus taken over the protection of the coast and troops required for that purpose are now available for use in the field. After even a successful battle, the ascendancy of the Fleet under the numerical superiority of the enemy would give way, and under the pressure of the enemy Fleet the attitude of the neutrals would be prejudiciously influenced. The Fleet must therefore be held back and avoid actions which might lead to heavy losses. This does not, however, prevent favorable opportunities being made use of to damage the enemy. An employment of the Fleet outside the German Bight, which the enemy tries to bring about through his movements in the Skagerrak, is not mentioned in the orders for operations as being one of the favorable opportunities. There is nothing to be said against an attempt of the big cruisers in the North Sea to damage the enemy."

This last concession, from the studied German naval policy of inactivity of the Battle Fleet, developed into a series of raids by the German battle cruisers, with attending light forces, of which the events will be given in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XIV

GERMAN NAVAL RAIDS. THE DOGGER BANK CHASE

(See Map at page 238.)

THERE had been a demonstration against the British coastal waters on November 3, 1914, when three German battle cruisers, *Seydlitz*, *Moltke*, and *Von der Tann*, with three light cruisers, suddenly appeared about daybreak near the Cross Sands Lightship off Gorleston. They were discovered by the British cruiser *Halcyon*, which was fired upon by the German ships, as were two patrolling destroyers. These British light forces escaped under a smoke screen and gave the alarm. The German ships at once (7.40 A.M.) turned back to the east and went home, without any other attempts except minelaying. They were not engaged by British battle cruisers, as Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers had been at Cromarty when the German ships were reported.

But, in December, the German Naval Command decided to make more serious efforts in raiding with battle cruisers, taking advantage of the permission to use this type of warship accorded by the German Naval Staff, which has been quoted.¹ "On December 15 the big cruisers under the command of Vice-Admiral Hipper sailed under orders to bombard the fortified coast towns of Scarborough and Hartlepool and to lay mines along the coast, for there was constant traffic between the

¹ "These instructions served the purpose of the further enterprise against the English coast." — Admiral Scheer.

East Coast ports.”¹ The bombardment of these towns could not be expected to do any damage of military value in itself, as this German statement was misleading and they were not “fortified” in the sense of having any works worth destroying. All the Germans could hope for, from this bombardment, would be to produce the moral effect of attacks upon the British coasts, with whatever effects this might have upon the British dread of invasion, in holding back British troops for the “Home Defense.”²

The projected minelaying operation was, of course, of military value, but the Germans had another object behind this particular raid, which had not been sufficiently emphasized in the early accounts.³

In addition, on this occasion, the German Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Ingenohl, had also planned to bring out the German Battle Fleet, although his instructions had definitely limited him to taking risks only with the German battle cruisers. However, the German Admiral assumed the position that he could use his battleships to the extent of taking them out behind the German battle cruisers, to a supporting rendezvous toward the Dogger Bank. Admiral Ingenohl had hoped that inferior British forces, called out to act against the German raiders, might be drawn into action with the German Battle Fleet.

In fact, something of the kind nearly took place. The British, after the news of Falkland, had felt that some descent upon their coast was imminent, and dispo-

¹ Admiral Scheer.

² “. . . the moral effect was valuable to the Germans, because it assisted the invasion-mongers.” — Lord Sydenham.

³ “Of all this we knew nothing till long afterwards.” — Sir Julian Corbett.

tions had been ordered to meet this danger.¹ An important part of these dispositions was the order for the Second Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet (Vice Admiral Warrender) and Admiral Beatty's Battle Cruiser Squadron, with light cruisers and destroyers, to a rendezvous south of the Dogger Bank to meet together. This rendezvous was only fifty miles away from Admiral Ingenohl's rendezvous.

It was therefore natural that in the dark hours of the morning of December 16, before the German raiders had bombarded Scarborough and Hartlepool, the destroyers of the two fleets, which were thus unknowingly so close together, clashed. A German destroyer had been sighted to port at 5.15 A.M. by the British destroyers moving to their rendezvous, and soon other German destroyers were seen in the same direction. A brisk action ensued for about an hour. But the German Admiral, hampered by his instructions not to risk his battleships, turned the High Sea Fleet away to the southeast, in order to avoid torpedo attacks in the dark hours. The German Battle Fleet soon after (7.10 A.M.) turned again (E. S. E.— $\frac{1}{2}$ E.) "and started on the return journey."² Admiral Scheer has expressed the disappointment of the German Navy in being so bound by "restrictions" that the High Sea Fleet missed a promising opportunity for an action against a weaker British fleet.³

¹ "By December 10 news of the Battle of the Falklands had revealed the weakening of the Grand Fleet. Now if ever was the enemy's moment to strike, and by the 14th reports that an attack of the kind was in preparation so far confirmed our expectation that it was decided to put the fleet in motion to meet it." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² Admiral Scheer.

³ "At all events the restrictions imposed on the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet brought about the failure of the bold and promising plan, owing to its not having been carried out in a proper manner." — *Ibid.*

In the meantime, the German raiding force was proceeding on its mission against the British coast. Toward daybreak the wind rose, making such a high sea that the German light cruisers and destroyers could only be a hindrance to Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers, and he dismissed them all, except the light cruiser *Kolberg* which was to lay the mines off the British coast.

The German raiding squadron was divided into two groups for the bombardments, the *Seydlitz*, *Moltke*, and *Blücher* making for Hartlepool, the *Von der Tann* and *Derfflinger* for Scarborough. At Hartlepool there was resistance both from the naval patrols and from guns on shore, but this was not sufficient justification for the destruction of civilian residents of the town. Of these in Hartlepool 86 were killed and 424 wounded. The town of Whitby, an undefended place, was also shelled by this same group of German ships. At Scarborough there was no resistance,¹ and consequently no excuse for the damage done to civilians.

The *Kolberg* had laid her mines without interference, and at 9.25 A.M. the whole German squadron joined up with the *Seydlitz* and started to return. In addition to a heavy sea, there was a great deal of mist, and this favored the escape of the German ships, although Admirals Warrender and Beatty were between them and their bases, and their own supporting Battle Fleet had gone home.

The British Admirals had been informed of the attacks on the coast towns, and that the raiding German ships were making back for their bases. But these

¹ "As there was no counter action it must be assumed that the battery at Scarborough was either not manned in proper time, or had been evacuated by the garrison." — Admiral Scheer.

British naval forces were far to the east of the gap between the minefields, where the Germans had the most narrow area for escape. Consequently Admiral Warrender and Admiral Beatty had a wider area to cover, in the prevailing conditions of mist and high seas. There was some confusion of instructions, which hampered their efforts, but the retreating Germans were enabled to avoid being intercepted through the information given by one of their own light cruisers which had been sent back, as described. The *Stralsund* had sighted Admiral Warrender's British Second Battle Squadron of six battleships, and had kept in touch, continuing to report the courses of the enemy. Profiting from this information, Admiral Hipper at 1 P.M. turned his squadron sharply off in a northeasterly direction and evaded the intercepting British forces in the mist.

Attempts by the outlying British submarines to attack Admiral Hipper's ships were set at nought by the conditions of wind and sea, and the German squadron made good its escape to its bases.

Even after these raiding tactics of the Germans had been inaugurated, with only fast cruiser forces and no sign of transporting troops, there was an astonishing persistence of the idea of a German invasion of Great Britain. The following seems strange reading at this time — but we must realize that it reflected the prevailing opinion in Great Britain in December, 1914. "Although the long-expected activity of the enemy at sea had taken the form of a purely naval, and not a combined operation, the intelligence which continued to come in made it impossible to relax the measures taken to stop an attempt to land troops on our coasts. Seeing how narrowly the enemy's squadron had escaped

destruction in the northern area, there was an increased probability that any further attempt to invade would be made in the southern area.”¹

It is, therefore, evident that British military information had not yet grasped the fact that the Germans had no serious intention of invading Great Britain, and that there had been no preparations for any such project. In contrast to the Germans' early decision that their own coasts were in no danger, and that German garrisons could be safely transferred to the Channel Coast, as described, the British still continued to look for, and use forces to guard against, the transportation of German invading troops to the British coasts. As has also been stated, this obstinate retention of a prewar theory was not merely a delusion of the public, but it was a fixed idea of the British military and naval leaders, and the reader must again be asked to keep in mind that this dread of a German invasion of Great Britain remained a harmful influence upon British strategy until 1918.

With this idea of the Home Defense so strongly held in Great Britain, a better protection in the southern area of the North Sea was considered very important, and “something was done to bring the battle cruisers more closely into the anti-invasion system.”² The move referred to was the order (December 20, 1914) for Admiral Beatty's Battle Cruiser Squadron to join the Third Battle Squadron and Third Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth. This force was to be under the supreme control of Admiral Jellicoe; “At the first sign of another raid he would put to sea and assume the general direction, but as Whitehall was the centre of intelligence the

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

Admiralty would directly instruct Admiral Beatty what would be the rendezvous.”¹ This same arrangement was to apply to Commodore Tyrwhitt’s flotillas and Commodore Keyes’ “oversea” submarines. By January 1 Admiral Beatty’s Squadron would comprise six battle cruisers.²

These new British naval dispositions were “tested”³ December 25 when the whole fleet was brought out in support of an air raid on Cuxhaven, which was unsuccessful on account of foggy weather. The concentration had worked smoothly, but on returning to Scapa (December 27) the Grand Fleet encountered a heavy gale, as it entered this base, and the dreadnoughts *Conqueror* and *Monarch* were seriously damaged by collision.

The month of January, 1915, opened with bad weather, one storm following after another. Admiral Scheer has stated that any advance of the German fleet was postponed on account of the difficulties of mine-sweeping in the heavy seas.

After the weather had become favorable, another sally of the German battle cruisers was undertaken. On January 23 Vice Admiral Hipper was ordered “to reconnoitre off the Dogger Bank with the cruisers of the 1st and 2d Scouting Divisions, the First Leader of the Torpedo-boat Forces, and the Second Flotilla, and there to destroy any of the enemy’s light forces to be met with. They were to set out in the evening, when darkness fell, and were expected back the following evening

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Lion* (flag), *Tiger*, *Princess Royal*, *Queen Mary*, *New Zealand*, *Indomitable*.

³ “The various squadrons had scarcely assumed their new stations before the scheme was tested.” — Sir Julian Corbett.

when it was again dark.”¹ This time there was no co-operating plan for using the German High Sea Fleet. The operation was to be merely a raid by the German battle cruisers and supporting light forces.

For the British, in the interval of inactivity, “reports of restlessness in the German naval ports had never ceased, and there was every reason to believe that the comparative impunity with which they had raided the Yorkshire coast in December would tempt the enemy to repeat the venture there or elsewhere.”² These reports had proved to be unfounded, and the only offensive on the part of the Germans had been the first of the Zeppelin raids, which penetrated inland (January 19-20), and dropped bombs on King’s Lynn, Yarmouth, and Sheringham.

But the Admiralty had received reliable information of the approaching German sortie of January 23, and shortly after noon on that day orders were sent to Scapa, Rosyth, and Harwich, “which put in active operation the prearranged plan for meeting the long-expected attack.”³ As a result, Vice Admiral Hipper was approaching areas where powerful British naval forces were being disposed in the night to repulse an expected attack. The Grand Fleet had left Scapa at 9 A.M. (January 23) to cover the northern waters, and the Rosyth and Harwich forces were moving for a rendezvous in the morning of January 24 on the Dogger Bank, the very place for which the German ships were heading.

As the battle cruiser *Von der Tann* was in dock being repaired, Admiral Hipper had with him three battle cruisers *Seydlitz* (flag), *Derfflinger*, and *Moltke*, the ar-

¹ Admiral Scheer.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

³ *Ibid.*

mored cruiser *Blücher*,¹ four light cruisers, and destroyers. Under the circumstances contact was inevitable, and the German light cruiser *Kolberg* and British light cruiser *Aurora* met as dawn was breaking (January 24, 1915), firing upon one another (7.15 A.M.), with hits for both cruisers. The *Kolberg* also sighted thick clouds of smoke, as did the light cruiser *Stralsund*. "The conclusion was thus to be drawn that other and more numerous forces were lying off the Dogger Bank."² Consequently Admiral Hipper "assembled his ships on a south-easterly course, as it was still not sufficiently light to make out the number and type of the enemy forces."³ But soon it became evident to the German Admiral that he was in the presence of superior British forces,⁴ and he decided to make off at full speed on his southeasterly course.

The *Blücher* and the German light cruisers engaged and stood off the British destroyers on the north. But the German destroyers were sent on ahead, and the action became a stern chase to the southeast. Admiral Beatty was coming up with his five battle cruisers, and at 8.15 A.M. settled down to the chase on a parallel course to starboard of the course of the fleeing German battle cruisers.

The British battle cruisers were working up to their superior speed and were gaining. Six of Admiral Beatty's destroyers had been within 9000 yards of the *Blücher*, but they were recalled to take station ahead of the line. The rest of the British destroyers were about two miles astern. The British light cruisers were off the enemy's port quarter, as Admiral Beatty drew up

¹ They were in order as named in the ensuing action.

² Admiral Scheer.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ See Tables, pages 232-233.

BRITISH FORCES AT THE BATTLE OF DOGGER BANK
JANUARY 24, 1915

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Lion</i> (Flag), 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron	Battle Cruiser	1912	26,350	31.7	8-13.5"; 16-4"
<i>Tiger</i> , " " "	"	1914	28,500	29.0	8-13.5"; 12-6"
<i>Princess Royal</i> , " " "	"	1912	26,350	32.4	8-13.5"; 16-4"
<i>New Zealand</i> , " " "	"	1912	18,800	26.4	8-12"; 16-4"
<i>Indomitable</i> , 2d Battle Cruiser Squadron	"	1903	17,250	25.3	8-12"; 12-4"
<i>Aurora</i> , with Destroyer Flotilla	Light	1914	3,520	28.5 (designed)	2-6"; 6-4"
<i>Arcthusa</i> , Broad Pennant, with Destroyer Flotilla	"	1911	3,520	28.5 (designed)	2-6"; 6-4"
<i>Undaunted</i> , with 3d Destroyer Flotilla	"	1914	3,520	28.5 (designed)	2-6"; 6-4"
<i>Southampton</i> (Flag), 1st Light Cruiser Squadron	"	1912	5,400	26.0	8-6"
<i>Nottingham</i> , " " "	"	1914	5,400	24.7	9-6"
<i>Birmingham</i> , " " "	"	1914	5,400	25.5	9-6"
<i>Lovestoft</i> , " " "	"	1914	5,400	25.6	9-6"

DESTROYERS

<i>Seven M</i> Class, <i>Miranda</i> , <i>Meteor</i> , etc.	Destroyer	1914	883 to 1014	55.0 (designed)	4-21" torpedo tubes (in pairs)
<i>Fifteen I</i> Class, <i>Attack</i> , <i>Ariel</i> , etc., 1st Flotilla	"	1910-1911	750 to 780	31.0 (designed)	2-21" torpedo tubes (in pairs)
<i>Thirteen L</i> Class, <i>Lookout</i> , <i>Laurel</i> , etc., 3d Flotilla	"	1912-1913	807	35.0 (designed)	4-21" torpedo tubes (in pairs)

GERMAN FORCES AT THE BATTLE OF DOGGER BANK

JANUARY 24, 1915

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Seydlitz</i> (Flag)	Battle Cruiser	1913	25,000	29.0	10-11"; 12-6"
<i>Moltke</i>	"	1911	23,000	28.4	10-11"; 12-6"
<i>Derfflinger</i>	"	1914	26,600	26.5	8-12"; 12-5.9"
<i>Blücher</i>	Armored "	1909	15,500	26.4	12-8.2"; 8-6"
<i>Graudenz</i>	Light "	1914	4,900	28.0 (designed)	12-4.1"
<i>Rostock</i>	"	1913	4,900	28.0 (designed)	12-4.1"
<i>Stralsund</i>	"	1912	4,550	25.2	12-4.1"
<i>Kolberg</i>	"	1909	4,350	27.2	12-4.1"

DESTROYERS

Fifth Flotilla (12) destroyers V-1 and G-7 class . . .	Destroyer	1912	650 (about)	32.5	5-20" torpedo tubes
2d Half Flotilla (5) destroyers V-26 and S-33 class . . .	"	1913	820	32.5	8-20" torpedo tubes (in pairs)
18th Half Flotilla (5) destroyers V-186 and G-192 class	"	1911	650 (about)	32.5	4-18" torpedo tubes

on his parallel course to starboard of the enemy. At 8.52 A.M. Admiral Beatty signaled for 29 knots, although his two rear ships (*New Zealand* and *Indomitable*)¹ could not attain any such speed and would surely fall behind. Shortly afterwards the *Lion* opened fire at about 20,000 yards, "and about a quarter of an hour after the engagement began, the *Lion* seemed to be hitting the *Blücher*."² The three fast British battle cruisers had drawn up on the German ships and all three were soon engaged, with the result that the two last ships of the enemy (*Moltke* and *Blücher*) suffered damage, especially the *Blücher*, which was an armored cruiser, a weaker type of ship, and had no chance from the first.

At 9.35 A.M. Admiral Beatty could shift his fire to the *Seydlitz*, and signaled to his squadron to engage opposite numbers. By a misinterpretation of this signal one of the German battle cruisers was left not under fire, but the *Seydlitz* had suffered a heavy hit which put out her two after turrets by setting ammunition afire, with great destruction of life.³

The British destroyers had fallen back from the van to a position broad on the battle cruisers' port quarter in order not to cloud the range with smoke. At 9.20 A.M. Admiral Beatty had thought that the Germans were about to make a destroyer attack, and ordered his destroyers to get ahead again. But so fast was the pace at which the British battle cruisers were moving, that

¹ Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers were pursuing in this order: *Lion* (flag), *Tiger*, *Princess Royal*, *New Zealand*, *Indomitable*.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

³ "However regrettable was the great loss of life on board the *Seydlitz* through the fire spreading to the munition chamber of each turret, a valuable lesson had been learned for the future in dealing with reserve ammunition, and it was applied in subsequent actions." — Admiral Scheer.

they could not get up. As he still feared a destroyer attack, Admiral Beatty at 9.40 A.M. signaled a general warning to the squadron and turned away two points.

All this time the German ships had concentrated their fire upon the British flagship, and the *Lion* began to suffer. At 9.54 A.M. and 10.01 A.M. the Germans scored heavy hits upon the *Lion*. One of the A turret guns was put out of action, her armor was pierced, water flooded and damaged her electric connections, "and the ship began to take a list to port: but her speed, which had just been reduced to 24 knots to allow the squadron to close up, appears to have been maintained, and the battle continued at a range which increased considerably after our turn away at 9.40." ¹

The German destroyers were making use of smoke screens and Admiral Beatty still expected a destroyer attack. But at 10.18 A.M. he had turned toward the enemy to bring the range down to 17,500 yards. Then the Germans again concentrated successfully on the *Lion*. She was hit heavily, and began to take in more water, so that some of her compartments were flooded to the main deck, "and Admiral Beatty was forced to begin zigzagging." ² "Between 10.35 and 10.50 shell after shell hit her. Again the armour was pierced and more bunkers flooded." ³

On the German side, the case of the badly damaged *Blücher* was hopeless. She had reported engine trouble, and at 10.48 A.M. sheered off to port, out of control. Admiral Beatty ordered the *Indomitable* to follow and engage her. The other four British battle cruisers kept on, engaged with the three German battle cruisers. The German destroyers had turned to starboard, and Ad-

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

miral Beatty declined to take the risk of getting in their wake for fear of minelaying. So he kept off on his parallel course to starboard of the Germans.¹

Suddenly there came an unexpected climax to the action. At 10.54 A.M. there was a report of enemy submarines on the starboard bow of the *Lion*,² and to avoid them Admiral Beatty signaled for eight points together to port. This at once put Admiral Beatty's squadron at right angles to the chase, and, with the high speed at which the German ships were moving, this meant a loss of distance for the British battle cruisers which was a serious interruption to the pursuit, so serious that, in effect, it broke off the pursuit.

Almost immediately after this signal, the *Lion* received another hit that drove in the armor abreast of one of the boiler rooms, and made it necessary to stop the port engine. Her list increased to 10 degrees — and she was put out of action, as she could do no more than 15 knots. The British Admiralty's historian has thus described the ensuing situation: "The result was all that the advocates of concentration on the van could wish. Owing to the injuries the flagship had suffered the Admiral lost control of the squadron and apparently was unable to transfer it to his second in command.

¹ "This was a risk that could not be taken for fear of minelaying, and there was nothing for it but to rely on speed to overlap the flying enemy, and so either force them to the northward towards Admiral Jellicoe or compel them to accept close action." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² Admiral Beatty's Report stated: "At 10.54 submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I personally observed the wash of a periscope two points on our starboard bow." It is now known that the Germans did not bring out any supporting forces for this Dogger Bank raid until their battle cruisers were returning to Heligoland Bight. "On these facts it is clear that none of these submarines could have been on the spot where they were reported or have taken any part in the action." — Sir Julian Corbett.

In fact a period ensued at the crisis of the action when neither Admiral was in a position to direct the movements of the fleet, and inevitable confusion of aim occurred."

As has been explained, Admiral Beatty's signal for the eight point turn to port had swung the British battle cruisers wide of the chase. To quote again from the British historian: "The Admiral quickly saw, however, that the turn as ordered was unnecessarily wide." Accordingly, at 11.02 A.M. Admiral Beatty signaled "Course N. E."

The British Admiralty's historian has explained that Rear Admiral Moore, who succeeded to the command after the *Lion* had dropped out of action, "took charge of the squadron in circumstances of exceptional difficulty," as he could not know the reason for Admiral Beatty's signal for the eight point turn.

After signaling "Course N. E.," Admiral Beatty made signal, "Attack the enemy's rear." This caused confusion, as the signal "seems to have been hoisted before the compass signal 'Course N. E.' had been hauled down. The result was that the Rear-Admiral concluded that his Chief was ordering the squadron to 'attack the enemy's rear bearing N. E.,' that being the meaning of the flag groups as they were seen from the *New Zealand* (flagship of Admiral Moore), as well as from the *Tiger* and *Indomitable*, who both logged the signal in the same terms."¹ Admiral Beatty had afterwards signaled "Keep closer to the enemy," but none of the British battle cruisers took it in. The *Lion's* wireless was out of action, and she could only signal by flags.

The result of this confused situation was the breaking

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

off of the chase of the German battle cruisers, as Rear Admiral Moore's attitude has been expressed by the Admiralty's historian as follows: "The *Blücher*, which bore about N. E. from the *New Zealand*, was therefore taken to be the objective indicated, both by the eight-point turn made at 11.0 and the signals subsequently received."

The Germans stated that a torpedo attack was intended at this time, but this was recalled, and the German squadron held on its southeasterly course, for its base, leaving the *Blücher* to its fate. The British squadron circled around this single German armored cruiser, "pouring in salvos till she was a mere mass of smoke and flame."¹ She was also attacked with torpedoes. The *Blücher* resisted to the last and put one destroyer out of action, but at 11.45 A.M. she was helpless, and Admiral Moore ceased fire, leaving light cruisers to rescue the survivors of her company. At 12.10 she capsized and sank. About 260 lives were saved, but more would have been rescued by the British if it had not been for attacks by a German airplane and a Zeppelin.

One aspect of this confused situation is self-evident. For Rear Admiral Moore's squadron of battle cruisers to concentrate upon the disabled *Blücher* was a waste of their efforts, and a waste of their time which might have been devoted to a renewed chase of the already badly damaged German battle cruisers, as there remained a long run before the Heligoland minefields could be reached. The German armored cruiser was practically a wreck, which could not escape and could be finished at leisure. On the other hand, the only chance for doing further damage to the escaping Ger-

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

VII. NORTHWESTERN EUROPE

(This map is diagrammatic only)

INDICATIONS OF POSITIONS

BRITISH

- ① Main Bases, British Grand Fleet.
- ② North Base, Battle Cruiser Fleet.
- ③ Harwich Force.
- ④ Dover Force.
- ⑤ Dover Patrol.
- ⑥ Home, Base of British Expeditionary Force.
- ⑦ Brest, Temporary Base at time of threatening invasion of France.
- ⑧ Lough Swilly, Temporary Base of Grand Fleet.
- ⑨ Auxiliary Patrol Areas.

These numbers show the many small local areas of coastal administration and operation, having no coordinating heads.

⑩ British Minefields proclaimed dangerous.

GERMAN

⑪ Double Base of German High Sea Fleet.

⑫ Baltic Area controlled by the Germans.

⑬ Pomeranian Coast. The objective of the Fisher scheme for landing a Russian Army of Invasion.


⑭ Minefields laid by the Germans off the British coasts, proclaimed dangerous, and the mined outworks of Heligoland.

⑮ The positions of the neutral countries should also be studied, especially as making difficult the exclusion of goods from the Central Powers, as explained in the text.

OPERATIONS

- (A) First German attempt to lay mines from improvised minelayer *Königin Luise*. *Königin Luise* sunk August 5, 1914. *Amphion* sunk by one of the mines August 6, 1914.
- (B) First German tentative attempt to send out U-boats for offensive August 4–August 11, 1914.
- (C) Action in Heligoland Bight August 28, 1914.
- (D) *Cressy*, *Aboukir*, *Hogue* torpedoed on Broad Fourteens September 23, 1914.
- (E) *Hawke* torpedoed October 15, 1914.
- (F) Mines laid by Berlin and loss of the *Audacious* October 27, 1914.
- (G) Gorleston Raid, etc.
- (H) Raid against Hartlepool, Whitby, Scarborough, etc.
- (I) Raid on Dogger Bank, etc.

These indications of positions and operations show the great concentrations of main naval forces in European waters, with the unexpectedly narrow scope of naval operations in these areas.





man battle cruisers was immediate pursuit. But it was not until Admiral Moore ceased fire, at 11.45 A.M., that he "turned his attention to the ships that had abandoned her."¹

Consequently, the fast German ships were out of reach, and the British squadron was returning to look after the *Lion* when Vice Admiral Beatty again took command, having boarded a destroyer and shifted his flag to the *Princess Royal*.

There was nothing left to do but to bring in the disabled *Lion*. This was a matter of some difficulty, as her starboard engine was also in trouble, and she had to be towed by the *Indomitable*. There were apprehensions of German submarine attacks, and it was not until the morning of January 26 that she was brought into the Forth, but no torpedo attacks were made by the Germans.

This Dogger Bank chase was notable in being the first action between squadrons of battle cruisers, the new type of warship which was at the height of its vogue in those days. Of course the disparity of forces, and the long ranges at which the ships fought, did not give a thorough test of the new type. But it is of great tactical interest that the German ships were able to concentrate on the *Lion*, and put her out of action by gunfire at long range. As the narrative has shown, the disabling of the *Lion* was no matter of merely a "chance shot," which was the general assumption at the time, but Admiral Beatty's flagship was put out by successive damaging hits. It should also be noted that the Germans profited from the lesson of the fire on the *Seydlitz*, to secure a better separation of the ammunition, and this was a great advantage for them at Jutland.

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

CHAPTER XV

THE DARDANELLES PROJECT

AT the beginning of the year 1915, it became evident that there would be no advance of the British Army along the Flanders Coast, and consequently that the British Navy would not be called upon for a joint operation with this object. A concentration of the British military effort on the sea flank of the western front had been the favored strategy of the British Command, as this would make the area of British operations also a defense for Great Britain.

General French had urged an advance against Zeebrugge as his plan for an early campaign, and there had been consideration of a scheme for a joint operation of the Army and Navy. This had been brought to a head by a sudden loss for the British Navy. Early in the morning of January 1, 1915, the *Formidable*, a pre-dreadnought, had been sunk by a German submarine, while exercising with the Squadron from the North Sea. "Under the impression of the sinking of the *Formidable*, the First Sea Lord and the Admiralty Staff advised that a formal and official communication should be made to the Military authorities."¹ Accordingly a note was sent to Lord Kitchener,² pointing out the development of Zeebrugge as a German submarine base, the danger to transportation across the Channel, and stating: "The Admiralty are of the opinion that it would be possible, under cover of warships, to land a large force at

¹ Winston Churchill: "The World Crisis, 1915."

² January 1, 1915.

Zeebrugge in conjunction with any genuine forward movement along the seashore at Ostend. They wish these views, which they have so frequently put forward, to be placed again before the French commanders, and hope they may receive the consideration which their urgency and importance require." But Lord Kitchener notified the British Commander-in-Chief in France that "the Council came to the conclusion that the advantages to be obtained from such an advance at the present moment would not be commensurate with the heavy losses involved." General Joffre was also opposed to the attempt, and the French Commander-in-Chief stated (Mem. of January 19, 1915): "The main object, namely, the defeat of the enemy, makes it necessary to delay the offensive towards Ostend-Zeebrugge." This postponement meant, in the words of Winston Churchill, "Thus ended the Sea Coast project. It petered out like so many other schemes in this period of various devices and invariable indecision. Whether it would have succeeded or not, no one can tell." But it should be said, aside from the difficulties of advance for the army, and from the naval viewpoint, that the guns of the Navy could not hope to dominate guns on shore, as was shown afterwards.

On the other hand, the Dardanelles began to demand attention as an objective for the strategy of the Entente Allies. Before describing the ill-starred attempt to win the Dardanelles, one thing should be emphasized beyond any misunderstanding — the vital importance of this objective in the World War. The failure of the wrongly conceived project against the Dardanelles was so disastrous that the great stake at issue has been obscured by all manner of outside discussions. But it can be no ex-

aggeration to state that, at the beginning of 1915, the possession of the Dardanelles would have been the richest prize in the world for the Entente Allies.

In fact, if the Allies had captured Constantinople at the beginning of 1915, it would have been so great a physical and moral victory, that it is hard to see how the Central Powers could have held out against its effects.¹ Possession of the Dardanelles by the Entente Allies would have meant that the barrier separating Russia from Great Britain and France had been destroyed, and that this most harmful factor in the military situation had been eliminated. With the Straits opened, munitions could have been sent to Russia, and Russian food products could have been shipped to Great Britain and France. This is only stating the benefits in the baldest terms. For, even in addition to being thus able to succor the Russians in the impending crisis of the fatal Teutonic offensive of 1915, there would have been the inestimable moral effect throughout the East, the influence upon the hesitating nations, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania.

All these great objects to be gained justified risks, but, on the other hand, this all-important undertaking should have implied, as a matter of course, that plans had been made to use every possible means to insure success. In this respect, it can never be said that the efforts were equal to the great occasion. On the contrary, it must be understood that the preparations were never on a basis to promise a victory.

The very causes of failure, the inevitable seeds of defeat, were innate in the conception and growth of the

¹ "Should the Dardanelles fall, then the World War has been decided against us." — Admiral Tirpitz, 1915.

project. As has been stated, the problem of the Dardanelles had not been included in the prewar naval strategy of the Entente Allies.¹ Even the course of events which has been described, leading to the German domination of Constantinople, had only tardily stirred the Allies to a realization of what had been gained by the Central Powers, after the inactivity of the Allies had allowed Germany to win the control of the Dardanelles.

But the break with the Turks did not arouse the Entente Allies to the extent of preparing any definite whole-hearted operation for winning the Dardanelles. The Report of the French Naval Committee has claimed, "Prepared without delay, under the form of one of those combined expeditions of which the strength was founded upon the mastery of the time and the choice of the place, success was certain." It should be stated at once that the Dardanelles operation never had this foundation for success, as there never was any plan that would fit this description.

On the contrary, instead of being resolutely planned from the first as a joint operation of Army and Navy forces to win and occupy Constantinople, the Dardanelles project went through the stages of being planned as a demonstration and diversion, as an unassisted naval attack, as a joint operation — and the result was a series of costly attempts, which successively gave the enemy notice and time to organize an effective defense. In addition, considerations of "alternative objectives" ² were allowed to interfere. There were the constant ob-

¹ It is on record, in the Report of the Dardanelles Commission, that there was an adverse report against a Dardanelles enterprise in 1906-07.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

jections of those who believed in concentrating all forces on the Western Front, the alternatives of the Balkan and Syrian schemes, and always there were the retarding effects of the two most harmful influences upon British strategy, the exaggerated care for the Home Defense,¹ and the rival claims of Lord Fisher's cherished Baltic program.

The following narrative of events, all of which are matters of official record, will show these causes of failure more clearly than all the arguments that have been put forward in the discussions of this campaign. "On November 25 the idea of making a serious attack on the Dardanelles was discussed at a meeting of the War Council. . . . Lord Kitchener agreed that it might become necessary to make a diversion by an attack on the Turkish communications, but considered that the moment had not yet arrived for doing so."² Nothing was done in preparation, except to gather horse-boats at Alexandria "in case the War Office should, at a later stage, wish to undertake a joint naval and military operation in the eastern Mediterranean."³

"Thus matters stood until January 2d, 1915, when a very important telegram which materially affected the situation was received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Petrograd. In this telegram it was represented that the Russians were being somewhat hard pressed in the Caucasus and a hope was expressed, on behalf of the Russian Government, that, in order to relieve this pressure, a demonstration against the Turks would be made in some other quarter."⁴ To this telegram Lord Kitchener

¹ "He (Lord Kitchener) had to provide for home defence, to which he attached the utmost importance." — Report, Dardanelles Commission.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

ner on January 3, 1915, sent a reply, "authorizing him to assure the Russian Government that a demonstration would be made against the Turks. . . . This therefore was the first phase in the whole transaction. By January 3d His Majesty's Government was pledged to make a demonstration against the Turks. The time and method of making that demonstration were, as yet, wholly undecided."¹

Then was developed the idea of an attack upon the Dardanelles by the use of naval forces alone. This grew from the profound impression that had been made by the easy reduction of Liége and Namur² by means of the new high-angle fire artillery. Especial confidence was felt in the 15 inch guns of the new British battleship *Queen Elizabeth*, and thus the mistake was made of believing that ships' guns would be able to duplicate the results gained by guns on shore.³

On January 3, 1915, the following telegram was dispatched from the Admiralty to Vice Admiral Carden, who was off the Dardanelles:

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

² "The fall of the Liége and Namur forts had led to the belief that permanent works were easily dealt with by modern long-range artillery, and this was confirmed by the fall of the outer forts." "The utilization of aircraft had led to the hope that in a comparatively confined space like the Gallipoli Peninsula, the value of naval bombardment, particularly by indirect laying, would be enormously increased. . . . Looking to all the facts in the case we are disposed to think that undue importance was attached to the ease with which the Belgian forts were destroyed, and that the extent to which there was an analogy between those forts and the forts at the Dardanelles was over-rated." — Ibid.

³ "The authorities responsible for the mistaken idea were impressed by the success with which the Germans had reduced the Belgian forts, and concluded that in the same way ships' guns could reduce the Dardanelles forts." — Sir Percy Scott: "Fifty Years in the Royal Navy."

“Do you think it is a practicable operation to force the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone?”

“It is assumed that older battleships would be employed, that they would be furnished with mine sweepers and that they would be preceded by colliers or other merchant vessels as sweepers and bumpers.”

“The importance of the results would justify severe loss. Let me know what your views are.”¹

On January 5, 1915, Vice Admiral Carden replied to the Admiralty:

“I do not think that the Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended operations with a large number of ships.”

In reply the following was sent to Vice Admiral Carden on January 6, 1915:

“High authorities here concur in your opinion.”

“Forward detailed particulars showing what force would be required for extended operations. How do you think it should be employed, and what results could be gained?”

“On January 11th Vice-Admiral Carden replied to the telegram sent to him from the Admiralty on the 6th. Four operations he said were possible. These were:

(a) The destruction of defences at the entrance to the Dardanelles.

(b) Action inside the Straits, so as to clear the defences up to and including Kephez Point battery N. S.

(c) Destruction of defences of the Narrows.

¹ The Report of the Dardanelles Commission makes the following statement: “This, and other telegrams which purport to be textually reproduced, have been paraphrased, but great care has been taken not to make the least change in the sense.”

(d) Sweeping of a clear channel through the mine-field and advance through the Narrows, followed by a reduction of the forts farther up, and advance into the Sea of Marmora.”¹

Mr. Churchill testified that this telegram made a great impression on everyone who read it, as it proposed instead of rushing the Straits, “a scheme by which the forts would be methodically attacked and destroyed one by one,” saying, “That, of course, squared with the impression produced in many people’s minds by the destruction of the strong forts on land by the German heavy artillery.”²

Vice Admiral Carden’s plans were discussed at “the very important meeting of the War Council,”³ which took place on January 13, 1915. At this meeting the decision arrived at was as follows:

“That Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective.”⁴

Following this meeting of the War Council, a telegram was sent to Vice Admiral Carden by the First Lord, “with Lord Fisher’s concurrence”:⁵ “Your scheme was laid by the First Sea Lord and myself before the

¹ As given in Report, Dardanelles Commission. The Carden dispatch given in full, Appendix, pages 323 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Thus given in Report, Dardanelles Commission. It is interesting to note that this “unanimous” decision of the Council was recorded as follows:

“That the Admiralty should consider promptly the possibility of effective action in the Adriatic at Cattaro or elsewhere — with a view (*inter alia*) of bringing pressure on Italy.”

“That the Admiralty should also prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective.”

⁵ Winston Churchill: “The World Crisis, 1915.”

Cabinet War Council yesterday, and was approved in principle."

"We see no difficulty in providing the force you require, including the *Queen Elizabeth*, by February 15."

"We entirely agree with your plan of methodical piecemeal reduction of forts as the Germans did at Antwerp."

"We propose to entrust this operation to you."

"Admiral de Robeck will probably be your second in command."

"The sooner we can begin the better."

"You will shortly receive the official instructions of the Board."

"Continue to perfect your plans."

This telegram has thus put on official record the prevailing optimism, which assumed that ships' guns would be able to accomplish "piecemeal reduction of forts as the Germans did at Antwerp."¹

After this decision, the British Admiralty communicated with the French Government to secure the cooperation of the French fleet. The French Minister of Marine visited London, and a new arrangement was made as to the spheres of operations in the Mediterranean, by which a French Squadron for the Dardanelles was placed under the command of Admiral Carden. This was the natural thing to do, as the British naval force was to be much greater than the French contingent.

A later telegram from Admiral Guépratte, in command under Admiral Carden of this French contingent, sent by request to the French Minister of Marine, is a

¹ "Moreover, the *Queen Elizabeth* came into the argument with a cumulative effect." — Winston Churchill: "The World Crisis, 1915."

vivid exposition of this unsound plan. "Received your telegram 31 January. General lines of Carden project are: Reduction forts entrance Dardanelles; drag mines entrance; reduction of the forts Chakak and Kalessi; drag large field of mines Point Kephez; search for and destroy Ottoman fleet, particularly *Goeben*; hold Constantinople under menace of our guns, and to get in touch with Russian fleet." To carry out this ambitious program implied, in itself, a landing force, and this was unmistakably expressed in the conclusion arrived at by the Dardanelles Commission. "We hold that the possibility of making a surprise amphibious attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula offered such great military and political advantages that it was mistaken and ill-advised to sacrifice this possibility by hastily deciding to undertake a purely naval attack which from its nature could not attain completely the objects set out in the terms of the decision."

As to the vexed question of responsibility for this decision of January 13, 1915, Lord Kitchener was practically a military dictator, and Lord Fisher was paramount in the British Admiralty. Keeping these facts in mind, the following will be found one of the most significant passages in the Commission's Report: "It is highly probable that if either Lord Kitchener or Lord Fisher had, from the first, expressed, on technical grounds, strong objections to the attack on the Dardanelles, the project would have been abandoned, and it may be regarded as quite certain that, under the hypothesis, the plan would have been much more carefully examined than appears to have been the case."

It was only after it became evident that the project "was going to broaden out into a far larger and far

longer undertaking than he had contemplated,"¹ that Lord Fisher's opposition became active. The First Sea Lord had fully appreciated the great difficulties that would be met in an attack on the Dardanelles, and he never had approved of the project. In fact, he had opposed the undertaking. But unfortunately Lord Fisher, at the time of the momentous decision, did not take a firm stand in opposition on professional grounds, but allowed himself to be persuaded to assent to the project. His later and increasing opposition, which ultimately led to his resignation, was aroused because he felt that "the larger and longer undertaking" would divert naval energies from his own special program for the Baltic.

Lord Fisher had sent in a memorandum against the Dardanelles attack, and on January 28, 1915, there was a meeting of the War Council, preceded by a private meeting in the Prime Minister's room. On this day Lord Fisher urged his own scheme of strategy, and his own account of what happened has left no doubt as to Lord Fisher's attitude.² "When we got to the Council Table — the members having been kept waiting for a considerable time — the Prime Minister gave the decision that the Dardanelles project must proceed; and as I rose from the Council Table Lord Kitchener followed me, and was so earnest and even emotional that I should return that I said to myself after some delay: 'Well, we can withdraw the ships at any time, so long as the Military don't land,' and I succumbed. I was mad on that Armada of 612 vessels, so generously fos-

¹ Mr. Churchill's testimony before Dardanelles Commission.

² "Lord Fisher spoke in favor of those alternative schemes, which we have not thought it advisable to describe, but to which we have already alluded (paragraph 67). He did not criticise the attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula on its own merits." — Report, Dardanelles Commission.

tered by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill and sustained by the Prime Minister.”¹

In this unfortunate spirit was the great enterprise undertaken. It is enough to read from the text of the Dardanelles Commission Report: “After the meeting of January 28th, the objective of the British Government remained the same, but the views entertained as to the means of realizing it underwent a gradual but profound change. The necessity for employing a large military force became daily more apparent. The idea of a purely naval operation was gradually dropped. The prestige argument grew in importance. It does not appear that the War Council ever definitely discussed and deliberately changed the policy. General Callwell says that it would be very difficult to assign any date at which the change took place. ‘We drifted,’ he said, ‘into the big military attack!’”

And the following from this Report described the conditions under which the first attack on the Dardanelles was allowed to take place. “None of the responsible authorities appear to have paid much attention to the course of action which it would be necessary to adopt after the passage of the Dardanelles had been forced. Admiral Carden thought that ‘as the operations progressed he would receive further orders from the Admiralty as to the precise lines they wished him to act upon.’ The fact that, even after the passage had been forced, communications with the fleet in the Sea of Marmora might, to some extent, be impeded by such batteries as had not been destroyed was recognized. But in London, where, according to General Callwell’s evidence, the resistance to be offered by the Turks had,

¹ Lord Fisher: “Memories and Records.”

from the first, been greatly under-estimated, no great importance was attached to this argument. Lord Kitchener was of opinion that directly the passage had been forced the Gallipoli garrison would evacuate the Peninsula, inasmuch as their communications with Constantinople would be cut off. In a Memorandum dated March 23d he wrote: 'Once the ships are through, the position of the Gallipoli Peninsula ceases to be of any military importance.' Moreover, he and others, including Lord Grey, confidently looked forward to a revolution taking place in Constantinople if once the British Fleet appeared in the Sea of Marmora."

With this unreasoning optimism, and lack of preparation for the actual conditions, was the great venture carried through.

CHAPTER XVI

THE DARDANELLES. FIRST NAVAL ATTACKS

(See Map at page 234.)

AS Admiral Carden gathered his naval forces, and worked out his plans for the attack on the Dardanelles, it became evident that an advance base would be necessary. Mudros in the island of Lemnos was the best for the purpose, and through the friendship of the Greek Prime Minister, M. Venizelos, it was arranged that the Entente Allies could occupy the island.¹ Yet, as the preparations were carried forward, the strange anomaly was soon presented of military forces actually assigned for service in the Mediterranean area, but, instead of being destined for the Dardanelles operation, they were originally allotted to the postponed Salonica Balkan project.

This scheme, at the beginning of 1915, held no real promise of definite results. It was a tentative plan for bolstering up Serbia and aligning Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria on the side of the Entente, by landing an Allied Army at Salonica. There were ineffective parleys with M. Venizelos, but nothing ever came from the idea, and the plan had been abandoned by February 15.

There was also some negotiation with M. Venizelos, as to the possibility of Greek troops being used in co-operation with the naval attacks upon the Dardanelles. But, aside from the uncertain position of Greece at the

¹ "Turkey had never recognized it as having ceased to be Turkish. The Greek garrison, therefore, had only to withdraw and the Allies could treat it as enemy's territory." — Sir Julian Corbett.

time, the Russian Foreign Minister had given notice to the British Ambassador that, "The Russian Government could not consent to Greece participating in operations in the Dardanelles, as it would be sure to lead to complications. . . ." In this situation, consequently, we must realize that the only practical solution lay in the question of the proper use of these Allied troops, which were shown to be available for the Balkan project. Of course, if they were available for Salonica, they were also actually available for the Dardanelles at this time.

The incredible thing in this whole matter was the fact that the idea of using these troops for the Balkan scheme should have been entertained at all, when the one sure way for the Entente Allies to impress the hesitating Balkan nations was to strike a strong blow at the Dardanelles.

The following from the British naval history has shown the surprising state of mind of the British leadership, which at this time was only gradually drifting toward what should have been the very first essential of the Dardanelles operation: "Although, owing to the attitude which Greece felt forced to maintain, this resolution had no effect of the nature contemplated, its reaction on the Dardanelles enterprise was profound. The discussion had revealed the possibility of finding troops for the Mediterranean, and ever since the enterprise had been sanctioned opinion had become more and more impressed with the unwisdom of attempting it without a military force of at least sufficient strength to secure at each stage what the fleet might win. . . . Primarily the idea of sending troops to the Eastern Mediterranean was to save Serbia, and in the second place to provide the fleet at the Dardanelles with a landing-force."¹

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

This assurance, that British troops would be found available for the Eastern Mediterranean, was strengthened by the "hopeless failure"¹ of the only Turkish attack upon Egypt and the Suez Canal (January 28–February 11, 1915). The Germans had been inciting the Turks to make this attack, but the only Turkish response was a foray across the desert with some 15,000 men. This could make no impression upon the prepared British defense of the Canal, and the Turks were driven off with ease. Naval forces had formed an important part of this constituted defense of the Suez Canal, including the old battleships *Ocean* and *Swiftsure* with light units. This feeble showing made by the Turks proved that the defense of Egypt need not any longer be considered a reason for holding back troops. Yet, even then, no adequate landing force was provided to cooperate with the first naval attacks at the Dardanelles. In this regard, it is again enough to quote from the Admiralty's historian: "But it would seem that the new orientation of the war was not yet apprehended with sufficient conviction for a whole-hearted new departure to be taken. . . . The troops were only to move from Egypt if required, and none of them were as yet pledged to the fleet. The naval attack was not yet transformed into a true combined operation, for it was expressly provided that the whole military force was merely to be held available to support the naval operations in case of need."²

¹ Lord Sydenham.

² Sir Julian Corbett. In the Report of the Dardanelles Commission it was stated: "He (Lord Kitchener) would not go further than stating at a meeting which took place on February 9th that 'if the Navy required the assistance of the land forces at a later stage, that assistance would be forthcoming.'"

As a result, Admiral Carden was given only two battalions of Marines, and "it was clearly understood that they were only intended to land after the entrance forts were silenced, in order to destroy the torpedo tubes which were believed to be part of the entrance defenses."¹ The opportunity for a coup at the Dardanelles was thus thrown away, and the fleet was prepared for attacks without any force to hold what might be gained — in fact the fleet was restricted to attempts which could not win its objective, and would only serve notice to the enemy to prepare defenses against later attempts with troops. These conditions foredoomed the operation to failure.

The bulk of Admiral Carden's force from the British Navy was made up of older battleships, which had been released when the outer seas were cleared of German warships. The four French battleships of Admiral Gnéprat's contingent squadron were also of older types. But, in addition, there was one British battleship upon which great reliance was placed. This was the new dreadnought *Queen Elizabeth*, the name ship of her class of 25 knot battleships carrying eight 15 inch guns. As has been explained, it was thought that great results would be obtained by long range indirect fire of these 15 inch guns.

But the *Queen Elizabeth*, while at gun practice near Gibraltar just before leaving for the Dardanelles, had stripped the blades of one of her turbines, and this accident had reduced her speed to 15 knots. As this reduction of speed left Admiral Carden with no ship that could be relied upon to bring the *Goeben* to action, he was allowed to retain the battle cruiser *Inflexible*,

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

on which he hoisted his flag. The total of ships thus gathered gave him a formidable naval force, as detailed in the table on page 326.

The first bombardment was on February 19, 1915. This was planned to carry out the first stage of Admiral Carden's plan, devised to progress as follows:

"1. Reduction of the defences at the entrance to the Straits, in Bashika Bay and on the north coast of Gallipoli.

2. Sweeping the minefields and reducing the defences up to the Narrows.

3. Reduction of the Narrows.

4. Sweeping the principal minefield (which was off Kephez).

5. Silencing the forts above the Narrows.

6. Passing the fleet into the Sea of Marmora.

7. Operations in the Sea of Marmora and patrolling the Dardanelles." ¹

"In dealing with the forts, the general principle was to be an attack in three stages: first, a long-range bombardment (direct or indirect) out of range or bearing of the enemy's guns (11,000 and 12,000 yards); secondly, a bombardment at medium ranges, using secondary armament and direct fire; and thirdly, the final reduction of the forts at decisive ranges of from 3000 to 4000 yards. Special importance was attached to ships not being hit in the initial stages, and if they came under unexpected fire they were to withdraw and resume long-range bombardment." ²

"For the first phase six ships were selected, the *Suffren* (flag of Admiral Guépratte), *Bouvet*, *Inflexible* (flag of Admiral Carden), *Triumph*, *Cornwallis* and *Albion*,

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

with the *Gaulois* as supporting ship for the *Suffren*, and *Amethyst* for *Albion*. The *Vengeance* (flag of Admiral de Robeck) was to observe the fire for her division.”¹

The French flagship *Suffren* was to bombard Kum Kale, the main fort on the Asiatic side of the entrance, with the *Bouvet* to spot for her five miles off Cape Helles, and the *Gaulois* patrolling off Bashika Bay “to prevent the flagship being molested by field guns on the quarter.”² The supporting fort on the Asiatic side, Orkanie, was to be engaged by the *Cornwallis*. On the European side, the main defense, Sedd el Bahr, was assigned to the *Inflexible*. The supporting fort at Cape Helles (Helles No. 1), was to be shelled by the *Triumph*. These ships were to be masked as much as possible from the different forts, and indirect as well as direct fire was to be used.

On the European side the *Albion*, with the *Amethyst* and seven British minesweepers, had the task of clearing an area “from one mile north to three miles south of Gaba Tepe”³ for the *Queen Elizabeth’s* indirect fire on the Narrows forts over the Peninsula. The British dreadnought was not to be used in the initial phase, but, with the *Agamemnon*, was to arrive that day. Consequently the bombardment at long range was begun at 9.51 A.M., February 19, 1915, without these two ships being present.⁴

The action was opened by the *Cornwallis*, followed shortly after by the *Triumph*, and at 10.32 A.M. the *Suffren* had anchored and was engaging Kum Kale. There was no reply from any of the forts, and Admiral Carden, from the *Inflexible*, ordered the other ships to

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ East European time, two hours in advance of Greenwich Mean Time.

anchor "to improve the shooting."¹ As the *Cornwallis* could not anchor in deep water, on account of a defective capstan, she changed duties with the *Vengeance*. The *Inflexible* had anchored at 11.50 A.M. and fired on the Helles fort at 15,400 yards two rounds, which fell short. She then moved 2500 yards nearer in, and engaged the Helles fort from 12.20 P.M. until 1.00 P.M., when she changed to her object Sedd el Bahr.

Spotting at these long ranges was reported as very difficult, and, "according to the report of a seaplane, all the guns in Sedd el Bahr, Orkanie, and Kum Kale were intact. Still, so good had been the shooting since the ships anchored, that the Admiral considered the effect of the long-range bombardment had been severe enough for the ships to close nearer, and at 2.0 he made the signal for the second stage to begin."²

For this, the operation orders involved "bombardment at closer ranges, overwhelming of forts at close range, and sweeping channel towards the entrance of Straits." In this stage the ships were to keep moving. The *Suffren* and the *Vengeance* were to engage Kum Kale at 7000 yards, making repeated short runs at decreasing ranges to silence this fort, and then to take on Orkanie at 5000 yards. The *Inflexible* and the *Bouvet* were to deal with the European forts on a similar plan. The *Triumph* was to silence a field gun battery above Tekke Burnu.

After the *Inflexible* had fired three rounds at Sedd el Bahr, with no response (3 P.M.), the inshore squadron kept moving in. By 3.50 P.M. the *Suffren* had made three runs and there was no reply from Kum Kale. The French flagship then closed in, at 4.10 P.M., followed by

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

the *Vengeance* and *Cornwallis*, which were on Orkanie and Helles respectively. "Out of the clouds of dust and smoke that enveloped the forts came no sign of life; they seemed completely overwhelmed." ¹ Consequently at 4.40 P.M. the Admiral signaled, "Cease fire and examine forts." Admiral de Robeck in the *Vengeance* was moving toward the entrance, in response to this order, "when suddenly both Helles and Orkanie opened a hot fire on him as though they had not been touched." ²

The British naval historian has stated, "It was a complete surprise, that gave ominous presage of the difficulties to come," ³ but the *Vengeance* engaged the Helles fort at once. She was joined by the *Cornwallis*, and the *Suffren*, *Gaulois*, and *Inflexible* were also soon in action to attempt to complete the reduction of the forts. They were also joined by the *Agamemnon*, which had just arrived, and this battleship moved in to support the *Cornwallis*. But it was then too late. Only twenty minutes after this new reinforcement, Admiral Carden at 5.20 P.M., "judging it now too late to do more that evening, made the 'General Recall.'—The light to landward was getting bad, while the ships were clearly silhouetted against the western sky, and in his instructions he had insisted on the moral importance of avoiding injury to the ships in the initial stage." ⁴ At 5.30 P.M. "Cease firing" was signaled. None of the ships had been hit, and the losses of the Turks had also been very light. ⁵

Admiral Carden had intended to renew the attack the next day, but there was a succession of stormy days

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "The enemy's casualties seem to have been very slight. The Turks report one officer and a few men killed on the European side, and one officer and two men at Orkanie." — Ibid.

which delayed the second bombardment until February 25. This gave the Turks so much time that they had recovered from the effects of the first day's attack.

In the meantime, Admiral Carden had become convinced "of the necessity of having military assistance at hand as soon as possible."¹ He expressed his definite desire for a force of troops sufficient to make a landing and occupy the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula, after the fleet had silenced the entrance forts. "His idea was that 10,000 might be landed at once to hold the line of the Soghanli Dere, and onward across the Chana plain to the coast where the width of the peninsula is little more than five miles from sea to sea."² If this could have been done, it would have prevented the reoccupation of the Gallipoli forts, enabled the British to deal with the enemy mobile howitzer artillery and torpedo tubes, and given the British the control of the dominating observation position of Achi Baba.

At an "informal meeting of some of the Ministers,"³ on February 16, 1915, the idea had been entertained of sending to Lemnos the 29 Division from Great Britain and a force from Egypt, "to be available in case of necessity to support the naval attack on the Dardanelles."⁴ Horse-boats, transports, tugs, and lighters were also to be procured "for the conveyance and landing of a force of 50,000 men at any point where they may be required."⁵ But there was a reaction against this, and on February 20 Lord Kitchener gave notice that it had been decided the 29 Division was not to go.

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

³ Report, Dardanelles Commission.

² Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "It had not been definitely decided to use troops on a large scale, but they were to be massed so as to be in readiness should their assistance be required." — Ibid.

In the words of the Commission's Report, "On February 16th, it had been decided to employ troops on a large scale. This decision still held good, but its execution was to be delayed. At the same time, the idea of forcing the Dardanelles by the action of the Fleet alone had not been abandoned."

With the War Council thus still holding off from the necessary decision to use military forces in the attack, there was no hope for Admiral Carden's suggestion. "As soon as the Admiral's proposal for seizing the tail of the peninsula came forward, it was referred to the War Office, and they quickly replied that in their opinion its occupation 'was not necessary for the reduction of the forts.'" ¹ The following from the Commission's Report should be kept in mind, as it is a true statement of the unhappy consequences of the wavering irresolute guidance that was given to this operation, which was deserving of all the best efforts of the Entente Allies. "Yet for at least three weeks the Government vacillated and came to no definite decision in one sense or the other. The natural result ensued. The favorable moment for action was allowed to lapse. Time was given to the Turks, with the help of German officers, to strengthen their position, so that eventually the opposition to be encountered became of a far more formidable character than was originally to be anticipated."

Consequently, Admiral Carden had no military force available for his second attack beginning February 25, 1915, except the two battalions of Marines, which had arrived at Mudros. The Marines could only be used to cover fleet demolition parties, and, as no landings of these had been ordered for February 25, the Marines remained on the transports at Mudros.

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

From the lesson of his lack of success in his first attempt to silence the entrance forts, Admiral Carden had concluded, "The result of the day's action on the 19th February showed apparently that the effect of long-range bombardment by direct fire on modern earth-work forts is slight."¹ Therefore, he changed his plan in the second attempt against the entrance forts (February 25, 1915). Four ships were told off, which were to work in pairs and make runs up to the jaws of the Straits and back, to engage at ranges down to 3000 yards. In support, the *Agamemnon*, *Queen Elizabeth*, *Irresistible*, and *Gaulois* were anchored to fire, at long ranges, deliberately on all four entrance forts, to dominate their fire before the selected ships made their runs in, and to check the enemy's fire when the forts were being engaged at short range.

The *Queen Elizabeth* and the *Inflexible* were at 11,600 yards and 11,500 yards respectively. The *Agamemnon* was anchored inside the *Queen Elizabeth*, and at 10.17 A.M. was engaging the Helles fort at 10,000 yards. This Turkish fort "was far from being destroyed on the first day,"² and soon was straddling the *Agamemnon*, which was ordered to weigh. But, before the British battleship could get away, she was hit seven times in ten minutes. The *Queen Elizabeth* was signaled to take on Helles in her place, but it was not until nearly noon that she began to score hits,³ and, as the *Agamemnon* had returned to action, the two British battleships put out the two guns of the battery.

In the meantime, the *Gaulois* was firing on Kum Kale, the *Irresistible* on Orkanie. At one time the *Gaulois* also

¹ Admiral Carden's Report.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

³ "With her sixteenth and seventeenth shots." — Ibid.

was compelled to withdraw, but as noon approached both ships were firing with telling effects on the forts. By noon none of the entrance forts was firing. At 12.15 P.M. Admiral Carden signaled to Admiral de Robeck to make the first run in the *Vengeance* and *Cornwallis*. These ships went in to 4000 yards, and were only under weak fire from the forts. At 2.20 P.M. Admiral Guépratte with the *Suffren* and *Charlemagne* made the second run, going in to 3000 yards.

At 3 P.M. Admiral Carden could assume that the entrance forts were practically silenced, and he signaled the minesweepers with their two covering ships to come in. Of these the *Albion* closed on the south shore, the *Triumph* on the north. There was some desultory firing from the forts, and the *Agamemnon* and *Irresistible* were also engaged. But at 4 P.M. the trawlers were ordered to begin to sweep, under cover of the *Vengeance*, *Albion*, and *Triumph*. The rest of the fleet went back to the Tenedos anchorage for the night.

During that night the trawlers, with an escort of destroyers, had swept for four miles up the Straits, and at 8 A.M. February 26, after they had reported all clear, the *Albion*, *Triumph*, and newly arrived *Majestic* were sent in. These battleships shelled the entrance forts without reply, and shortly before noon the *Albion* and *Majestic* had pushed on to the limit of the swept area and were engaging Fort Dardanos at long range. At this stage the British first realized that the land defenses of the Turks were not restricted to the forts. The Turks had also been able to bring to the defense many mobile howitzers and mortars (6" and 8")¹ and their main reli-

¹ "So that about this time there were in these areas over fifty heavy pieces." — Sir Julian Corbett.

ance was upon this artillery, rather than upon the guns in the fixed batteries. These mobile guns were placed about in the hills, where they were concealed and did not offer a target, and yet their high-angle fire could drop shells into the restricted area of the Straits. It was like the experience with the German guns placed on the Channel Coast. From 3 P.M. on, the *Albion* and *Majestic* were obliged to keep constantly shifting their ground, to avoid serious damage. As it was, the *Majestic* had received a hit below the water line, when Admiral de Robeck signaled the recall at 4 P.M.

On that day, early in the afternoon, demolition parties from the *Vengeance* and *Irresistible* had gone ashore, respectively on the Asiatic and European side, and on the next day Admiral Carden had intended to move in a transport with Marines. But on February 27 the weather was very bad, and nothing was done beyond sending a demolition party ashore from the *Irresistible*.

February 28 was also stormy, and nothing was done. But on March 1, although there was a heavy gale, Admiral de Robeck, who had transferred his flag to the *Irresistible*,¹ sent in the *Albion* and *Triumph* to engage Fort Dardanos again, with the *Ocean* and *Majestic* to look after the mobile guns, while he himself in the flagship watched the entrance forts. But it was the same story as on February 26. The British were unable to keep down the fire of the Turkish mobile guns. "So widely distributed and well concealed were the guns that little could be done with them, and though the *Majestic* moved up till she could use her howitzers, shells came thick from both shores. Under the cross

¹ "As the *Vengeance* had to go to Mudros to attend to her boilers."—Sir Julian Corbett.

fire the ships were constantly being hit, though not seriously. By keeping continuously on the move and circling, they could baffle the enemy's gunlayers, but it was only a waste of ammunition to attempt Dardanos in these circumstances." ¹ Consequently the ships were recalled. On this day another demolition party had landed from the *Irresistible*.

That night there was an additional object lesson of the difficulties of attacking with ships alone. As the trawlers were attempting in the darkness to extend their sweep toward Kephez Point, they were found by a searchlight, and the fact was soon evident that the minefields were well defended by gunfire. The *Ame-thyst* and four destroyers covered the trawlers, and they were able to get away. But they had failed to reach the minefield, and it was shown that they could do nothing with it until after the defending guns were mastered.

March 2 was again stormy, and again Admiral Carden could not bring in the transport with the Marines, but he ordered another attack on Fort Dardanos to be made by the *Canopus*, *Cornwallis*, and *Swiftsure*. The plan of the runs had been changed, as the idea was to take advantage of a strip of water along the European shore, which was dead for the troublesome guns on that side. By hugging this shore, it was thought possible to get within 7000 yards of Fort Dardanos without undue exposure of the ships.

The ships entered the Straits at about 1.30 P.M., the *Canopus* and *Swiftsure* keeping along the European shore, while the *Cornwallis* was to engage the minor batteries. The *Canopus* and *Swiftsure* were able to get into position, and at 2.20 P.M. began a deliberate fire.

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

Fort Dardanos was silent for nearly two hours, but at 4.15 P.M. this battery suddenly opened fire, with such accuracy that the *Canopus* was hit several times with damage. This forced a withdrawal of the British ships, and they were again exposed to the fire of the mobile guns, which compelled them to keep in motion and turning to avoid serious hits. Shortly afterwards the ships were withdrawn.

The British Admiralty's history thus summarized the discouraging results up to this point: "Of the guns at Dardanos only one was seen to be dismantled, and, as with the entrance forts, although the effect of the fire seemed to render the working of the guns impossible, it certainly failed to destroy them. As for the mobile and concealed guns and howitzers on both shores, they proved quite as formidable as on the previous days. While they had done a good deal of minor damage to the ships, they seemed to have suffered little themselves. The minefield defence, moreover, was still intact, and when that night the destroyers and minesweepers attempted once more to attack the Kephez field, the fire that greeted them was so severe that no progress could be made."

On that day the French Squadron had been making a diversion in the Gulf of Xeros. On the following day (March 3) the weather was thick and stormy. A demolition party was landed, and in the afternoon, as visibility improved, the *Prince George* attempted another bombardment of Dardanos. But this ship also came under the fire of the Turkish howitzers, and was recalled.

All of these failures meant that no progress was being made against the minefields and the defending guns.

As to the mobile Turkish guns, "the inability of the seaplanes to observe and report during bombardment proved that the work would be of indefinite duration if proceeded with by ships alone. More obviously than ever troops were required, not only to make good what the fleet had won, but also to give it the eyes it needed."¹

The British naval history has given the following reason for the lack of troops to cooperate at this stage: "Although by this time it was apparent that observation of ship fire and location of concealed batteries would be the crux of the situation, in Lord Kitchener's instructions to General Birdwood there was no suggestion of using the troops to overcome the difficulty. . . . Lord Kitchener did, however, authorize him, if it could be done without compromising the troops, to employ part of his force 'to secure hold of forts or positions already won and dominated by ship fire.' Under the latter authority General Birdwood would probably have felt justified in suggesting the occupation of Achi Baba had its cardinal importance been clearly brought to his notice. As it was, in the appreciation of the previous day (March 3) after the conference with Admiral Carden, the point was entirely missed."²

On March 4 the weather had become favorable, and Admiral Carden was enabled to bring in the transport with Marines for landing — but it must be understood that these Marines could only act as cover for demolition parties, as they were not a force sufficient to seize

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² "But there is no evidence that it was seriously considered. History is filled with cases in which councils of war were unable to reach a sound and quick conclusion simply from failure to state with perfect lucidity and precision what the problem was they had to solve. This would seem to be another case in point." — *Ibid.*

and occupy positions ashore. Landings were made on both the north and south sides, near Sedd el Bahr and Kum Kale. At both points the detachments got ashore without opposition, covered by the guns of the fleet — but, in each case, the British were afterwards repulsed by Turkish snipers, and had to withdraw without accomplishing their objects. In regard to these setbacks the British naval history should also be quoted: “What seemed a favorable moment had therefore been seized, but, as the experience of the day proved, the time had gone for using so small a force. It was precisely the same that had been fixed when the landing was first projected, but the delay had told. The Germans had time to whip the Turks into facing the ships, and they had met with a distinct success, which lent itself to being worked up into an inspiring victory. The moral effect could not fail to be serious, and it was becoming more evident that without a strong force of troops there was little likelihood of the fleet being able to do even the preliminary work of forcing the Straits.”

It was a part of the tragedy of failure in the Dardanelles operation that, at this stage, there was for the officers on the spot only the gradual beginning of a realization of the new strength of the Turkish defense, and for the officials at home there was a first mistaken glamour of success, because the fleet was inside the entrance of the Straits. On the surface, the very fact that the Allied warships had forced the entrance of the Dardanelles, was taken to mean that the attack by the fleet alone was on its way to success. The real situation, that getting inside the entrance had only meant encountering the new Turkish defenses of mobile guns and well-defended minefields, was not understood at home, and,

in the absence of any real note of alarm by a professional appreciation of this situation,¹ sanguine plans were actually being made for operations *after* the Straits had been forced, instead of plans to fill the crying need for troops to coöperate with the fleet. In other words, an army was being gathered to operate against Constantinople and with the Russians on the Danube, instead of providing an army to advance with the fleet.

In the words of the British naval historian, "The fleet was left to do the best it could alone, and the troops on the spot remained in inactivity, serving no purpose by their presence beyond that of giving the Germans a further pretext for spurring the Turks to energetic work on the defence of the peninsula. So for the next fortnight the operations were purely naval. So far from any endeavor to seize an observing station, not even the arrested work of demolition was renewed. From now onward attention was entirely concentrated on the work which would finally determine how far it was possible for the fleet to go without assistance."

"On March 5 the bombardment of the inner defences was to begin, and for the first time the *Queen Elizabeth* was to fill the leading part, and prove whether she could do to them what the German heavy howitzers had done to the forts of Antwerp and Namur."²

This trial of the *Queen Elizabeth* exposed the fallacy of one of the arguments for a purely naval attack. For

¹ For the conduct of affairs, in this situation, neither the Admiralty nor the War Office can shift the responsibility. It is only necessary to repeat the same comment that was made by the Commission's Report as to the general plan (which has been quoted): "If either Lord Kitchener or Lord Fisher had expressed, on technical grounds, strong objections" the unsound plan would not have been carried out.

² Sir Julian Corbett.

indirect fire, the radical difference was shown between the problem for heavy ships' guns on a sea surface, and for heavy shore guns securely established in a position with a map relation to their target. The failure of the *Queen Elizabeth's* indirect fire was unmistakable.

A position had been swept clear for her, on the west side of the peninsula southwest of Gaba Tepe, where she could anchor and fire over the peninsula at the works on the Straits. Seaplanes were to spot for her, as well as three warships in the Straits. The seaplanes were inefficient. Two had to come down, and the other was only at hand when the light had gone. Consequently the spotting had to be done by the ships in the Straits, and they were obliged to keep moving all the time to avoid hits by the mobile guns, which were firing upon them. The *Queen Elizabeth* was herself hit several times by these guns. Under these conditions, she could not accomplish results.

The next day (March 6) the *Queen Elizabeth* tried again, with a single ship spotting. But again she could accomplish nothing. She was forced to shift her berth twice, because the hidden Turkish howitzers had her under heavy fire, and her spotting ship *Albion* was also greatly interfered with by these mobile guns. Admiral Carden, inside the Straits, had in addition bombarded the defenses in hopes of preparing the way for the trawlers to attack the Kephez minefields. But that night the Turkish defending guns were again ready with so hot a fire that the trawlers had to retire without doing anything.

After these successive failures, Admiral Carden was urged to bring the *Queen Elizabeth* inside the entrance, to use her heavy guns in direct fire. But first, on March 7,

he tried an attack on the Narrows with the *Agamemnon* and *Lord Nelson* covered by the French Squadron. These two British ships made runs inside against the Narrows forts, while the French ships were used against the Turkish howitzers. But the *Agamemnon* was hit eight times by heavy shell, the *Lord Nelson* seven times, and their attack did not win success. On the same day the Russian fleet had bombarded the Turkish coal ports on the Black Sea.

Of this day's result, the British naval history stated: "It was obvious that the periodical silence of the forts meant, not that they had been put out of action, but that the gunners took shelter ready to return to the guns as occasion offered. Heavier shell was required to wreck the forts, and Admiral Carden, putting aside all hesitation about using the *Queen Elizabeth* inside, ordered her to conduct a direct bombardment next day (March 8)." The new dreadnought was safeguarded in every way. Four British battleships were told off to cover her, two on each side, to engage the mobile Turkish guns which had been giving so much trouble to bombarding ships.

"Still hope ran high. The instructions to be ready for closing, no less than the fact that all five of the principal forts in the Narrows were indicated as objectives, show that much was expected from the risk that was to be taken, and Admiral Carden himself took charge with his flag in the *Queen Elizabeth*. But again there was a tale of disappointment. . . ." ¹ Visibility was bad. Spotting from the ships was impossible. The clouds were so low that the seaplanes could not spot the shots. "Till 3.30 the Admiral persevered, and then, as the

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

light was growing worse, the ships were withdrawn with nothing done.”¹

“So for a time, with deep disappointments, the attack on the Narrows came to an end. Three weeks had now gone by — three out of the four which Admiral Carden had originally estimated the whole operation would take — and the second phase seemed no nearer completion.”²

There had been a diversion against Smyrna by a detachment of two battleships, *Triumph*, *Swiftsure*, the *Euryalus*, and afterwards the Russian cruiser *Askold*, with minesweepers, under Admiral Peirse. The forts had been bombarded for four days without much result,³ and the affair had become a matter of negotiation with the Vali of Smyrna. At the Dardanelles Admiral Carden had given up attacks on the Narrows forts, and was attempting to do away with the minefields which prevented the ships from getting close enough to the forts.⁴ For three nights (March 9, 10, 11) attempts were made upon the minefields, but all were without success.⁵

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² Ibid.

³ “The experience, in fact, was exactly the same as at the Dardanelles.” — Ibid.

⁴ “It was no longer a question of whether ships could destroy forts, but of how they could get close enough to do it in the face of minefields protected by mobile guns.” — Ibid.

⁵ “Next night (March 11) the same plan was tried again with the 1st group of trawlers, but the results were more discouraging than ever.” — Ibid.

CHAPTER XVII

THE DARDANELLES. FINAL DEFEAT OF NAVAL ATTACKS

(See Map at page 284.)

THE Report of the Dardanelles Commission has given the following exchange of telegrams.

On March 11th the First Lord sent the following telegram to the Admiral: — (No. 101) “Personal and Secret. Caution and deliberate methods were emphasized in your original instructions, and the skill and patience which has enabled your progress to be carried thus far without loss are highly appreciated.”

“If, however, success cannot be obtained without loss of ships and men, results to be gained are important enough to justify such a loss. The whole operation may be decided and consequences of a decisive character upon the war may be produced by the turning of the corner Chanak; and we suggest for your consideration that a point has now been reached when it is necessary to choose favorable weather conditions to overwhelm forts of the Narrows at decisive range and bringing to bear upon them the fire of the largest possible number of guns, great and small. Under cover of this fire landing parties might destroy the guns of the forts, and sweeping operations to clear as much as possible of the minefields might also be carried out.”

“It might be necessary to repeat the operation until the destruction of all the forts at the Narrows and the clearing of the approaches of mines has been accomplished.”

“We have no wish to hurry you or urge you beyond your judgment, but we recognize clearly that at a certain period in your operations you will have to press hard for a decision and we desire to know whether, in your opinion, that period has now arrived. Every well-conceived action for forcing a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive our support.”

“Before you take any decisive departure from the present policy we wish to hear your views.”

13 March. From First Lord to Vice Admiral Eastern Mediterranean:—¹

“From the above it is evident that methodical and resolute conduct of the operations by night and day should be pursued, the inevitable losses being accepted. The enemy is harassed and anxious now. Interference with submarines will be a very serious complication. Time is of the essence.”

13 March. From Vice Admiral Eastern Mediterranean, to Admiralty:—

“Your 101 is fully concurred in by me. I consider stage when vigorous sustained action is necessary for success has now been reached. I am of the opinion that in order to ensure my communication line immediately fleet enters Sea of Marmora military operations on a large scale should be opened at once.”

From the above telegrams it will be evident that during the attack only demolition parties were to be used for landing, and it was understood that the “military operations on a large scale” were to be undertaken only *after* Admiral Carden’s fleet had entered the Sea of Mar-

¹ This supplementary telegram is quoted in Mr. Roch’s Mem., Report, Dardanelles Commission.

mora. The military force was, by this time, an assured factor,¹ and on March 12 Sir Ian Hamilton had been appointed to command it.² But its employment was to follow, not to assist, the naval operation. Therefore, it must be kept in mind that this ensuing attack was an attempt by the fleet alone to push through the Narrows into the Sea of Marmora.

On the night of March 14 Admiral Carden made "a final attempt on the minefield"³ in the dark hours. "As the Admiral reported, it was a very gallant enterprise, admirably conducted by all concerned, but in his opinion it proved that the defence of the minefields was so well organized that effective sweeping by night was impossible, and there was nothing for it but to proceed with his whole force by daylight on the lines he had already indicated to the Admiralty. He was still confident he could get through, and his message concluded with a request for fleet-sweepers to accompany the fleet when it entered the Sea of Marmora."⁴

The comment of the Admiralty's historian was:

¹ "At a meeting on March 10th, Lord Kitchener announced to the War Council that the 'approximate strength of the forces available against Constantinople' would be as follows:

Naval Division.....	11,000
Australasian Infantry.....	30,600
Australasian Mounted Troops.....	3,500
29th Division.....	18,000
French Division.....	18,000
Russian Army Corps.....	47,600
	128,700

It should be noted that the despatch of the Russian Corps referred to above was to follow and be contingent upon our obtaining access to Constantinople through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora." — Report, Dardanelles Commission.

² "On March 12, Sir Ian Hamilton was appointed to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force." — Ibid.

³ Sir Julian Corbett.

⁴ Ibid.

“Now, therefore, was the time to strike, before the enemy could receive fresh supplies of ammunition or submarines interfere. To make good the losses he must sustain, the last two ships of the Channel Fleet, *Queen* and *Implacable*, had been ordered to join him, under Rear Admiral Thursby. He was also informed that General Sir Ian Hamilton, who had been appointed to command the troops, would be with him on the 16th.”

The following is from the Report of the Dardanelles Commission:

“On March 16th, Admiral Carden was obliged to resign his command for reasons wholly based on the state of his health.”

“On March 17th, the First Lord sent the following telegram to Vice Admiral de Robeck:

““Secret and Personal. I am conferring upon you the command of the Mediterranean Detached Fleet, with fullest confidence in your ability. In doing so I presume that you fully agree with Admiralty telegrams 101 and 109 and your predecessor’s replies thereto, and that in your independent and separate judgment the immediate operations proposed are practicable. Do not hesitate to say if you think otherwise. If you agree, the operations should be carried out without delay and without further reference at the first opportunity. You work in closest harmony with General Hamilton.””

“On the same day (March 17th) Admiral de Robeck replied: ‘Personal and Secret. I am very grateful for your telegram. Telegrams mentioned by you meet with my full concurrence.’”

““Weather permitting, I will proceed with operations tomorrow.’”

““I am convinced that success depends on our ability to clear the minefields for forcing Narrows. To do this

successfully the forts must be silenced while sweeping operations are in progress.’”

“‘I have had today an entirely satisfactory interview with Generals Hamilton and d’Amade and Admiral Wemyss on my flagship.’”¹

On March 18, 1915, the great attack was made by the Allied Fleet. The day was clear, without wind, giving perfect conditions for the effort. At an early hour the British minesweepers had reported all clear to within 8000 yards of the Narrows forts, and “at 8.15 the signal to carry on was flying from the flagship.”² Admiral de Robeck’s flag was on the *Queen Elizabeth*, and his fleet had been reorganized in three divisions as shown in the accompanying table.³

¹ That naval officers by profession should have approved this purely naval attack was explained by the following state of mind, which was prevalent at the time: “What was in our minds was that we would have got straight through to Constantinople, and it was generally anticipated that the arrival of the Fleet there would be the end of the ruling powers in Turkey. That was what we were always given to understand — that there would have been a revolution in Constantinople if we had arrived there with the Fleet.” (Testimony of Admiral de Robeck before Dardanelles Commission.)

² Sir Julian Corbett.

³ FIRST DIVISION

1st Sub-Division
Queen Elizabeth
Inflexible

2d Sub-Division
Agamemnon
Lord Nelson

SECOND DIVISION

3d Sub-Division
Ocean
Irresistible
Albion
Vengeance

4th Sub-Division
Swiftsure
Majestic

5th Sub-Division
Canopus
Cornwallis

THIRD DIVISION

6th Sub-Division
Suffren
Bouvet
Gaulois
Charlemagne

7th Sub-Division
Triumph
Prince George

In the scheme of attack, the four battleships of the First Division were to take station in line abreast ("known as Line A") 14,000 yards from the Narrows, *Queen Elizabeth* (flag) left wing ship, with *Agamemnon*, *Lord Nelson*, *Inflexible*, in order as named. These ships were to "engage the principal forts on both sides (that is Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20) and carry on the long-range bombardment."¹ The second line (known as Line B) consisted of the four French battleships of the Third Division, which were to pass through the intervals and advance up to the limit of the swept area, with the two British ships of the Third Division, *Prince George* and *Triumph*, in supporting positions on each flank. After four hours, the Third Division was to be relieved by six ships of the Second Division.² An armed picket boat was to attend each battleship to guard against floating mines.

"By these arrangements it was hoped that sweeping could begin two hours after the bombardment commenced. The trawlers were then to be ready to clear a passage 900 yards broad past Kephez Point into Sari Sighlar Bay, and as the work proceeded the advanced line would move on into the bay and endeavor to complete the destruction of the forts at decisive range. Finally, by the way of diversion, and as a means of distracting the attention of the mobile guns on the European side, the Naval Division, with seven transports, was to make a demonstration on the western side of the peninsula."³

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² The six battleships of the 3 and 4 Sub-Divisions, the 5 Sub-Division (*Canopus* and *Cornwallis*) having been reserved to support minesweepers during the night.

³ Sir Julian Corbett,

Shortly before 10.00 A.M. the fleet approached the entrance. At 10.30 A.M. the *Agamemnon* led in the First Division, with destroyers sweeping ahead and the *Prince George* and *Triumph* on either beam. As these Line A ships moved into position, the Turkish howitzers began to annoy them, but they were disposed as assigned and opened fire at about 11.30 A.M. "At 12.6 enough seemed to have been done for Admiral de Robeck to signal the French division to pass through the British line and begin closer work."¹

But, in the next hour, the fire of the concealed Turkish howitzers had grown effective against the British Line A ships. The *Agamemnon* had been hit twelve times, with so much structural damage that she was obliged to turn 32 points to throw out the range. The *Inflexible* was so much damaged that she was obliged to fall out of line with her forebridge on fire. The four French ships, after passing in, had come under heavy fire. And, although the gunfire of the eight battleships had seemed damaging enough for Admiral de Robeck to call up the minesweepers at 1.45 P.M., yet the French battleships had also suffered damage. The *Gaulois* had been so badly holed forward that Admiral Guépratte had called to the *Dublin* to come inside and stand by her.

Consequently the fresh Second Division of British battleships was ordered in to relieve the French battleships, and shortly before 2 P.M. the French ships were coming out. The *Gaulois*, with a list and down by the bow, was unfit for further action.² As the *Bouvet* was about to pass the British Line A ships, there was a sudden explosion and the French battleship turned turtle, sinking so quickly that only about a score of her com-

¹ Sir Julian Corbett.

² The *Gaulois* had to be beached to save her.

pany could be saved by the destroyers and picket boats, which rushed to the spot. She had struck a mine, one of a number which the Turks had managed to lay in Eren Keui Bay.¹

The British battleships of the Second Division had passed in, to replace the French ships, in the following alignment from right to left, *Ocean*, *Albion*, *Irresistible*, *Vengeance*, with the *Swiftsure* and *Majestic*, as supports, replacing the *Triumph* and *Prince George* on the right and left respectively. These British battleships opened fire at 2.39 P.M., with the range at 12,000 yards, closing gradually to 10,000 yards. "Though the forts ceased firing from time to time, it was evident that they were not really out of action and obviously the projected attack on the minefield could not yet take place."²

The *Irresistible* had taken a list at 3.32 P.M., "and as the enemy's fire did not slacken the Admiral signalled the advanced line to open out the range."³ But, in spite of the efforts of the sweepers, the Turkish mines became a factor that brought about the decisive defeat of the fleet. Shortly after 4 P.M. the *Inflexible*, which had come back to her Line A position, struck a mine which put her out of action, with a heavy list and down by the head. "She at once made for Tenedos, but it was doubtful whether she could reach it."⁴ At about 4.15 P.M. the *Irresistible*, which had opened out the range and was drifting with engines stopped, also struck a mine. This battleship was at once disabled, her engines useless, and she was down by the stern. Her crew was taken off, and she was left adrift in a sinking condition.

¹ "They had been deliberately placed in our usual manœuvring ground, and, in spite of all of our precautions, they had achieved a staggering success." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

Efforts had been made to save her, and the *Ocean* had stood by her to attempt to tow her out. But, shortly after 5.50 P.M., this was found to be impossible under the galling fire, and the Admiral hoisted the "General Recall."¹ Shortly afterwards, the *Ocean*, as she was coming out, shared the same fate by striking a mine. This blow was at once followed by a heavy hit from a shell, and the ship was flooded to such an extent that she had a list of 15°. This British battleship also had to be abandoned, and left adrift. Both the *Irresistible* and the *Ocean* sank within the Straits in the darkness that night.

Outside of the sinking of the three battleships *Bouvet*, *Irresistible*, and *Ocean*, the *Inflexible*, *Suffren*, and *Gaulois* were so damaged that they had to be docked and repaired before they could be of any further service. In addition, "the *Charlemagne* had her stokehold flooded; the *Agamemnon* had one 12 inch gun damaged. The *Lord Nelson* had one 9.2 inch gun put out of action; the *Albion's* fore-turret was put out of action for several days."² These were heavy losses for the sixteen attacking capital ships.³

Admiral de Robeck had reported: "Squadron is ready for immediate action except as regards ships lost and damaged, but it is necessary to reconsider the plan of attack. A method of dealing with floating mines must be found."

¹ "It was clear, in view of the unexpected danger, and the losses sustained, that battleships could not be left inside the Straits after dark to cover the minesweepers, so that all idea of clearing the Kephez minefield that night had to be abandoned." — Sir Julian Corbett.

² Report, Dardanelles Commission.

³ *Canopus* and *Cornwallis* were not used, because, as explained, they were held in reserve to cover the intended attempts on the minefields.

“News of these events reached the Admiralty on the following day.”

“Lord Fisher and Sir A. Wilson, when consulted by Mr. Churchill, were determined to continue the attack.”

“Lord Fisher immediately ordered two battleships, the *London* and the *Prince of Wales*, to reinforce the fleet in addition to the *Queen* and *Implacable*.”

“On the same day the War Council authorized ‘the First Lord of the Admiralty to inform Vice-Admiral de Robeck that he could continue the naval operations against the Dardanelles if he thought fit.’”¹

“On March 23d, however, Admiral de Robeck changed his views.”² He had been in council with Generals Hamilton and Birdwood.

“Admiral de Robeck told us at this Conference it was apparent to him that an army was necessary to keep his lines of communication and that to effect this it was ‘necessary to hold the Peninsula.’”

“While ready to continue the action he therefore telegraphed that day to the Admiralty his opinion that ‘a decisive operation about the middle of next month appears to me better than to take great risks for what may well be only half measures.’”³

Upon receiving this, Mr. Churchill, who was in favor of renewing the naval attacks, brought the matter to a discussion in the Admiralty. “The First Sea Lord, however, did not agree; nor did Sir A. Wilson. Nor did Sir Henry Jackson. Lord Fisher took the line that hitherto he had been willing to carry the enterprise forward, because it was supported and recommended by

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission (Mem. of Mr. Roeh).

² Report, Dardanelles Commission.

³ Report, Dardanelles Commission (Mem. of Mr. Roch).

the Commander on the spot. But now that Admiral de Robeck and Sir Ian Hamilton had decided upon a joint operation, we were bound to accept their view.”¹

As a result, “On March 23, owing to representations made by Admiral de Robeck and Sir Ian Hamilton, it was decided to postpone further operations until adequate military forces could be assembled. The idea of making a purely naval attack was definitely abandoned.”²

The account which has been given of the progress of events at the Dardanelles cannot leave any doubts as to the faults in planning and carrying out this project. All that has been said of the strategic value of the capture of the Dardanelles³ must be kept in mind, to appreciate the complete failure to rise to the occasion. The words of Admiral Tirpitz summed up the case: “Should the Dardanelles fall, then the World War has been decided against us.”⁴

Here was a splendid opportunity for surprise, and yet the successive nibbles of the ill conceived attacks not only threw away this factor of surprise, which should be an essential part of any such operation, but also served successive notices in advance to the Turks for the preparation of defenses.

From the first, there was a fundamental need of a joint operation with troops and ships. All the reader has to do is to ask two questions. Even if the fleet had penetrated the Dardanelles, how could it have maintained itself there without a military force? And, as this mili-

¹ Report, Dardanelles Commission (Mem. of Mr. Roch).

² Report, Dardanelles Commission.

³ “The incalculable profit to be achieved.”—Lord Esher: “The Tragedy of Kithener.”


⁴ “My Memoirs.”

VIII. THE DARDANELLES

(This map is diagrammatic only)

- (A) Allied Naval Base.
- (B) Position of Fleet in preliminary bombardments against outer defenses at (1) and (2).
- (C) Position of Fleet in later and final bombardments against inner defenses at (3) and (4).
- (1) Outer defenses at Cape Helles and Sedd el Bahr mounting eight guns of 9.4" to 11" caliber.
- (2) Outer defenses at Kum Kale and Orkanie mounting eight guns of 9.4" to 11" caliber.
- (3) Inner defenses at Derma Burnu, Namazieli, Hamidieh II, and Rumili, mounting two 14" guns and twenty five guns from 9.4" to 11" caliber.
- (4) Inner defenses at Nagdra, Anodolu, Medjidieh, Chem-enlik, and Hamidieh I, mounting four 14" guns and twenty four guns of from 9.4" to 11" caliber.

NOTE: In addition to the above, there were the intermediate defenses, including Fort Dardanos on the Asiatic side, and these mounted many lighter guns. The Turks also made effective use of mobile high angle fire howitzers which were in concealed positions among the hills.





tary force was necessary, why not have it ready to cooperate in the attack? The vacillating failure to fix upon this needful coöperation of troops and ships has been put in a strong light by the demonstrated availability of troops for the Salonica project and after the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal had failed.

The campaign which followed at the Dardanelles was of a character totally different from the naval operations which have been described, and it belonged to an equally different period of the World War. On the sea as well as on land, the course of the war was being cast in the mold that produced the long drawn struggle of years of exhausting effort. On the sea, the Germans had begun their first attempt to change the whole character of naval warfare by the use of the submarine, to wear down the sea power of the Entente Allies. On land, the Allies were to pour their offensive forces into trench warfare, of which Gallipoli became a part. The naval history of this new phase of the World War will be given in the following volume of this work.



APPENDICES

Ships		Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Africa</i> ,	3d Battle Squadron.	Battleship	1905	16,350	18.9	4-12"; 4-9.2"; 10-6"
<i>Britannia</i> ,	" "	"	1906	16,350	18.7	4-12"; 4-9.2"; 10-6"
<i>Commonwealth</i> ,	" "	"	1905	16,350	19.0	4-12"; 4-9.2"; 10-6"
<i>Dominion</i> ,	" "	"	1905	16,350	19.3	4-12"; 4-9.2"; 10-6"
<i>Hindustan</i> ,	" "	"	1905	16,350	19.0	4-12"; 4-9.2"; 10-6"
<i>Zealandia</i> ,	" "	"	1905	16,350	18.6	4-12"; 4-9.2"; 10-6"
<i>Blanche</i> , Attached to Squadron 3.		Light Cruiser	1910	3,350	26.1	10-4" (2 torpedo tubes)
<i>Dreadnought</i> (Flag), 4th Battle Squadron.		Battleship	1906	17,900	22.4	10-12"
<i>Bellerophon</i> ,	" "	"	1909	18,600	22.1	10-12"; 16-4"
<i>Tenacity</i> ,	" "	"	1909	18,600	22.7	10-12"; 16-4"
<i>Agincourt</i> ,	" "	"	1914	27,500	22.0	14-12"; 20-6"
<i>Blonde</i> , Attached to Squadron 4.		Light Cruiser	1911	3,350	25.0	10-4" (2 torpedo tubes)
<i>Lion</i> (Flag), 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.		Battle Cruiser	1912	26,350	31.7	8-13.5"; 16-4"
<i>Princess Royal</i> ,	" "	"	1912	26,350	32.4	8-13.5"; 16-4"
<i>Queen Mary</i> ,	" "	"	1914 May	26,350	33.0	8-13.5"; 16-4"
<i>New Zealand</i> ,	" "	"	1912	18,890	26.4	8-12"; 16-4"
<i>Shannon</i> (Flag), 2d Cruiser Squadron.		Cruiser	1908	14,600	21.5	4-9.2"; 10-7.5"
<i>Achilles</i> ,	" "	"	1907	13,550	23.0	6-9.2"; 4-7.5"
<i>Cochrane</i> ,	" "	"	1907	13,550	22.8	6-9.2"; 4-7.5"
<i>Natal</i> ,	" "	"	1907	13,550	23.1	4-7.5"; 6-6"
<i>Antrim</i> (Flag), 3d Cruiser Squadron.		"	1905	10,850	23.2	4-7.5"; 6-6"
<i>Argyll</i> ,	" "	"	1905	10,850	21.7	4-7.5"; 6-6"
<i>Devonshire</i> ,	" "	"	1905	10,850	23.1	4-7.5"; 6-6"
<i>Roxburgh</i> ,	" "	"	1905	10,850	23.6	4-7.5"; 6-6"
<i>Southampton</i> (Flag), 1st Light Cruiser Squad.		Light Cruiser	1912	5,400	26.0	8-6"
<i>Birmingham</i> ,	" "	"	1914	5,400	25.5	9-6"
<i>Nottingham</i> ,	" "	"	1914	5,400	24.7	9-6"
<i>Lowesoft</i> ,	" "	"	1914	5,400	25.6	9-6"
<i>Amethyst</i> , Commodore of Flotillas.		"	1904	3,000	20.0	12-4"

BRITISH GRAND FLEET — (Continued)

SECOND DESTROYER FLOTILLA

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
20 H Class.....	Destroyer	Program 1909-10	800	27.0	2-4"; 2-21" torpedo tubes
<i>Active</i> , Flotilla Cruiser.....	Cruiser	1912	3,440	25.0	10-4"
<i>Blake</i> , Depot Ship.....	"	1889	9,000	21.0 designed	. . .

FOURTH DESTROYER FLOTILLA

20 K Class.....	Destroyer	Program 1912	950	30-32	3-4"; 4-21" torpedo tubes (in pairs)
<i>Swift</i> , Flotilla Cruiser.....	Cruiser	1908	1,825	36.0	4-4"; 2-18" torpedo tubes (in pairs)
<i>Hecla</i> , Depot Ship.....	"	1878	6,400	12.0 designed	6-4"
6 Minesweeping Boats: <i>Circe</i> , etc.	Gunboat	Program 1890-92	800	19.0 designed	2-4.7"
8 D Class.....	Submarine	Program 1910-12	600	16.0	3 torpedo tubes
9 E Class.....	"		800	16.0	4 " "

HARWICH FORCE — (Continued)

Ships		Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Drake</i> ,	6th Cruiser Squadron	Light Cruiser	1902	14,100	24.6	2-9.2"; 16-6"
<i>Good Hope</i> ,	" "	"	1902	14,100	23.5	2-9.2"; 16-6"
<i>King Alfred</i> ,	" "	"	1903	14,100	24.8	2-9.2"; 16-6"
<i>Leviathan</i> ,	" "	"	1903	14,100	23.7	2-9.2"; 16-6"
7 Minelayers: <i>Thetis</i> , <i>Apollo</i> , etc.		Cruiser	1891	3,400-3,600	18.5	6-6 pdr.
20 I Class,	1st Flotilla	Destroyer	Program 1910-11	750-780	28-30	2-4"; 2-21" torpedo tubes
<i>Fearless</i> , Cruiser,	" "	Cruiser	1913	3,440	25.0	10-4"
<i>Woodrich</i> , Depot Ship,	" "	"	1912	3,380	13.2	4-4"
15 L Class,	3d Flotilla	Destroyer	Program 1912-13	800	35.0	3-4"; 4-21" torpedo tubes (in pairs)
<i>Amphion</i> , Cruiser,	" "	Cruiser	1912	3,440	25.0	10-4"
<i>Dido</i> , Depot Ship,	" "	"	1895	5,600	18.0	11-6"
Sixth Flotilla at Portsmouth		Cruisers 3 (Flotilla)	Destroyers	Torpedo-Boat Destroyers 23 (old type)	Torpedo Boats
Seventh " at Devonport.		1 "	21		12
Eighth " at Chatham.		1 "	13		11
Ninth " " "		2 "	16		..

Ships		Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Caesar</i> ,	7th Battle Squadron.....	Battleship	1897	14,900	17.0	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Hannibal</i> ,	" "	"	1897	14,900	16.2	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Illustrious</i> ,	" "	"	1898	14,900	16.1	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Magnificent</i> ,	" "	"	1895	14,900	15.9	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Majestic</i> ,	" "	"	1895	14,900	16.8	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Mars</i> ,	" "	"	1897	14,900	16.6	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Prince George</i> ,	" "	"	1896	14,900	17.0	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Victorious</i> ,	" "	"	1897	14,900	16.4	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Sapphire</i> ,	Attached to 7th Squadron.....	Light Cruiser	1905	3,000	22.0	12-4"
<i>Albion</i> ,	8th Battle Squadron.....	Battleship	1902	12,950	18.0	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Canopus</i> ,	" "	"	1900	12,950	16.5	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Glory</i> ,	" "	"	1901	12,950	17.6	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Goliath</i> ,	" "	"	1900	12,950	16.5	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Ocean</i> ,	" "	"	1900	12,950	17.8	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Jupiter</i> ,	" "	"	1897	14,900	17.0	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Proserpine</i> ,	Attached to 8th Squadron.....	Light Cruiser	1899	2,135	17.0	8-4"
Seventh Cruiser Squadron	(6) Aboukir Class...	Cruiser	1901-1903	12,060	17-20	2-9.2"; 12-6"
Ninth	(2) Donegal Class...	"	1903	9,800	24.0	14-6"
"	(3) Amphitrite Class	"	1899-1900	11,000	17-19	16-6"
"	(3) Challenger Class	"	1900-1905	6,000	19.0	two had 11-6"; one, 10-6"
Tenth	(2) Crescent Class...	"	1891-1892	7,700	18.0	1-9.2"; 12-6"
"	(6) Gibraltar Class	"	1890-1892	7,950	18.0	2-9.2"; 10-6"
Eleventh	(5) Doris Class.....	"	Program	5,600	19.5	11.6"
"	"	"	1894		designed	
Twelfth	(3) Diana Class....	"	Program	5,600	19.5	11-6"
"	"	"	1894		designed	
<i>Charlydis</i>		"	Program	4,360	19.5	2-6"; 8-4.7"
"		"	1893		designed	

GERMAN HIGH SEA FLEET — AUGUST 1914

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed (Max.)	Armament
<i>Friedrich der Grosse</i> (Fleet Flagship)	Battleship	1913	24,700	23.8	Cal. 10-12", 50; 14-5.9", 50
<i>First Battle Squadron</i>					
<i>Ostfriesland</i> (Flag)	"	1911	22,800	21.4	12-12", 50; 14-5.9", 45
<i>Thuringen</i> , 1st Division	"	1911	22,800	21.2	12-12", 50; 14-5.9", 45
<i>Holgoland</i> , "	"	1911	22,800	22.0	12-12", 50; 14-5.9", 45
<i>Oldenburg</i> , "	"	1912	22,800	22.2	12-12", 50; 14-5.9", 45
<i>Posen</i> (2d Flag)					
<i>Rheinland</i> , 2d Division	"	1910	18,900	21.4	12-11", 45; 12-5.9", 45
<i>Nassau</i> , "	"	1910	18,900	20.3	12-11", 45; 12-5.9", 45
<i>Westfalen</i> , "	"	1909	18,900	20.8	12-11", 45; 12-5.9", 45
	"	1909	18,900	20.4	12-11", 45; 12-5.9", 45
<i>Second Battle Squadron</i>					
<i>Preussen</i> (Flag)	"	1905	13,200	18.7	4-11", 40; 14-6.7", 40
<i>Schlesien</i> , 3d Division	"	1908	13,200	19.0	4-11", 40; 14-6.7", 40
<i>Hessen</i> , "	"	1905	13,200	18.2	4-11", 40; 14-6.7", 40
<i>Lothringen</i> , "	"	1906	13,200	18.5	4-11", 40; 14-6.7", 40
<i>Hannover</i> (2d Flag)					
<i>Schleswig-Holstein</i> , 4th Division	"	1907	13,200	19.1	4-11", 40; 14-6.7", 40
<i>Pommern</i> , "	"	1908	13,200	19.0	4-11", 40; 14-6.7", 40
<i>Deutschland</i> , "	"	1907	13,200	19.2	4-11", 40; 14-6.7", 40
	"	1906	13,200	18.9	4-11", 40; 14-6.7", 40
<i>Elsass</i> , Reserve Ship					
<i>Braunschweig</i> , "	"	1904	13,200	18.6	4-11", 40; 14-6.7", 40
	"	1904	13,200	18.1	4-11", 40; 14-6.7", 40

Ships		Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed (Max.)	Armament
<i>Kaiser</i> ,	5th Div., 3d Battle Squad.	Battleship	1912	24,700	23.4	Cal. 10-12", 50; 14-5.9", 50
<i>Kaiserin</i> ,	" "	"	1913	24,700	23.3	Cal. 10-12", 50; 14-5.9", 50
<i>König Albert</i> ,	" "	"	1913	24,700	22.1	Cal. 10-12", 50; 14-5.9", 50
<i>Prinzregent (Flag)</i> ,	" "	"	1913	24,700	20.5	Cal. 10-12", 50; 14-5.9", 50
<i>Seydlitz (Flag)</i>	Battle Cruiser	1913	25,000	29.0	10-11", 50; 12-5.9", 45
<i>Moltke</i>	"	1911	23,000	28.4	10-11", 50; 12-5.9", 45
<i>Von der Tann (3d Flag)</i>	"	1910	19,400	28.1	8-11", 45; 10-5.9", 45
<i>Köln (2d Flag)</i>	Light Cruiser	1910	4,350	26.8	12-4.1", 40
<i>Mainz</i>	"	1909	4,350	27.2	12-4.1", 40
<i>Stralsund</i>	"	1912	4,550	28.2	12-4.1", 45
<i>Kolberg</i>	"	1909	4,350	27.2	12-4.1", 40
<i>Rostock</i>	"	1913	4,900	28.0	12-4.1", 45
<i>Strassburg</i>	"	1912	4,550	28.2	12-4.1", 45
<i>Derfflinger</i> ¹	Battle Cruiser	July 1914	26,600	26.5	8-12", 50; 12-5.9", 50

DESTROYERS — GERMAN		Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
11 Destroyers V-187 to 191 incl.	} 1st Flotilla	Destroyer	1911	650	32.5 designed	3-18" } torpedo tubes. Based on Kiel
G-192 to 197 incl.		"	1911	650	32.5 designed	
11 " S-139 to 149 incl.	} 3d "	"	1907	525	30.0 designed	3-18" } torpedo tubes. Based on Kiel
V-162 to 165 incl.		"	1909	620	32.0 designed	
S-166-170 incl. 172-173		"	1909	615-636	32.0 designed	3-18" } torpedo tubes. Based on Kiel

¹ Joined Battle Cruiser at later date.

GERMAN HIGH SEA FLEET — (Continued)

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
11 Destroyers S-115 to 119 incl. G-108 to 113 4th Flotilla	Destroyer	1903-04	420	28.0 designed	3-18" torpedo tubes. Based on Wil- helmshaven
12 " V-1 to 6 incl. G-7 to 12 incl. 5th "	"	1912	650	32.5	5-20" As above
11 " V-151 to 161 incl. 6th "	"	1908	680	30.0	3-18" "
11 " S-14 to 24 incl. 7th "	"	1912	820	32.5	8-20" "
TENDERS					
<i>Hela</i> (No fighting value)	Protected Cruiser	1896	2,040	18.0	—
<i>Blitz</i> and <i>Pfeil</i> (No fighting value)	Gunboat	Program 1892	1,390	15.0	—
SUBMARINES					
7 boats, 1st Flotilla	Submarine	1913-14	800	18/7	4 tubes
7 " 2d "	"	1911-12	650	14/8	4 "
7 " 3d "	"	1908-11	250	13/8	3 "
TENDERS					
<i>Hamburg</i>	Small Cruiser	1904	3,250	23.3	10-4.1"
<i>Stettin</i>	"	1908	3,450	24.0	10-4.1"
<i>Vulcan</i> , School Ship	11.0	— Special dock and Salvage Ship

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Goeben</i>	Battle Cruiser	1911	23,000	28.0	10-11"; 12-6"
<i>Breslau</i>	Light Cruiser	1912	4,550	27.5	12-4.1"

BRITISH FORCES IN MEDITERRANEAN IN AUGUST 1914

<i>Inflexible</i> (Flag), 2d Battle Cruiser Squadron ..	Battle Cruiser	1908	17,250	28.4	8-12"; 16-4"
<i>Indefatigable</i> , " " " "	" "	1912	18,750	29.1	8-12"; 16-4"
<i>Indomitable</i> , " " " "	" "	1908	17,250	28.7	8-12"; 16-4"
<i>Defence</i> (Flag), 1st Cruiser Squadron	Cruiser	1908	14,000	23.0	4-9.2"; 10-7.5"
<i>Black Prince</i> , " " " "	" "	1906	13,550	20.5	6-9.2"; 10-6"
<i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> , " " " "	" "	1905	13,550	23.1	6-9.2"; 10-6"
<i>Warrior</i> , " " " "	" "	1908	13,550	22.9	6-9.2"; 4-7.5"
<i>Chatham</i> , Light Cruiser	Light Cruiser	1912	5,400	25.0	8-6"
<i>Dublin</i> , " " " "	" "	1912	5,400	25.0	8-6"
<i>Gloucester</i> , " " " "	" "	1911	4,800	26.3	2-6"; 10-4"
<i>Weymouth</i> , " " " "	" "	1911	5,250	25.6	8-6"
<i>Hussar</i> , Attached Ship.....	Torpedo Gunb't	1894	1,070	17.0	1-4"; 5 torpedo tubes
<i>Imogene</i> , Attached Ship.....	" "	1882	460	10.0	-----

FIFTH DESTROYER FLOTILLA

<i>Blenheim</i> , Depot Ship.....	Cruiser	1890	9,000	21.0 <small>designed</small>	4-6"
16 G Class.....	Destroyer	1910	860-950	27-28	2 torpedo tubes
16 (6 in reserve).....	Torpedo Boat	Launched 1886-94	60-130	20-23	3 to 5 torpedo tubes
6 Submarines B-6 to B-11 incl. (obsolete).....	Submarine	1905	280	13 ¹ 8 ²	2 torpedo tubes

¹ Above water.

² Below water.

FRENCH FORCES IN MEDITERRANEAN — AUGUST 1914

Ships		Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
	Section of the Comdr- in-Chief					
<i>Courbet</i>	{ Flag Fleet	Battleship	1913	23,467	20.7	12-12"; 22-5.5"
<i>Jean Bart</i>		"	1913	23,467	22.6	12-12"; 22-5.5"
<i>Jurien-de-la-Graviere</i>		Cruiser	1901	5,685	23.0	8-6.4"
<i>Paris</i> ,	1st Battle Squadron	Battleship	1914	23,467	21.6	12-12"; 22-5.5"
<i>France</i> ,		"	1914	23,467	21.0	12-12"; 22-5.5"
<i>Danton</i> ,		"	1911	18,400	20.6	4-12"; 12-9.4"
<i>Mirabeau</i> ,		"	1911	18,400	20.1	4-12"; 12-9.4"
<i>Diderot</i> ,		"	1911	18,400	19.9	4-12"; 12-9.4"
<i>Condorcet</i> ,		"	1911	18,400	19.7	4-12"; 12-9.4"
<i>Vergniaud</i> ,		"	1911	18,400	19.2	4-12"; 12-9.4"
<i>Voltaire</i> ,		"	1911	18,400	20.6	4-12"; 12-9.4"
<i>Democratie</i> ,		2d Battle Squadron	1907	14,900	17.8	4-12"; 10-7.6"
<i>Justice</i> ,		"	1907	14,900	19.4	4-12"; 10-7.6"
<i>Vérité (Flag)</i> ,		"	1908	14,900	19.2	4-12"; 10-7.6"
<i>République</i> ,		"	1906	14,865	17.2	4-12"; 18-6.4"
<i>Patric</i> ,		"	1906	14,865	18.0	4-12"; 18-6.4"
<i>Suffren (Flag)</i> ,		Supplementary Division	1903	12,750	16.0	4-12"; 10-6.4"
<i>Boutet</i> ,		"	1898	12,205	17.0	2-12"; 2-10.8"; 8-5.5"
<i>Gaulois</i> ,		"	1899	11,260	18.2	4-12"; 10-5.5"
<i>St. Louis</i> ,		"	1900	11,260	18.3	4-12"; 10-5.5"
<i>Charlemagne</i> ,	Training Squadron	1899	11,260	18.1	4-12"; 10-5.5"	
<i>Jaureguiberry</i> ,	"	1897	11,900	17.8	2-12"; 2-10.8"; 8-5.5"	
<i>Carnot</i> ,	In normal reserve	1898	12,150	18.0	2-12"; 2-10.8"; 8-5.5"	

FRENCH FORCES IN MEDITERRANEAN — (Continued)

Ships		Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Latouche-Tréville</i> , Special Detail Near East (Crete)		Armored Cruiser	1895	4,750	18.5 designed	2-7.6"; 6-5.5"
<i>Bruix</i> ,	" " "	" "	1897	4,750	18.5 designed	2-7.6"; 6-5.5"
<i>Amiral Charner</i> , Special Reserve		" "	4,750
<i>Friant</i> , Special Detail		Protected Cruiser	1893	3,940	19.0	6-6.4"
<i>Cassard</i> ,	" "	Cruiser	1896	3,950	19.0	6-6.4"
<i>Cosmao</i> ,	" "	"	1889	2,000	20.0	4-5.5"
<i>Casabiancas</i> , Minelayer		Torpedo Gumb't	1895	960	21.5	1-4"
<i>Cassini</i> ,	"	"	1894	1,050	21.5	1-4"
<i>Hache</i> ,	"	"	1906	303	28.0	1-9 pdr.
<i>Massue</i> ,	"	"	1906	303	28.0	1-9 pdr.
<i>Gutchen</i> , Special Reserve		Protected Cruiser	1902	8,277	23.0	2-6.4"; 6-5.5"
<i>Châteaurenault</i> , Special Reserve (Minelayer)		" "	1898	8,000	23.0	2-6.4"; 6-5.5"
<i>D'Entrecasteaux</i> ,	"	"	1898	8,114	18.0	2-9.4"; 12-5.5"
<i>Du Chayla</i> ,	"	"	1898	4,000	18.0	6-6.4"; 4-4"
<i>Surouf</i> ,	"	"	1889	2,000	20.0	4-5.5"
<i>Lavoisier</i> , Normal Reserve		"	1897	2,350	20.0	4-5.5"; 2-4"
<i>Mareau</i> , Torpedo School Ship		Battleship	1887	10,900	4-13.4"; 17-5.5"
<i>Boulier</i> (Flag), 1st Squadron		Destroyer	1908	714	31.0
<i>Dunois</i> (Flag), 2d		Torpedo Gumb't	1897	900	20.0	6-9 pdr.

DESTROYERS 1ST SQUADRON

Ships		Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
6	destroyers	Destroyer	1913	703-734	30	4-18" torpedo tubes
6	"	"	1913-14	750	28-31	4-18" torpedo tubes
11	"	"	1909-10	450	28	2 to 3-18" torpedo tubes
9	"	"	1906-08	335	25-28	3-18" torpedo tubes
32						

DESTROYERS 2D SQUADRON

17	destroyers	Destroyer	1902-08	300-330	25-28	2-18" torpedo tubes
1	"	"	1913	732	35	4-18" "
18						

SUBMARINES 1ST SQUADRON

16	submarines	Submarine	1908	350	11/8	4 to 6 torpedo tubes
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SUBMARINES 2D SQUADRON

15	submarines	Submarines	1908	350	11/8	4 to 6 torpedo tubes
1	"	"	1910	577	15/11	7 torpedo tubes
1	"	"	1911	530	15/10	6 "
17						

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Saida</i>	Light Cruiser	1914	3,500	27.0	9-4.1"
<i>Heligoland</i> , 1st Torpedo Flotilla.....	"	1914	3,500	29.2	9-4.1"
<i>Novara</i>	"	1914	3,500	27.0	9-4.1"
<i>Zenta</i> , In Reserve.....	"	1898	2,300	19.5	8-4.7"
<i>Szigetar</i> , Near East Station.....	"	1901	2,350	20.1	8-4.7"
<i>Kaiser Franz Josef</i> , In Reserve.....	"	1889	4,060	18.0	2-5.9"; 6-5.9"
					Reconstructed 1905-06

DESTROYERS — AUSTRIAN

7 Old Type: <i>Meteor</i> , <i>Blitz</i> , <i>Komet</i> , etc.....	Destroyers	1889-96	350-540	20-21	3 to 4 torpedo tubes
11 Huzzar Class.....	"	1905-10	400	28.0	2-17.7" "
6 Tatra Class.....	"	1911-13	800	32.5	4-20.8" "
2½ Kaiman Class.....	Torpedo Boats	1905-08	200	26.0	2-17.7" "
12 Boats.....	"	1909-10	110	26.0	2-17.7" "
6 ".....	"	1896-99	115	26.0	2-17.7" "
9 ".....	"	1886-92	78	19.0	2-14" "

SUBMARINES

6 — U-1 to U-6 incl.	Submarine	1910	220-236	12/7½ to 10	2 to 3 torpedo tubes
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ITALIAN FLEET — JUNE 1915

Ships		Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Conte di Carour</i> (Fleet Flag)		Battleship	1915 (Jan.)	24,500	22.0 designed	13-12"; 18-4.7"
<i>1st Squadron</i>						
<i>Dante Alighieri</i> , 1st Division		"	1912	20,500	23.0 designed	12-12"; 20-4.7"
<i>Leonardo da Vinci</i> , "		"	1914	22,000	22.5 designed	13-12"; 18.4.7"
<i>Giulio Cesare</i> , "		"	1914	24,500	22.0 designed	13-12"; 19-4.7"
<i>Duilio</i> , Joined " in July		"	1915 (July)	24,500	22.0 designed	13-12"; 16-6"
<i>G. Garibaldi</i> , 3d Division		"	1901	7,400	17.2	1-10"; 2-8"; 14-6"
<i>F. Ferruccio</i> , "		"	1904	7,400	17.9	1-10"; 2-8"; 14-6"
<i>Varese</i> , "		"	1901	7,400	16.8	1-10"; 2-8"; 14-6"
<i>V. Pisani</i> , "		"	1899	6,500	18.0	12-6"; 6-4.7"
<i>2d Squadron</i>			Refit. 1905			
<i>Regina Margherita</i> (Flag)		"	1904	13,427	18.0 designed	4-12"; 4-8"; 12-6"
<i>Regina Elena</i> , 2d Division		"	1907	12,625	21.9	2-12"; 12-8"
<i>Napoli</i> , "		"	1908	12,625	21.0	2-12"; 12-8"
<i>Vittorio Emanuele</i> , "		"	1907	12,625	21.0 designed	2-12"; 12-8"
<i>Roma</i> , "		"	1908	12,625	22.5	2-12"; 12-8"
<i>San Marco</i> , 4th Division		"	1910	11,000	23.0	4-10"; 8-7.5"
<i>Pisa</i> , "		"	1909	10,118	23.1 designed	4-10"; 8-7.5"
<i>San Giorgio</i> , "		"	1910	10,200	22.5	4-10"; 8-7.5"
<i>Analfi</i> , "		"	1909	10,118	23.6	4-10"; 8-7.5"

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>B. Brin</i> , 5th Division	Battleship	1904	13,427	18.0	4-12"; 4-8"; 12-6"
<i>E. Filiberto</i> , "	"	1901	9,800	16.2	4-10"; 8-6"; 8-4.7"
<i>Saint Bon</i> , "	"	1901	9,800	18.0	4-10"; 8-6"; 8-4.7"
<i>Carlo Alberto</i> , "	"	1898	6,500	designed	12-6"; 6-4.7"
<i>Andrea Doria</i>	"	Refit. 1904 1915 (May)	24,500	22.0	13-12"; 16-6"
<i>Marsala</i> , Scouting Division	Scout Cruiser	1913	3,470	28.0	6-4.7"
<i>Città di Palermo</i> , 6th Division	Auxiliary Cruis'r	1910	3,500	designed	2-4.7"
<i>Città di Catania</i> , "	"	1910	3,500	19.0	2-4.7"
<i>Città di Messina</i> , "	"	1910	3,500	19.0	2-4.7"
<i>Città di Siracusa</i> , "	"	1910	3,500	19.0	2-4.7"
<i>Quarto</i> , "	Scout Cruiser	1912	3,300	28.0	6-4.7"
<i>Nino Bixio</i> , "	"	1913	3,470	designed	28.0
<i>Libia</i> , "	Protect'd Crus'r	1913	3,800	designed	6-4.7"
<i>Agordat</i> , "	Torpedo Gunb't	1900	1,313	designed	2-6"; 8-4.7"
<i>Sardegna</i> , 7th Division	Armored Ship	1890	13,860	designed	2-4.7"; 2-14" above water torpedo tubes
<i>Marco Polo</i> , "	Battleship	1895	4,583	designed	4-old 13.5"; 8-old 6"; 16-4.7"
<i>Carlo Alberto</i> , "	"	1898	6,500	designed	6-6"; 4-4.7"
		Refit. 1904		18.0	12-6"; 6-4.7"

ITALIAN FLEET (Continued) — DESTROYERS — JUNE 1915

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
3 A. Poerio Class	Destroyer	1914	1,030	30.0 designed	4-18" torpedo tubes
1 F. Nullo Class	"	1914	770	30.0 designed	4-18" " "
2 Ardito Class	"	1913	686	30.0 designed	2-18" " "
2 Animoso Class	"	1913	700	30.0 designed	4-18" " "
6 Indomito Class	"	1913	686	30.0 designed	2-18" " "
1 Ascaro Class	"	1913	398	29.0 designed	3-18" " "
10 Artigliere Class	"	1907-10	380	28.5 designed	3-18" " "
6 Nembro Class	"	1903	330	30.0 designed	4-18" " "
5 Lampo Class	"	1902	320	30.0 designed	2-18" " "
1 Fulmine Class	"	1899	298	28.0 designed	3-18" " "

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ITALIAN SHIPS — JUNE 1915

<i>Sicilia</i>	Old Armored Ship	1896	13,375	20.0 designed	4-old 13.5"; 5-above water torpedo tubes
<i>Re Umberto</i>	Old Armored Ship	1887	13,251	20.0 designed	4-old 13.5"; 5-above water torpedo tubes

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Dandolo</i>	Old Armored Ship	1882	12,265	15.5 designed	4-10"; 7-6"; 4-above water torpedo tubes
<i>Italia</i> (Torpedo School Ship).....	Old Armored Ship	1880	15,654	17.0 designed	8-old 6"; 4-old 4.7"; (4 old 100 ton)
<i>Puglia</i> (Minelayer).....	Protected Cruiser	1901	2,538	19.5 designed	6-4.7"
<i>Calabria</i>	Protected Cruiser	1897	2,492	16.0 designed	4-6"
<i>Elba</i> (Balloon Ship).....	Protected Cruiser	1895	2,730	19.5 designed	6-4.7"
<i>Lombardia</i> (Submarine Depot Ship).....	Protected Cruiser	1893	2,280	19.5 designed	6-4.7"
<i>Etruria</i>	Protected Cruiser	1894	2,280	19.5 designed	6-4.7"
<i>Liguria</i> (Minelayer).....	Protected Cruiser	1894	2,280	19.5 designed	6-4.7"
<i>Piemonte</i>	Protected Cruiser	1889	2,650	23.0 designed	10-4.7"
<i>Etna</i> (Cadet Training Ship).....	Protected Cruiser	1887	3,530	17.0 designed	2-6"
<i>Giovanni Bausan</i>	Protected Cruiser	1885	3,330	17.5 designed	2-old 10"; 4-6"
<i>Coatit</i> (Minelayer).....	Torpedo Gunboat	1900	1,313	23.0 designed	2-4.7"; 2-14" above water torpedo tubes
<i>Minerva</i> (Minelayer).....	Torpedo Gunboat	1892	940	19.0 designed	6-above water torpedo tubes
<i>Partenope</i> (Minelayer).....	Torpedo Gunboat	1890	834	22.0 designed	6-above water torpedo tubes

ITALIAN SHIPS — (Continued)

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Iride</i> (Minelayer)	Torpedo Gunboat	1892	916	22.0 designed	6-above water torpedo tubes
<i>Montebello</i> (Minelayer)	Torpedo Gunboat	1889	860	20.0 designed	3-above water torpedo tubes
<i>Goito</i> (Minelayer)	Torpedo Gunboat	1888	840	20.0 designed	3-above water torpedo tubes
<i>Tripoli</i> (Minelayer)	Torpedo Gunboat	1886	840	20.0 designed	3-above water torpedo tubes

TORPEDO BOATS — JUNE 1915

60 Sea-Going Class	Torpedo Boat	1905-12	120-220	25.0- 26.0	2 to 3-18" torpedo tubes
5 1st Class	" "	1888-1907	136-162	22.5- 25.5 (Max)	2 to 3-18" torpedo tubes
14 2d Class	" "	1886-95	79	20.0 (Max)	2-14" torpedo tubes
6 3d Class	" "	1882-87	39	21.0 (Max)	2-14" torpedo tubes
85					

SUBMARINES

21	Submarine	1890-1914	95-250 107-300	9-18 6-14	2-torpedo tubes — one had 1 torpedo tube
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APPENDIX

AUSTRALIAN FLEET, PACIFIC AREA — 1914

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Australia</i>	Battle Cruiser	1913	19,200	25.0 designed	8-12"
<i>Sydney</i>	Light Cruiser	1913	5,400	24.75 designed	8-6"
<i>Melbourne</i>	"	1913	5,400	24.75 designed	8-6"
<i>Encounter</i>	"	1902	5,900	20.0 designed	11-6"
<i>Pioneer</i>	"	1899	2,200	16.0	8-4"
<i>Yarra</i>	Destroyer	1909-11	700	26.0 designed	1-4"; 3-18" torpedo tubes
<i>Parramatta</i>	"	1909-11	700	26.0 designed	1-4" torpedo tube
<i>Warrago</i>	"	1909-11	700	26.0 designed	1-4" torpedo tube
<i>Protector</i> (Parent Ship).....	Cruiser	1884	920	14.0 designed	1-0ld 8"; 5-6"
<i>AE-1</i> and <i>AE-2</i>	Submarines	1912	725	16.0 designed	4 torpedo tubes

NEW ZEALAND SQUADRON, PACIFIC AREA — 1914

<i>Psyche</i>	Light Cruiser	1900	2,135	20.5 designed	8-4"
<i>Philomel</i>	"	1891	2,575	16.5 designed	8-4.7"
<i>Pyramus</i>	"	1900	2,135	17.0 designed	8-4"

JAPANESE NAVY — APRIL 1914

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Kongo</i>	Battle Cruiser	1913	27,500	27.0 designed	8-14"; 16-6"
<i>Hiei</i>	"	1914	27,500	27.0 designed	8-14"; 16-6"
<i>Kawachi</i>	Battleship	1912	21,420	20.0 designed	12-12"; 10-6"
<i>Settsu</i>	"	1913	21,420	20.0 designed	12-12"; 10-6"
<i>Aki</i>	"	1911	19,800	20.7 designed	4-12"; 12-10"; 8-6"
<i>Satsuma</i>	"	1910	19,370	18.25 designed	4-12"; 12-10"; 12-4.7"
<i>Kashima</i>	"	1906	16,400	19.2	4-12"; 4-10"; 12-6"
<i>Katori</i>	"	1906	16,400	20.2	4-12"; 4-10"; 12-6"
<i>Iwami</i>	"	1904	13,566	18.0	4-12"; 6-8" (Reconstructed 1907)
<i>Mikasa</i>	"	1902	15,200	18.6	4-12"; 14-6" (Reconstructed 1907-08)
<i>Hizen</i>	"	1902	12,700	18.8	4-12"; 12-6" (Reconstructed 1907-08)
<i>Asahi</i>	"	1901	15,200	18.3	4-12"; 14-6"
<i>Shikishima</i>	"	1900	15,200	18.8	4-12"; 14-6"
<i>Sagami</i>	"	1901	13,500	18.3	4-10"; 10-6"
<i>Suwo</i>	"	1902	13,500	19.1	4-10"; 10-6"
<i>Fuji</i>	"	1896	12,300	15.0	4-12"; 10-6"
<i>Kurama</i> , Used as Battle Cruiser.....	"	1910	14,600	21.25 designed	4-12"; 8-8"; 14-4.7"

APPENDIX

Ships		Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Ibuki</i> , Used as Battle Cruiser		Battleship	1909	14,600	22.0	4-12"; 8-8"; 14-4.7"
<i>Iitoma</i>	"	"	1907	13,750	20.5 designed	4-12"; 12-6"; 12-4.7"
<i>Tsububa</i>	"	"	1907	13,750	20.5	4-12"; 12-6"; 12-4.7"
<i>Nissitai</i>	"	Armored Cruiser	1904	7,750	18.5	4-8"; 14-6"
<i>Kasuga</i>	"	"	1904	7,750	19.8	4-8"; 14-6"
<i>Aso</i>	"	"	1901	7,800	21.0 designed	2-8"; 8-6"
<i>Iwate</i>	"	"	1901	9,800	21.5	4-8"; 14-6" (Refit 1906)
<i>Idzumo</i>	"	"	1901	9,800	20.5	4-8"; 14-6"
<i>Adjuma</i>	"	"	Program 1899	9,456	20.0 designed	4-8"; 12-6"
<i>Yakamo</i>	"	"	1901	9,850	20.0	4-8"; 12-6"
<i>Asama</i>	"	"	Program 1898	9,750	19.0	4-8"; 14-6"
<i>Tokawa</i>	"	"	Program 1898	9,750	21.5 designed	4-8"; 14-6"
<i>Hirato</i>	"	Cruiser	1912	5,040	26.0 designed	6-6"
<i>Yahagi</i>	"	"	1912	5,040	26.0 designed	6-6"
<i>Chikuma</i>	"	"	1912	5,040	26.0 designed	6-6"
<i>Tone</i>	"	"	1909	4,105	23.0 designed	2-6"; 12-4.7"
<i>Clouva</i>	"	"	Program 1903	3,000	21.0 designed	2-6"; 6-4.7"

JAPANESE NAVY — (Continued)

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Tsushima</i>	Cruiser	1902	3,420	20.0 designed	6-6"
<i>Niitaka</i>	"	1902	3,420	20.0 designed	6-6"
<i>Soya</i>	"	1901	6,500	23.0 designed	12-6"
<i>Tsugaru</i>	"	1902	6,630	18.0	8-6"
<i>Chitose</i>	"	1899	4,760	23.0	2-8"; 10-4.7" Refit 1905
<i>Kasagi</i>	"	1899	4,760	22.0	2-8"; 10-4.7" Refit 1904
<i>Akashi</i>	"	Program 1897	2,700	20.0 designed	2-6"; 6-4.7"
<i>Suma</i>	"	Program 1897	2,700	20.0 designed	2-6"; 6-4.7"
2 <i>Sakura Class</i>	"	1913	605	30.0	4-18" torpedo tubes
2 <i>Umikaze Class</i>	"	1911	1,100	32.0 designed	4-18" " "
34 <i>Arare Class</i>	"	1905-08	380	29.0 designed	2-18" " "
4 <i>Asashio Class</i>	"	1901-04	365	31.0 designed	2-18" " "

APPENDIX

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
2 Akebono Class.....	Cruiser	1897-1900	306	31.0 designed	2-18" torpedo tubes
5 Kagero Class.....	"	1897-1900	275	30.0 designed	"
1 Yamabiko Class.....	"	1900-02	303	27.0 designed	"
16 Hayabusa 1st Class.....	Torpedo Boat	1900-04	150	28.0 designed	"
13 2d Class.....	"	1901-02	89	24.0 designed	"
14 Submarines.....	Submarine	1904-14	(average) 85-520	9/7 to 17.5/9	1-6
4 Coast defense battleships	} Practically no Military value				
2 Depot Ships					
1 old cruiser					
4 old light cruisers					
9 Gunboats					
2 Despatch Boats					
1 Surveying Ship					



APPENDIX B

LETTER OF ADMIRAL JELLCOE TO THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY, AND THE WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE ADMIRALTY, DEFINING THE "CONDUCT OF THE FLEET IN ACTION."

No. 339/H. F. 0034.

"IRON DUKE," 30th October, 1914

SIR,

The experience gained of German methods since the commencement of the war makes it possible and very desirable to consider the manner in which these methods are likely to be made use of tactically in a fleet action.

2. The Germans have shown that they rely to a very great extent on submarines, mines and torpedoes, and there can be no doubt whatever that they will endeavour to make the fullest use of these weapons in a fleet action, especially since they possess an actual superiority over us in these particular directions.

3. It therefore becomes necessary to consider our own tactical methods in relation to these forms of attack.

4. In the first place, it is evident that the Germans cannot rely with certainty upon having their full complement of submarines and minelayers present in a fleet action, unless the battle is fought in waters selected by them, and in the Southern area of the North Sea. Aircraft, also, could only be brought into action in this locality.

5. My object will therefore be to fight the fleet action in the Northern portion of the North Sea, which position is incidentally nearer our own bases, giving our wounded ships a chance to reach them, whilst it ensures the final destruction or capture of enemy wounded vessels, and greatly handicaps

a night destroyer attack before or after a fleet action. The Northern area is also favourable to a concentration of our cruisers and torpedo craft with the battlefleet; such concentration on the part of the enemy being always possible, since he will choose a time for coming out when all his ships are coaled and ready in all respects to fight.

6. Owing to the necessity that exists for keeping our cruisers at sea, it is probable that many will be short of coal when the opportunity for a fleet action arises, and they might be unable to move far to the Southward for this reason.

7. The presence of a large force of cruisers is most necessary, for observation and for screening the battlefleet, so that the latter may be manœuvred into any desired position behind the cruiser screen. This is a strong additional reason for fighting in the Northern area.

8. Secondly, it is necessary to consider what may be termed the tactics of the actual battlefield.

The German submarines, if worked as is expected with the battlefleet, can be used in one of two ways:—

- (a) With the cruisers, or possibly with destroyers.
- (b) With the battlefleet.

In the first case the submarines would probably be led by the cruisers to a position favourable for attacking our battlefleet as it advanced to deploy, and in the second case they might be kept in a position in rear, or to the flank, of the enemy's battlefleet, which would move in the direction required to draw our own Fleet into contact with the submarines.

9. The first move at (a) should be defeated by our own cruisers, provided we have a sufficient number present, as they should be able to force the enemy's cruisers to action at a speed which would interfere with submarine tactics.

The cruisers must, however, have destroyers in company to assist in dealing with the submarines, and should be well in advance of the battlefleet; hence the necessity for numbers.

10. The second move at (b) can be countered by judicious handling of our battlefleet, but may, and probably will, involve a refusal to comply with the enemy's tactics by moving in the invited direction. If, for instance, the enemy battlefleet were to turn away from an advancing Fleet, I should assume that the intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, *and should decline to be so drawn*.

11. I desire particularly to draw the attention of their Lordships to this point, since it may be deemed a refusal of battle, and, indeed, might possibly result in failure to bring the enemy to action as soon as is expected and hoped.

12. Such a result would be absolutely repugnant to the feelings of all British Naval Officers and men, but with new and untried methods of warfare new tactics must be devised to meet them.

I feel that such tactics, if not understood, may bring odium upon me, but so long as I have the confidence of their Lordships I intend to pursue what is, in my considered opinion, the proper course to defeat and annihilate the enemy's battlefleet, without regard to uninstructed opinion or criticism.

13. The situation is a difficult one. It is quite within the bounds of possibility that half of our battlefleet might be disabled by under-water attack before the guns opened fire at all, if a false move is made, and I feel that I must constantly bear in mind the great probability of such attack and be prepared tactically to prevent its success.

14. The safeguard against submarines will consist in moving the battlefleet at very high speed to a flank before deployment takes place or the gun action commences.

This will take us off the ground on which the enemy desires to fight, but it may, of course, result in his refusal to follow me.

If the battlefleets remain within sight of one another, though not near the original area, the limited submerged radius of action and speed of the submarines will prevent the submarines from following without coming to the surface,

and I should feel that after an interval of high-speed manœuvring, I could safely close.

15. The object of this letter is to place my views before their Lordships, and to direct their attention to the alterations in pre-conceived ideas of battle tactics which are forced upon us by the anticipated appearance in a fleet action of submarines and minelayers.

16. There can be no doubt that the fullest use will also be made by the enemy of surface torpedo craft.

This point has been referred to in previous letters to their Lordships, and, so long as the whole of the First Fleet Flotillas are with the Fleet, the hostile destroyers will be successfully countered and engaged.

The necessity for attaching some destroyers to the Cruiser Squadrons, alluded to in paragraph 9, emphasizes the necessity for the junction of the 1st and 3d Flotillas with the Fleet before a fleet action takes place.

17. It will, however, be very desirable that *all* available ships and torpedo craft should be ordered to the position of the fleet action as soon as it is known to be imminent, as the presence of even Third Fleet Vessels after the action or towards its conclusion may prove of great assistance in rendering the victory shattering and complete.

The Channel Fleet should be accompanied by as many destroyers, drawn from the Dover or Coast patrols, as can be spared.

I trust that their Lordships will give the necessary orders on the receipt of information from me of an impending fleet action.

18. In the event of a fleet action being imminent, or, indeed, as soon as the High Sea Fleet is known to be moving Northward, it is most desirable that a considerable number of our oversea submarines should proceed towards the Fleet, getting first on the line between the Germans and Heligoland in order to intercept them when returning. The German Fleet would probably arrange its movements so as to pass

Heligoland at dusk when coming out and at dawn when returning, in order to minimise submarine risk. The opportunity for submarine attack in the Heligoland Bight would not therefore be very great, and from four to six submarines would be the greatest number that could be usefully employed there. The remainder, accompanied by one or two light cruisers, taken, if necessary, from the Dover patrol, should work up towards the position of the fleet, the light cruisers keeping in wireless touch with me.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. R. JELlicoe, *Admiral*.

The Secretary of the Admiralty.

M. 03177/14

ADMIRALTY, 7th November, 1914

SIR,

I have laid before My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 30th ultimo, No. 339/H. F. 0034, and I am commanded by them to inform you that they approve your views, as stated therein, and desire to assure you of their full confidence in your contemplated conduct of the Fleet in action.

2. My Lords will, as desired, give orders for all available Ships and Torpedo Craft to proceed to the position of the Fleet Action on learning from you that it is imminent.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

The Commander-in-Chief,
H. M. Ships and Vessels,
Home Fleets.

APPENDIX C

DEVELOPMENT OF THE BLOCKADE OF THE CONFEDERACY, IN THE CIVIL WAR 1861-1865, WHICH HAD ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AFTERWARDS USED IN THE WORLD WAR. FROM THE AUTHOR'S "GUIDE TO THE MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR."

For the Federals on the sea the hardest task was the blockade of the Confederate coast. Blockades had been used before in warfare, and the status of a blockade was well defined.¹ But what the United States Navy accomplished was no "cabinet blockade," but an effective blockade such as had never been seen.

Here was one of the longest coast lines in the world, where harbors and inlets gave every advantage to the blockade runner. The United States Navy had not ships enough to carry out the task, but, with characteristic energy, all kinds of craft were utilized. The steamer *Circassian*, one of the most valuable prizes of the war, was actually captured by a Fulton ferryboat. At first the blockade was *de facto*, as different portions of the coast were policed and notified of the blockade, but in an astonishingly short time the long coast line was effectively hemmed in. "As to the legal efficiency of the blockade after the first six months there can be no question."²

This was only the beginning of the undertaking. Great profits offered inducements to blockade runners. After the blockade became stringent and ships were being constantly seized on the high seas, attempts were made to evade capture

¹ "A blockade to be legal must be effective." — Declaration of Paris, 1856.

² Professor J. R. Soley, U. S. N.

by clearing for one of the available neutral ports, touching there, and then trying to run into a Confederate port.

Bermuda, Nassau, Havana, and Matamoras were these ports, of which Nassau was much the most active. The idea was that the claim of neutral destination would protect the ship for most of its voyage, and it would be in danger only in the short run between the neutral port and the Southern port.

This practice proved easy to stop, as the character of cargo and evidence of final destination brought condemnation in the courts. This evidence was most difficult in the case of Matamoras, the only town of importance on the Confederate southern border; but so general became the forfeiture of ships and cargoes that some other evasion was necessary.

The next scheme tried was clearance for the neutral ports, and then trans-shipment at the neutral port. The return cargoes were to be handled in the same way. "But here again the courts stepped in, and held that though a trans-shipment was made, even after landing the cargo and going through a form of sale, the two voyages were parts of one and the same transaction, and the cargo from the outset was liable to condemnation, if the original intention had been to forward the goods to a blockaded port. Nor did the decision stop here. As all property, both ship and cargo, is confiscated, upon proof of breach of blockade, it was held that ships carrying on this traffic to neutral ports were confiscable, provided the ultimate destination of the cargo to a blockaded port was known to the owner. In the words of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 'The ships are planks of the same bridge.'" ¹

The last resort of the blockade runners was most ingenious: to break the voyage by shipping to a Federal port, then to a neutral port, then to the Confederate port. Goods were shipped to New York by regular steamship lines, thence to Nassau, to be sent to the South. This was ended, when it was

¹ Professor J. R. Soley, U. S. N.

observed that trade with Nassau and Bermuda was abnormal, by orders issued to the collectors of customs to refuse clearance to vessels whose cargoes were in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, and to require owners to give ample security where there was ground for apprehension that cargoes were destined for the enemy's use.

These orders were general and named no particular ports. Yet the "merchants of Nassau" complained of this "unjust discrimination" and persuaded Earl Russell to take up the subject diplomatically. The correspondence that followed showed so plainly that "the trade of the Bahamas" was blockade running, that the British Government "derived little satisfaction," and the traffic was ended.

Thus were overcome difficulties, physical and legal, that seemed insuperable. The amount of harm done to the South by these perfected blockading tactics cannot be estimated.

This well-established case of successful legal blockading tactics was at the command of the British Government at the outbreak of this war. Enforcement of a legal blockade against the Teutonic Allies would have been very difficult, but if the British had proclaimed such a blockade at the outset, they could have attempted to build up their case on the case already established. Such a policy at the start might not have caused undue friction among the neutral nations.

Instead of this, Great Britain attempted to keep goods from the Teutonic Allies by using her command of the sea, and by proclaiming an increasing list of contrabands, and "war areas" in the North Sea. It is now recognized that this method was a mistake, especially the "war area" policy, which gave Germany the chance to play the same game, and Great Britain later imitated our Civil War blockade.

APPENDIX D

PLAN SUBMITTED BY VICE-ADMIRAL CARDEN FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE DARDANELLES BY THE USE OF NAVAL FORCES ALONE. THIS IS THE TEXT IN FULL. ONLY A SUMMARY WAS GIVEN IN THE REPORT OF THE DARDANELLES COMMISSION. WITH THIS PLAN ARE TABLES OF THE ALLIED NAVAL FORCES AT THE DARDANELLES.

Vice-Admiral Carden to Admiralty

January 11, 1915

FOR FIRST LORD:

In reply to your telegram of 6th instant.

Reference to Naval Intelligence Department report No. 838, Turkey Coast Defence, 1908. Possibility of operations:

(A) Total reduction of defences at the entrance.

(B) Clear defences inside of Straits up to and including Kephez Point Battery No. 8.

(C) Reduction of defences at the Narrows, Chanak.

(D) Clear passage through minefield, advancing through Narrows, reducing forts above Narrows, and final advance to Marmora.

Term defences includes permanent, semi-permanent, and field works, also guns or howitzers whose positions are not yet known.

Whilst (A) and (B) are being carried out, a battleship force would be employed in demonstration and bombardment of Bulair lines and coast and reduction of battery near Gaba Tepe. Force required, 12 battleships, of which 4 fitted with mine-bumpers. Three battle-cruisers, — 2 should be available on entering Marmora, — 3 light cruisers, 1 flotilla

leader, 16 destroyers, 1 depot repairing ship, 6 submarines, 4 seaplanes, and the *Foudre*, 12 mine-sweepers, including, perhaps, 4 fleet sweepers, 1 hospital ship, 6 colliers at Tenedos Island, 2 supply and ammunition ships. The above force allows for casualties.

Details of action:

Frequent reconnaissance by seaplanes indispensable.

(A) In direct bombardment of forts, reduction completed by direct bombardment at decisive range; torpedo tubes at the entrance and guns commanding minefield destroyed; minefield cleared.

(B) Battleships, preceded by mine-sweepers, enter Straits, working way up till position reached from which battery No. 8 can be silenced.

(C) Severe bombardment of forts by battle-cruisers from Gaba Tepe spotted from battleships; reduction completed by direct fire at decisive range.

(D) Battleships, preceded by sweepers, making way up towards Narrows. Forts 22, 23, 24 first bombarded from Gaba Tepe, spotting for 22 by seaplanes, then direct fire. Sweep minefields in Narrows, the fort at Nagara reduced by direct fire, battle force proceeds to Marmora preceded by mine-sweepers.

Expenditure on ammunition for (C) would be large, but if supplies sufficient, result should be successful. Difficulty as to (B) greatly increased if *Goeben* assisting defence from Nagara. It would, unless submarine attacks successful, necessitate employment of battle-cruisers from Gaba Tepe or direct.

Time required for operations depends greatly on *moral* of enemy under bombardment; garrison largely stiffened by the Germans; also on the weather conditions. Gales now frequent. Might do it all in a month about.

Expenditure of ammunition would be large. Approximate estimate of quantity required being prepared.

Disposition of squadron on completion of operations:
Marmora, 2 battle-cruisers, 4 battleships, 3 light cruisers,
1 flotilla leader, 12 torpedo-boat destroyers, 3 submarines,
1 supply and ammunition ship, 4 mine-sweepers, collier.

Remainder of force keeping Straits open and covering
mine-sweepers completing clearing minefield.

BRITISH FORCES AT THE DARDANELLES, FEBRUARY, 1915

Ships	Classification	Completed	Displacement	Speed	Armament
<i>Agamemnon</i>	Battleship	1907	16,500	18.9	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Albion</i>	"	1902	12,950	18.0	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Canopus</i>	"	1900	12,950	16.5	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Cornwallis</i>	"	1904	14,000	20.0	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Irresistible</i>	"	1902	15,000	18.5	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Lord Nelson</i>	"	1908	16,500	19.0	4-12"; 10-9.2"
<i>Majestic</i>	"	1895	14,900	16.8	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Prince George</i>	"	1896	14,900	17.0	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Queen Elizabeth</i>	"	1914	27,500	25.0 (designed)	8-15"
<i>Triumph</i>	"	1901	11,500	19.3	4-10"; 14-7.5"
<i>Vengeance</i>	"	1901	12,950	18.0	4-12"; 12-6"
<i>Amethyst</i>	Light Cruiser	1904	3,000	20.0	12-4"; 12-6"
<i>Dartmouth</i>	"	1911	5,250	25.0	8-6"
<i>Dublin</i>	"	1912	5,400	25.0	8-6"
<i>Sapphire</i>	"	1905	3,000	22.0	12-4"
<i>Ark Royal</i>	Aircraft Carrier	1911	7,450	11.0
<i>Hussar</i>	Gunboat	1894	1,070	17.0	1-4"; 5 torpedo tubes
<i>Blenheim</i> (with destroyers)	Depot Ship	1890	9,000	21.0 (designed)	4-6"
16 Destroyers <i>Beagle</i> and River Class	Destroyer G-Class	1910	860-950	27.0	2 torpedo tubes
<i>Inferible</i>	Battle Cruiser	1908	17,250	28.4	8-12"; 16-4"
21 Mine-Sweeping Trawlers — 3
7 Submarines

FRENCH FORCES AT THE DARDANELLES, FEBRUARY, 1915

<i>Suffren</i>	Battleship	1903	12,750	16.0	4-12"; 10-6.4"
<i>Bouvet</i>	"	1898	12,205	17.0 (designed)	2-12"; 2-10.8"; 8-5.5"
<i>Gaulois</i>	"	1899	11,260	18.2	4-12"; 10-5.5"
<i>Charlemagne</i>	"	1899	11,260	18.1	4-12"; 10-5.5"
2 Submarines

APPENDIX E

TABLE OF DATES OF THE WORLD WAR

1914

JUNE

28. Assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, Duchess of Hohenberg, at Sarajevo, by a Serbian student named Gavrio Prinzep.

JULY

5. Council at Potsdam.
6. *Goeben* ordered to Pola.
7. Admiral Spee, at Truk, ordered to "await developments."
10. Operation orders issued for British Home Fleet to assemble at Portland for manœuvres.
11. Admiral Spee received dispatch, "England probably hostile."
15. Admiral Spee sailed for Ponape.
16. British Home Fleet assembled at Portland.
17. Admiral Spee at Ponape.
23. Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia.
25. Serbia conceded all demands, except Austrian participation in investigation of murder. Austro-Hungarian reply that answer was unsatisfactory, and Ambassador left Belgrade.
Dresden and *Karlsruhe* at Port au Prince.
26. British Fleet ordered not to disperse after the manœuvres.
27. Russia gave assurances to Serbia, and Great Britain appealed for a conference for mediation.

28. Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia.
29. Bombardment of Belgrade.
 Russia mobilizing troops.
 British "Warning Telegram" sent out.
 British Fleet at sea.
30. Admiral Milne at Malta.
 Karlsruhe put to sea from Havana.
31. German ultimatum to Russia.
 Russian mobilization ordered.
 Dresden put to sea from Port au Prince.
 Königsberg put to sea from Dar-es-Salaam.

AUGUST

1. Germany declared war against Russia. Mobilization ordered.
 French mobilization ordered.
 Goeben and *Breslau* at Pola.
2. Assurance given by Great Britain of naval assistance to protect the French coast.
 Germany demanded passage of troops through Belgium.
3. Germany declared war against France.
 Belgium refused passage for German troops.
- 3-4. Germany declared war against Belgium. German troops invaded Belgium.
 Germany seized neutral Luxemburg.
 Italy proclaimed neutrality.
4. Germans attacking Liège.
 Great Britain declared war against Germany.
 Serbians defeated invading Austrians.
 Admiral Jellicoe took command of British Grand Fleet, which put to sea. Mobilization ordered.
 Goeben and *Breslau* bombarded Bona and Philippeville.
 French Fleet at sea to convoy troops.

German minelayer *Königin Luise* left port to lay mines.

German commerce destroyer *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* put to sea.

5. Lord Kitchener War Secretary for Great Britain.

Königin Luise sunk.

Austria-Hungary declared war against Russia.

Goeben and *Breslau* at Messina.

6. *Goeben* and *Breslau* escaped from Messina.

British cruiser *Amphion* sunk by mines.

First tentative sortie of ten German U-boats.

Karlsruhe escaped from Admiral Cradock's Squadron.

Admiral Spee sailed for secret base at Pagan Island.

Naval pact between France and Great Britain.

Emden and attendants escaped from Tsingtau.

- 7-10. City of Liége evacuated by the Germans. Some of the forts still held out.

French in Alsace-Lorraine.

Russians in East Prussia.

French troops being transported from Africa.

British Expeditionary Force prepared for transport to France.

10. *Goeben* and *Breslau* safe in the Dardanelles.

- 11-15. Admiral Spee's whole squadron, with attendants, concentrated at Pagan Island; and sailed for coast of South America, leaving *Emden* to destroy commerce. Reduction of the last of the Liége forts.

17. Germans in Louvain. Belgian Government in Antwerp.

Announcement of British Expeditionary Force on the Continent.

19. Admiral Spee at Eniwetok.

20. Russians in Gumbinnen, East Prussia.

Brussels occupied by the Germans.

Bombardment of Namur begun.

French repulsed in Alsace-Lorraine.

- 22-23. Germans in Namur.
 Battles of Charleroi and Mons. Allies in retreat.
 Austrians driven out of Serbia.
23. Japan declared war against Germany.
- 24-31. Period of Great German Offensive against France,
 Allied Armies retreating before the supposedly victori-
 ous advance of the Germans.
 Battle of Tannenberg; complete defeat of Russian in-
 vasion of East Prussia (August 26-30).
 Russians advancing in Galicia.
 Togoland surrendered to Great Britain. Samoa taken
 by New Zealand Expedition.
 Naval action in Heligoland Bight (August 28).
 British Base changed to St. Nazaire at threat of Ger-
 man invasion.
 Admiral Spee at the Marshall Islands (August 26-30).
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse sunk by H. M. S. *Highflyer*
 (August 27).

SEPTEMBER

- 1-10. Period of the defeat of the German "Dry Land" Offense;
 Battle of the Marne (September 6-10).
 French Government at Bordeaux (September 2).
 Austro-Hungarian defeat at Battle of Lemberg
 (September 1-3).
 Japanese first landing against Tsingtau (September 2).
 Admiral Spee at Christmas Island (September 6);
 cable station at Fanning Island destroyed (Septem-
 ber 7).
 Paet of London (September 5): Triple Entente Powers
 agreed not to make separate peace.
Emden in Bay of Bengal.
12. Germans made good their retreat to intrenched line of
 the Aisne. Ensuing vain attempts to dislodge them
 (Battle of the Aisne).

14. Confusion in naval plans caused by news of Admiral Spee at Samoa and the *Emden's* commerce destroying cruise.
German armed steamer *Cap Trafalgar* sunk by *Carmania*.
15. End of Battle of Masurian Lakes and of the Russian invasion of East Prussia.
Surrender of German New Guinea to Admiral Patey.
German counter attacks on the Aisne after failure of the Allies to dislodge the German Armies. Both sides intrenching on this line.
22. Przemysl invested by Russians.
German U-9 sunk British cruisers *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, and *Hogue*.
Russians captured Jaroslau in Galicia.
Admiral Spee bombarded Papeete (Tahiti).
23. Germans took St. Mihiel.
27. Beginning of attack on Antwerp.

OCTOBER

- 1-8. Quick reduction of Antwerp forts by bombardment.
British Marine Brigade in Antwerp (October 6).
Transfer of British Army to Flanders begun.
7. Marshall Islands occupied by Japanese.
9. Germans entered Antwerp.
13. British advance toward Lille.
14. Advance of Hindenburg toward Warsaw, which caused Russians to raise the siege of Przemysl.
Admiral Spee's whole squadron at rendezvous at Easter Island.
15. British cruiser *Hawke* sunk by U-boat.
16. Germans occupied Ostend and Zeebrugge.
Battle of the Yser begun.
17. Four old type German destroyers sunk while attempting to lay mines.

German minelayer *Berlin* started on cruise to lay mines.

Three British monitors as support for Belgians at the Yser.

Grand Fleet bases transferred to Lough Swilly and Loch-na-Keal at U-boat menace.

18. Admiral Spee left Easter Island for Chilean coast.

19. British Army all in Flanders, and Allied line complete to the North Sea.

20. First Battle of Ypres begun.

 Hindenburg in retreat from Warsaw.

20. Two British submarines passed into Baltic, and were inactive at Russian base.

21. S. S. *Crefield* reached Teneriffe with crews of thirteen vessels captured or sunk by the *Karlsruhe*.

22. Admiral Jellicoe at Lough Swilly. Military convoys diverted to Liverpool.

27-31. British hard pressed at Ypres.

 Belgians repulsed Germans at the Yser by inundating the country.

 Dutch rebellion of De Wet and Byers in South Africa.

27. British dreadnought *Audacious* sunk by one of the mines laid by *Berlin*.

29. Lord Fisher First Sea Lord of the Admiralty; Turkey in the war on side of Central Powers.

30. *Königsberg* discovered and blockaded in Rufiji River, East Africa.

NOVEMBER

1. British naval defeat, off Coronel, by Admiral Spee's Squadron.

1-17. British reinforced by French at Battle of Ypres, and the line was held. Russians again advanced in Galicia.

2. Admiralty proclaimed North Sea a military area.

3. German naval raid off Gorleston.

 Conference at British Admiralty, at which Lord Fisher's

building program for the Pomeranian project was adopted.

Admiral Jellicoe left Lough Swilly and returned to Seapa.

Futile bombardment of outer Dardanelles forts by Allied warships.

4. British battle cruisers, *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, under command of Admiral Sturdee, given secret orders to seek out Admiral Spee's Squadron in South American waters.

Karlsruhe destroyed at sea by internal explosion.

7. Tsingtau captured by the Japanese.
8. *Geier* interned at Honolulu.
9. *Emden* destroyed by H.M.A.S. *Sydney* off Cocos Island.
11. Admiral Sturdee left port on his cruise to seek Admiral Spee.

De Wet rebels routed by Gen. Botha.

16. German minelayer *Berlin* interned at Trondjem, Norway.
17. Admiral Sturdee at St. Vincent, Cape Verde.
21. Admiral Spee's Squadron at St. Quintin Bay, southern Chile.
26. H.M.S. *Bulwark* blown up by internal explosion in port.
Admiral Spee left St. Quintin Bay for trip around Cape Horn.
28. Admiral Sturdee left St. Vincent with united Squadron for the Falkland Islands.

DECEMBER

1. De Wet captured in South Africa, followed by collapse of the rebellion.
- 2-15. Defeat of Austrian invasion of Serbia. Austrians in Belgrade December 2, but routed in Battle of the Ridges and driven from Serbia.

Russian defeats in region of Lotz, and renewed Austro-German attack on Warsaw.

8. Naval victory of Admiral Sturdee at Falkland Islands.
10. French Government returned to Paris from Bordeaux.
11. *Goeben* in Black Sea, bombarding Batoum.
16. German naval raid, and bombardment of Hartlepool, Whitby, and Scarborough.
20. Order to assemble a naval force at Rosyth, "more closely into the anti-invasion system."
24. First German air raid on England.
25. Second German air raid on England.
British Fleet in support of unsuccessful air-raid on Cuxhaven.
28. Failure of Austro-German attempt to take Warsaw.
29. Battle begun between Russians and Turks in the Caucasus.

1915

JANUARY

- 1-4. Turkish disaster in the Caucasus.
 1. H.M.S. *Formidable* torpedoed in the Channel.
 3. Telegram to Russian Government that the British Government "was pledged to make a demonstration against the Turks." On same date a telegram was sent to Admiral Carden asking whether it would be possible "to force the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone."
11. Plan for reduction of Dardanelles defenses by naval forces sent by Admiral Carden.
13. British War Council's decision for "a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula."
24. Naval action, the Dogger Bank chase, as result of German raid against British coast.
28. Meeting of British War Council, which confirmed the decision for the naval attack on the Dardanelles. American merchant ship *William P. Frye* sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* (afterwards damage adjusted by German Government).

FEBRUARY

- 1-8. Feeble Turkish attack on Suez Canal utterly defeated.
- 7-12. Defeat of Russian invasion of East Prussia ("The Winter Battle").
18. German policy of "War Zones" about Great Britain put into effect.
19. First naval attack at Dardanelles.
- 25-26. Second naval attack at Dardanelles.

MARCH

- 1-11. Unsuccessful naval attacks at the Dardanelles.
- 11-12. Unsuccessful British offensive in Flanders; Battle of Neuve Chapelle.
10. *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* put into Newport.
12. Sir Ian Hamilton appointed to the command of the military forces for the Dardanelles.
14. German cruiser *Dresden* sunk off Juan Fernandez.
17. Admiral Carden succeeded in command of the naval forces at the Dardanelles by Admiral de Robeck.
18. Decisive defeat of great naval attack at the Dardanelles.

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